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Abstract

This study examines how leaders of transnational NGOs (TNGOs) across the United States
understand transnational activism and the roles their organizations play in world affairs. Three
roles are identified: alleviation, realization and environmentalism. Analysis suggests that
scholarship in international relations focuses disproportionately on the least common and least
resourceful types of TNGOs and routinely mischaracterizes a small number of highly visible
organizations as exemplary. Leaders‘ perspectives on organizational mission, activities,
autonomy, collaboration, effectiveness and obstacles reveal that the most numerous and
resourceful TNGOs are technocratic agencies favoring a materialistic, ameliorative approach to
transnational activism. Moreover, to the extent that TNGOs exercise ideational power to achieve
sociopolitical change, this power more closely resembles technocratic managerialism than overt
political contention. Insights are derived from a mixed-method analysis of over 200 hours of indepth interviews with top leaders from a diverse sample of 152 TNGOs registered in the United
States.

Keywords: transnational NGOs, transnational activism, elite interviews, mixed-method, finite
mixture modeling, latent class analysis, discrete factor analysis, socially distributed
conceptualizations, mission, activities, autonomy, collaboration, effectiveness, obstacles
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

What is the role of transnational NGOs (TNGOs) in world affairs? Scholars widely recognize the
significance of TNGOs to global politics (Boli & Thomas, 1999b; Checkel, 1997; Martha
Finnemore, 1996; Haas, 1992; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Klotz, 1995; Richard Price, 1998; RisseKappen, 1995; Risse, 2006; Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999). However, scholars also identify an
―NGO theory deficit‖ as disagreement persists over the precise role TNGOs play in the world
system (DeMars, 2005, p. 39).

This debate among scholars of transnational activism can be broadly regarded as a dialectic
between ‗proponents‘ and ‗detractors,‘ as illustrated in table 1.1 (Cox, 1999; DeMars, 2005;
Josselin & Wallace, 2001a). Proponents view TNGOs as agents of a grassroots global civil
society harnessing the ideational power of universal principles to overtly influence political
outcomes (Anheier, 2007; Boli & Thomas, 1999b; Florini, 2004; Glasius, 2002; Hafner-Burton,
2008; Kaldor, 2003; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Lipschutz, 2005; P. Nelson & Dorsey, 2007;
Richard Price, 1998; Risse, 2006; Risse et al., 1999; Struett, 2008; Tarrow, 2005; True &
Mintrom, 2001). Detractors, on the other hand, view TNGOs as agents of state and corporate
power that reproduce hierarchical power relations, perpetuate patterns of beneficiary dependency
and divert public attention from political solutions to ameliorative treatments (Bebbington, 2005;
Berkovitch & Gordon, 2008; Billon, 2006; Cooley & Ron, 2002; DeMars, 2005; Edwards &
Hulme, 1996; Feldman, 1997; Gill, 1995; Halliday, 2001; Jaeger, 2007; Roberts, Jones III, &
Frohling, 2005; Schuller, 2007).
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Table 1.1: TNGO literature
Proponents (thesis)
TNGOs work within civil
society, achieving sociopolitical
transformation

Detractors (antithesis)
TNGOs collaborate with states
and corporations, sustaining the
status quo

Mission and
activity

TNGOs empower constituents
through grassroots mobilization
and information politics

TNGOs create constituent
dependency through direct
service provision

Function

TNGOs politicize issues through
advocacy, addressing underlying
causes

TNGOs depoliticize issues,
diverting attention from causes
to treatments

Sectoral
typicality

Human rights, environmental,
and advocacy organizations are
typical TNGOs

Development, relief, service
delivery and contracting
organizations are typical
TNGOs

Examples

Anheier, 2007; Boli & Thomas,
1999; Florini, 2004; Glasius,
2002; Hafner-Burton, 2008;
Kaldor, 2003; Keck & Sikkink,
1998; Lipschutz, 2005; Nelson
& Dorsey, 2007; Price, 1998;
Risse, 2006; Risse, Ropp, &
Sikkink, 1999; Struett, 2008;
Tarrow, 2005; True & Mintrom,
2001; Warkentin, 2001…

Bebbington, 2005; Berkovitch
and Gordon, 2008; Billon,
2006; Cooley & Ron, 2002;
DeMars, 2005; Edwards &
Hulme, 1996; Feldman 1997;
Gill, 1995; Halliday, 2001;
Jaeger, 2007; Roberts, Jones III,
& Frohling, 2005; Schuller,
2007…

Collaborative
style
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This study explores how leaders—mostly presidents and executive officers—of TNGOs across
the United States understand transnational activism and the roles their organizations play in
world affairs. I analyze leaders‘ insights about organizational mission, activity, collaboration,
autonomy, effectiveness and obstacles.

To minimize prejudice introduced by conventional theoretical demarcations, I study the
perspectives of leaders from a diverse sample of organizations that vary by size, sector and
function (advocacy-service delivery). Leaders‘ organizations are generally headquartered in the
United States while their operations are primarily abroad, so this study offers a US perspective.

Leaders‘ discussions about their organizational missions and activities reveal the specific
strategies they employ to achieve their goals. The distribution of these strategies across
organizations suggests that the most common mode of transnational influence is the least
theorized within international relations scholarship. Leaders also discuss their collaborations
with other NGOs, states, corporations and intergovernmental organizations, revealing divergent
propensities toward independence and interdependence with established state and corporate
interests in the international system. Analysis also discovers the specific strategies TNGO
leaders employ to maintain organizational autonomy under conditions of financial dependence.

Leaders‘ understandings of organizational effectiveness provide additional insights into the
highly routinized and managerial nature of professionalized transnational activism. Also key to
understanding the role of TNGOs in world affairs is an appreciation of the financial and political
obstacles TNGOs confront as they pursue their missions. Leaders adopt an elaborate discourse
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that frames politically contentious activism as technocratic manageralism, and their pragmatic
concerns about funding challenge conventional understandings about the role and function of
TNGOs in world politics.

Finally, a synthetic meta-analysis of leaders‘ organizations paints a complex portrait of the
TNGO sector as informed by the perspectives of TNGO leaders in the United States. Analysis
suggests that the most common and resourceful type of TNGO employs a materialistic,
ameliorative approach to transnational activism and that a small number of highly visible
TNGOs are incorrectly regarded as exemplary transnational actors.

Chapter organization

To understand the role of TNGOs in world affairs, I analyze data from the Transnational NGO
Interview Project at Syracuse University. The data are derived from in-depth, face-to-face
interviews with TNGO leaders from a diverse sample of organizations registered in the United
States. Leaders provide particularly valuable insights because they are highly informed and
specifically empowered to speak on behalf of their organizations. This leadership focus fills an
important gap evident in the literature about organized transnational activism. Extant scholarship
is permeated by observational studies relying on secondary sources (e.g. Boli & Thomas, 1999a)
and in-depth case studies of either single organizations (e.g. Hopgood, 2006) or a small number
of purposively selected organizations (e.g. Cooley & Ron, 2002) reflecting a tradeoff between
scope and depth. By analyzing a large number of leadership perspectives, the Transnational
NGO Interview Project is both in-depth and large-n. I describe the data in detail in chapter two.
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The Transnational NGO Interview Project generated qualitative and quantitative datasets that
reveal how TNGO leaders think about governance, goals, strategies, activities, transnationalism,
effectiveness, accountability, communications, collaboration and leadership. The mixed-method
research design allows statistical analysis to be grounded in qualitative evidence, facilitating
interpretation and abductive reasoning (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009).

To understand how TNGO leaders ‗conceptualize‘ transnational activism, I combine the theorybased approach to concepts and finite mixture modeling (Magidson & Vermunt, 2003; Medin,
1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985). This novel approach to studying ‗ideas‘ in the context of
international relations theory is developed in chapter three.

Chapter four explores how leaders understand their organizations‘ missions and activities.
Analysis reveals four distinct ‗ideologies of activism‘ that structure how leaders perceive and
shape the world. These ideologies are material amelioration, ideational amelioration, material
empowerment and ideational empowerment. While the ideology of ideational empowerment is
often thought to exemplify transnational activism, among TNGO leaders this is the least common
orientation. The most common ideology is material amelioration.

Chapter five investigates TNGO leaders‘ attitudes toward organizational collaborations and the
specific strategies they employ to maintain organizational autonomy. Although most leaders
exhibit a ‗protective‘ collaborative style, others are much more ‗interdependent‘ with states and
corporations in a manner that could compromise organizational autonomy. These collaborative
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styles are distributed unevenly across different sectors of transnational activism. Additionally,
leaders employ a menue of specific strategies to maintain operational autonomy under conditions
of financial dependence.

Chapter six examines taxonomical approaches to the study of TNGOs and derives an empirical
taxonomy of TNGOs based on data from the Transnational NGO Interview Project. There are
three types of TNGO registered in the United States: humanitarian relief and development,
human rights activism and environmental advocacy. Analysis suggests that scholarship in
international relations focuses disproportionately on the least common and least resourceful
types of TNGOs. Moreover, so-called ‗exemplary‘ or ‗quintessential‘ TNGOs such as Amnesty
International and Greenpeace are highly unrepresentative of TNGOs generally and of the
subcategories they are widely thought to typify.

Chapter seven explores how TNGO leaders understand what it means to be organizationally
effective. Most leaders believe that effectiveness involves demonstrating ‗outcome
accountability,‘ while a minority describes effectiveness as ‗overhead minimization.‘ Both of
these conceptualizations reveal a strong culture of managerialism among TNGOs that focuses on
programmatic efficiency and upward accountability to donors with comparatively little emphasis
on maintaining downward accountability to beneficiaries (Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Raggo,
Schmitz, & Vijfeijken, 2010; Roberts et al., 2005).

Chapter eight examines the primary challenges facing TNGO leaders. Leaders are particularly
concerned about funding and surprisingly uncomfortable with politics. While theorists of
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transnational activism often regard politicization as a key tactic in the strategic repertoire of
TNGOs (e.g., Keck & Sikkink, 1998), most TNGO leaders view politics as an obstacle and
prefer to couch their work in relatively apolitical, technocratic terms.

Finally, chapter nine summarizes and synthesizes the results of previous chapters to identify and
interpret three distinct roles TNGOs play in world affairs: alleviation, realization and
environmentalism. I conclude with suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER TWO: DATA

Data for this study have been obtained from the Transnational NGO Interview Project, a largescale exploratory data collection effort undertaken by researchers affiliated with the
Transnational NGO Initiative within the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs at the Maxwell
School of Syracuse University. The core dataset of the Transnational NGO Interview Project is
available to the public through the Transnational NGO Initiative‘s website.2

The principal investigators of this research project interviewed TNGO leaders to gain deeper
insights than typically possible with observational research designs focusing on organizational
attributes gleaned from secondary sources. Leaders are specifically empowered not only to
direct, but also to speak on behalf of their organizations and are thus uniquely positioned and
well-informed to offer detailed insights about the inner workings and strategic considerations
motivating organizational behavior.

The research process involved many stages that have implications for interpreting the results of
the study. Research design issues of particular importance include how the unit of analysis was
defined, how potential respondents for the study were selected, how the interview protocol was
developed and implemented and how the resulting qualitative data were coded to facilitate
analysis. Each of these issues is addressed in this chapter.

The ultimate goal of the study was to collect baseline information about how leaders understand
issues of governance, goals, strategies, activities, effectiveness, accountability, transnationalism,
communications, collaboration and leadership. The study was not intended to test particular
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theories or models, but to explore leaders‘ perspectives by allowing them to describe their views
in their own words.

The first challenge of the research design was to define the unit of analysis, the TNGO, among
which to identify potential respondents. This presents a number of difficulties, however, most
notably the problem of defining the term ‗TNGO‘ and identifying a suitable roster from which to
select organizations.

Definition of TNGO

The problem of definition is greatly complicated by the presence of multiple overlapping
research programs in international relations, within which NGOs tend to be defined differently
for different purposes. These multitudinous programs examine global civil society (Lipschutz,
1992), global social change organizations (Gale, 1998), global society (Shaw, 1994),
international society (Halliday, 1992; Peterson, 1992; Shaw, 1992), social movements (Tarrow,
1998), transnational activism (Tarrow, 2005), transnational advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink,
1998), transnational politics (Tarrow, 2001), transnational relations (Keohane & Nye, 1970;
Risse-Kappen, 1995; Risse, 2006), transnational social movement organizations (Smith,
Chatfield, & Pagnucco, 1997; Warkentin, 2001), world civic politics (Wapner, 1995) and world
polity (Boli & Thomas, 1999a), to name a few. As O‘Brien et al. (2000, p. 12) noted: ―Each term
refers to a slightly different subject of study with a wider or narrower scope and is selected in
response to a specific research question.‖

15
The core term ‗NGO‘ emerged around 1945 when the United Nations (UN) found it necessary to
make legal distinctions between different types of participants (Willetts, 2002). The UN
recognized two main types of actors: governments and non-governmental organizations. Formal
UN recognition was achieved through the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which
awarded consultative status to NGOs that met certain criteria. Over time, the term ‗NGO‘ came
to denote organizations recognized by the UN and embodying six general principles. NGOs were
organizations that (1) supported the mission of the UN, (2) were representative of publics, (3)
had identifiable headquarters, (4) were nonprofit, (5) respected state-sovereignty and (6) were
not established by governments (Willetts, 2001). Since the UN is an international body, the term
also connoted, at least initially, international in scope.

The legalistic characterization of NGOs that evolved from ECOSOC recognition may be
contrasted with sociological definitions of NGO (Martens, 2002). More commonly today, NGOs
are appreciated less for their legal status as for their social roles and functions. Thus, NGOs are
typically regarded as components of ‗civil society‘ and ‗social movements‘ (Willetts, 2002).
Within the context of civil society NGOs are said to exist in ―the sphere of ideas, values,
institutions, organizations, networks, and individuals that are based on civility, located between
the family, the state, and the market and operating beyond the confines of national societies,
polities and economies‖ (Anheier, 2007, pp. 10-11).

The location of NGOs in this abstract sociological conceptual space makes definition somewhat
more difficult. Struggling to advance a positive, rather than negative definition of NGO, Martens
(2002, p. 282) defines NGOs as ―formal (professionalized) independent societal organizations
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whose primary aim is to promote common goals at the national or the international level.‖ Here,
Martins emphasizes a number of important qualities. First, she defines NGOs as legally
recognized organizations with professional staff. Second, she describes NGOs as independent
societal organizations, referring to their operational independence from government and location
within civil society. Third, she recognizes that NGOs exist to promote common or universal
goals as a means of distinguishing NGOs from organizations that pursue particularistic ends such
as economic rents. Finally, Martens‘ definition makes clear that NGOs may exist at the national
or international levels to take note that in common usage the term NGO has evolved from its
original context to refer not only to international organizations but domestic organizations as
well.

Willetts (2002) offers a similar definition of an NGO as an ―independent voluntary association of
people acting together on a continuous basis, for some common purpose, other than achieving
government office, making money or illegal activities.‖ This definition emphasizes similar
qualities. First, NGOs are again independent of governments. Second, they constitute a
―voluntary association of people acting together on a continuous basis,‖ which indicates that
NGOs are ongoing concerns in the sense of formal, legally recognized organizations. Willetts
also affirms that NGOs exist to serve a common purpose, again consistent with Martens‘
definition emphasizing common goals. Willetts goes slightly further than Martens, however, by
offering three specific stipulations. First, NGOs do not seek to achieve government office,
distinguishing them from lobbying organizations and political action committees. Second, NGOs
do not seek to make money, distinguishing them from for-profit corporations. And finally, NGOs
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do not engage in illegal activities, differentiating them from criminal organizations, guerilla
groups or other violent actors.

Other scholars wrestling with the definition problem tend to offer variations on these main
themes. Vakil (1997, p. 2059), for instance, noting similarities between kindred terms such as
NGO, nonprofit organization and private voluntary organization, defined NGOs as ―selfgoverning, private, not-for-profit organizations that are geared to improving the quality of life of
disadvantaged people.‖ Here again, the qualities of independence from government (selfgoverning, private), not primarily seeking to make money (not-for-profit) and pursuing common
aims (improving the quality of life) all appertain.

In sum, most scholars would agree that NGOs are (1) professional organizations that are (2)
independent of governments, (3) noncommercial and (4) pursuant of public goals. Josselin and
Wallace (2001a, p. 3), for example, define NGOs as ―largely or entirely autonomous from central
government funding and control…,‖ while DeMars (2005, p. 41) states simply that they are
private actors pursuing public purposes.‖ Halliday (2001) notes that NGOs may seek to advance
particularistic or universalistic goals, but most would agree with Boli and Thomas (1999a) that
NGOs by construction pursue more public or universalistic aims.

To the four main criteria listed above, we must further specify that a transnational NGO is an
NGO that operates across national boundaries. Thus, a TNGO is professional organization,
noncommercial and independent of governments, that pursues public goals across national
boundaries.
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This definition has specific implications for the choice of a sampling frame. First, TNGOs are
legally recognized organizations, which could be formally registered with ECOSOC, the Union
of International Associations (UIA) or recognized by national bureaus or research centers such
as, in the United States, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or National Center for Charitable
Statistics (NCCS). However, NGOs listed on such rosters may receive the bulk of their funding
from governments, violating the requirement of government independence. Additionally, many
NGOs could receive substantial revenues through fees for services, violating the noncommercial
criterion. Finally, these rosters often contain inactive organizations and organizations such as
labor unions, hospitals and food banks not normally considered NGOs. A suitable sampling
frame must filter out such organizations.

Moreover, as a practical matter, conducting an interview study with TNGO leaders selected from
an international roster from ECOSOC or the UIA is costly. A more practicable approach is to
focus on TNGO leaders located in a single country, such as United States. While this strategy
does represent a limitation, the population of TNGOs registered in the United States is
nevertheless a particularly large and influential population of organizations worthy of study in its
own right.

Sampling3

The Transnational NGO Interview Study is based on interviews with top leaders from
transnational NGOs registered in the United States and so offers a Northern, US-centric
perspective on transnational activism. According to the UIA, the United States itself is home to
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13 percent of TNGO headquarters, more than any other country. Worldwide, more than half of
TNGO headquarters are located in the United States and Europe ("Yearbook of International
Associations: Statistics, visualizations and patterns," 2003/2004, pp. 61-84, 87). Although
TNGOs located in the United States are not necessarily representative of TNGOs worldwide,
they nevertheless constitute a large and resourceful population with far-reaching global impact.

Within the United States, TNGOs are typically regarded as international nonprofits. The IRS
requires 501(c)(3) tax-exempt nonprofits with more than $25,000 in annual revenues to file IRS
Forms 990, which are available for public inspection. Based on these forms, the NCCS identified
6,500 international nonprofits in the United States in 2007. According to their data, these
organizations spent almost $30 billion combined (nominally) during their most recent fiscal
years.4 The combined average expenditures for organizations sampled for the Transnational
NGO Interview Project over the period 2001-2006 was about $20 billion (nominally).5 Roughly
speaking, the final sample accounts for about two-thirds of all US TNGO expenditures.

The principal investigators chose to sample TNGOs from a database of international nonprofits
maintained by Charity Navigator, an online rating agency in the United States. Charity Navigator
evaluates organizations with 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status from the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), at least four consecutive years of IRS Forms 990 available and public support greater than
$500,000 during their most recent fiscal years. Organizations that report zero fundraising costs or
that are overwhelmingly funded through government grants or fees for services are excluded,
along with private foundations, hospitals, hospital foundations, private universities, colleges,
community foundations and public broadcasting stations.
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These criteria comport nicely with the definition of TNGO provided above. Organizations with
501(c)(3) status are noncommercial and have a declared charitable purpose or public benefit,
meaning that they exist to promote common goals. They are also severely restricted from
lobbying and are expressly prohibited from supporting political candidates for government
office. Charity Navigator‘s own selection criteria help to further delineate the desired population.
Organizations that are primarily funded by governments are excluded, enforcing the
independence criterion. Additionally, organizations that receive the bulk of their funding through
fees for services are excluded, reinforcing the noncommercial criterion. Finally, organizations
that are technically 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations but which scholars widely agree should not
be considered NGOs—such as hospitals and universities—are specifically excluded.

Charity Navigator‘s criteria also exclude new organizations and very small or inactive
organizations with low levels of public support. The size criterion is significant since it
introduces a small bias that has the effect of attenuating the extreme inequality observed within
the US nonprofit sector.6

Based on total revenue data from the 2007 NCCS database, fewer than 10 percent of
organizations control over 90 percent of the revenues. On a scale of zero, indicating perfect
equality, to one, meaning perfect inequality, the Gini coefficient for international nonprofits in
the United States was 0.94 in 2007, indicating extreme inequality. This effect is mitigated in the
sample, which is a subset of organizations from the NCCS dataset. Among sampled
organizations, roughly 20 percent control about 90 percent of the revenues. Sampled
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organizations‘ average revenues over this period ranged from about $100,000 to over $3 billion.
The median TNGO had about $11 million in revenues. The smaller Gini coefficient of 0.87
indicates slightly less inequality within the sample as compared to the larger Gini coefficient of
0.94 in the population.7

To identify leaders for the interview study, researchers initially sampled 182 organizations from
the database of 334 international nonprofits rated by Charity Navigator in 2005. 8 Stratified
random sampling was employed to ensure representation by size, sector and financial
characteristics.9 One-hundred twenty-three interviews were completed with leaders from the
initial sample and 29 replacements were added for a total sample size of 152 cases. Table 2.1
indicates that the sample statistics closely match those of the population.
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Table 2.1: Sampling

Sector

Size

Financial
rating

Population
%
N
15%
49
14%
48
21%
69

Sample
%
n
14%
22
14%
21
21%
32

Environment
Human Rights
Humanitarian Relief
Sustainable
Development
Conflict Resolution
Total

42%
8%
100%

141
27
334

42%
9%
100%

64
13
152

Small
Medium
Large
Total

40%
40%
20%
100%

132
135
67
334

37%
42%
21%
100%

56
64
32
152

12%

40

14%

22

11%

38

9%

13

27%

90

23%

35

50%
100%

166
334

54%
100%

82
152

Low Efficiency/Low
Capacity
Low Efficiency/High
Capacity
High Efficiency/Low
Capacity
High Efficiency/High
Capacity
Total
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The overall response rate was 68 percent.10 In the final sample, 81 percent of respondents were
the CEOs, presidents or executive directors of their organizations, 12 percent were vice
presidents, and only 7 percent were below the level of vice-president.

Interview protocol

The interview protocol was not designed to test specific models or theories. It was designed to
collect baseline information about how leaders understand governance, goals, strategies,
activities, transnationalism, effectiveness, accountability, collaboration, communications and
leadership. Nearly all of the interview questions solicited open-ended responses where leaders
were free to speak in the own words. Specific protocol questions were developed in consultation
with practitioners and pilot tested during workshops in the United States and India throughout
2005 and 2006.

Interviews took place between 2006 and 2008 and were conducted at leaders‘ preferred
locations, usually their offices. Leaders were guaranteed confidentiality to promote candor. The
interviews averaged 82.5 minutes; the shortest was 32 minutes and the longest was 153 minutes.
Interviewers ultimately collected about 209 hours of digital recording. All the interviews were
recorded with the permission of the interviewees and subsequently transcribed.

Interviewers were asked to complete debriefing forms at the end of each interview in which they
assessed respondent candor and other issues that could conceivably affect data quality. Where
available, data from these debriefing forms show that 86% of respondents were perceived as very
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candid, 14% to have evinced occasional lack of candor, and none to have displayed prolonged
lack of candor. Instances of occasional lack of candor involved hesitation at discussing issues
that were currently confidential within organizations (such as succession planning), delayed
recall, pacing, and telephone and staff interruptions. In no instance was occasional lack of candor
judged to warrant discarding data.

A team of five graduate students manually coded the complete interview transcripts using
computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). An initial codebook was
created by an interdisciplinary team of researchers and thoroughly revised based on inductive
readings of initial transcripts for emergent themes. During initial coding exercises with out-ofsample transcripts, the content and number of codes were adjusted to conform to the interview
data. The codebook was finalized in the fall of 2007 after extensive deliberations among the
principal investigators and members of the coding team. To facilitate manual coding, the
codebook was hierarchically organized into nine major sections, 38 subsections, 91 code families
and 413 individual codes.

To measure the overall degree of intercoder agreement across all 413 codes, ten complete insample interviews were each coded twice by separate coders. Scores were calculated measuring
the percentage of agreement between the two coders of each interview transcript. The ten scores
were then averaged. A value of zero indicates complete disagreement, while a value of one
indicates complete agreement. The overall intercoder agreement score is 0.80, indicating
satisfactory intercoder agreement.
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Data structure

The coding process generated a qualitative dataset located in the CAQDAS that exported a raw
data table consisting of frequency counts for each code by transcript. The raw statistical output
from the CAQDAS is a table 152 cases by 413 codes. Additional information from secondary
sources such as Charity Navigator and organizations‘ websites and annual reports was
subsequently merged with the table. After merging the data, eliminating qualitative codes with
no meaningful quantitative interpretation and converting the remaining codes into response
variables, the final dataset is 152 cases by 327 variables. To facilitate analysis and interpretation,
and to eliminate a possible source of coder bias, response variables have been binarized.
Additionally, null observations in empty response vectors have been declared missing.

The quantification process brings with it a discursive change. Codes become response variables
and code families become sets of response variables. Thus, just as a leader‘s qualitative response
to a particular interview question can be represented by a string of qualitative codes, so too can
his or her response be represented by a set of values on a set of response variables. The ability to
represent leaders‘ responses quantitatively as response vectors, or more informally, response
patterns, enables useful statistical procedures to be undertaken to structure and discipline
qualitative inquiry. This is explained in detail in the next chapter.

Information poverty is a principal problem in the interpretation of statistical results. The mixedmethod design of the Transnational NGO Interview Project greatly facilitates interpretation.
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Every nonzero valid datum from the primary interview data is linked to an actual qualitative
quotation organized in the CAQDAS for efficient in-context analysis.

Summary

I use data from the Transnational NGO Interview Project, a large-scale exploratory data
collection effort undertaken by researchers affiliated with the Transnational NGO Initiative
within the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. A
TNGO is defined as a professional organization, noncommercial and independent of
governments, that pursues public goals across national boundaries. Based on this definition, as
well as resource limitations, a suitable sampling frame was identified in Charity Navigator, an
online nonprofit rating agency in the United States. Leaders interviewed for the study were
selected from a representative sample of 152 TNGOs from Charity Navigator‘s database of 334
international nonprofits. The United States hosts more TNGOs than any other country and
sampled organizations account for about two-thirds of all US TNGO expenditures.

The interview protocol was developed in collaboration with TNGO practitioners to collect
baseline information about how TNGO leaders understand governance, goals, strategies,
activities, transnationalism, effectiveness, accountability, communications, collaboration and
leadership. Interview transcripts were manually coded using CAQDAS and the codebook was
deliberately tailored to conform to the interview data. The coding process generated
complementary qualitative and quantitative datasets that enable efficient mixed-method inquiry.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHOD

This study examines how TNGO leaders conceptualize constructs such as organizational
mission, collaborations and effectiveness. In understanding leaders‘ perspectives, we gain
valuable insights about how they view their organizations‘ roles in world affairs. However, this
focus on leaders‘ conceptualizations requires some ontological and epistemological assumptions
about the nature of concepts and conceptual structures.

Conceptual structure

Over several decades cognitive psychologists‘ thinking about concepts and conceptual structures
has undergone a number of shifts (Medin, 1989). The so-called ‗classical view‘ holds that
concepts are categories with membership determined by the satisfaction of necessary and
sufficient conditions. However, sets of conditions often have exceptions, and a ‗modified
classical view‘ allows necessary and sufficient conditions as well as exceptions (Duffy).
Critiques of the strict classical view also gave rise to a ‗probabilistic view‘ in which category
membership depends upon proportions of attributes. According to Medin (1989; Murphy &
Medin, 1985), the classical and probabilistic views (as well as prototype and exemplary views)
assume that concepts are organized around a notion of ‗similarity.‘ This notion simply posits that
objects with similar attributes belong in the same category. According to the similarity-based
view, attributes therefore define categories. However, this has been disconfirmed by a significant
body of empirical research including many carefully designed experiments (Medin, 1989;
Murphy & Medin, 1985). Medin and others thus differentiate between similarly-based views and
a theory-based approach.
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According to the theory-based approach, attribute correlations do not define categories but
reflect them (Medin, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985). Under this view, categories are associated
not only with lists of attributes, but more importantly, with underlying explanatory principles
that determine which attributes are salient. Categories are thus defined by a latent ―explanatory
principle common to category members,‖ not merely attribute lists per se (Murphy & Medin,
1985, p. 298).

Attempts to uncover the latent explanatory principles underlying empirically observed attribute
correlations adduced by human respondents necessarily involve significant interpretive or
abductive inference (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009). The methodological challenges are
substantial, but not insurmountable.

The aggregation problem: shared beliefs as socially distributed conceptualizations

The theory-based approach has been implemented to study social conceptualizations empirically
within a methodological framework known as the cultural consensus model (Romney, Weller, &
Batchelder, 1986). Atran, Medin and Ross (2005) formally modeled cultural consensus in social
networks using instruments that asked respondents to draw relations between inductively derived
lists of objects. This method has a philosophical affinity with Q-sorting, which Dryzek, Clark
and McKenzie (1989) notably advanced as a response to Wendt‘s (1987) articulation of the
agent-structure problem in international relations theory (Brown, 1980; Stephenson, 1953). Qsorting similarly models social attributes as an emergent property of individual attributes, a
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useful approach for identifying social conceptualizations or shared beliefs. Whether modeling
‗consensus‘ or ‗concourse‘ both of these techniques assume cultural homogeneity.

Although the terms ‗shared idea‘ and ‗shared belief‘ are common in international relations, while
the term ‗ideology‘ is common in American politics, I introduce the more precise term ‗socially
distributed conceptualizations‘ to describe my view of shared ideas, beliefs or ideologies. I say
that conceptualizations are socially distributed to emphasize my understanding of the
aggregation problem when dealing with shared beliefs. I view social attributes—ideas, beliefs,
ideologies, conceptualizations, etc.—as emergent properties of attributed individuals existing in
social contexts.

Individuals may influence society and society may influence individuals, a dynamic property
commonly understood as the mutual constitution of agents and structure (Adler, 2002; M.
Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001; Guzzini, 2000; Hopf, 1998; Kubalkova, Onuf, & Kowert, 1998;
Onuf, 1998; R. Price & Reus-Smit, 1998; Wendt, 1987, 1992, 1999; Zehfuss, 2002). However,
although I recognize the reality of mutual influence, I do not regard individual agents and social
structures as ontologically independent entities. Individuals are part of the societies they
collectively constitute and societies are necessarily constituted by individuals. I agree that from
the point of view of an individual agent his or her social structure may seem immutable, but also
allow that a sea change in individual attitudes would likely bring about a corresponding change
in the social structure. Individuals collectively construct their social structure just as any one
individual may be socialized by it. I therefore view conceptualizations as socially distributed
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across individuals. One cannot recognize social beliefs without acknowledging, at least
implicitly, the underlying beliefs held by individuals.

The framework of socially distributed conceptualizations combines the associative network
model of memory (Collins & Quillian, 1969; Minsky, 1975; Taber, 2003), the theory-based
approach to concepts (Medin, 1989), the distributional view of culture (R. Huckfeldt, Johnson, &
Sprague, 2002) and compositional aggregation (Page & Shapiro, 1992). The distributional view
of culture holds that conceptualizations shared among individuals constitute social
conceptualizations. Compositional aggregation acknowledges population heterogeneity in
processes of social aggregation. A helpful formulation of the compositional framework is
Huckfeldt, Johnson and Sprague‘s (2002) social network approach, consistent with the
approaches of many agent-based modelers across the social sciences (Atran et al., 2005; e.g.
Axelrod, 1976; Bertie, Himmelweit, & Trigg, 2006; Bonham, Sergeev, & Parshin, 1997; Epstein,
2007; Hoffmann, 2006; Shapiro, Bonham, & Heradstveit, 1988; Taber, n.d.; Tesfatsion, 2003).
Compositional aggregation recognizes the possibility of multiple socially distributed
conceptualizations within populations. Some recent empirical scholarship in this vein examines
discord and contention within social networks of heterogeneous agents (Robert Huckfeldt, 2001,
2007; Robert Huckfeldt, Ikeda, & Pappi, 2005; R. Huckfeldt et al., 2002; Robert Huckfeldt &
Mendez, 2008; Robert Huckfeldt, Mendez, & Osborn, 2004).

As a matter of clarification, socially distributed conceptualizations differ fundamentally from the
dominant convention in much public opinion research that models belief system structure in
terms of ideological consistency. Following Converse‘s (1964) seminal article on the nature of
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belief systems in mass publics relative to elites, ideological constraint has typically been defined
and measured by the variance in people‘s scaled responses to issue questions (Barton & Parsons,
1977). Response categories for issue questions typically range along a seven point scale from
very conservative to very liberal. Respondents demonstrating evidence of ideological constraint
answer as either consistent liberals or conservatives, yielding a small overall variance. However,
this approach neglects the possibility that respondents may be constrained by ideologies other
than those chosen by the researcher. For example, using cluster analysis, Fleishman (1986)
discovered that the American electorate was empirically divided into six categories of political
ideology: liberals, quasi-liberals, pro-labors, laissez-faire advocates, conservatives and economic
moderates. A highly constrained laissez-faire advocate may incorrectly appear to be
ideologically unconstrained according to the conventional liberal-conservative continuum.

Present methodological approach

The empirical approach I employ to understand how leaders of transnational NGOs
conceptualize constructs involves an open-ended interviewing process. I infer leaders‘
conceptualizations on the empirical basis of their salient conceptual associations. Rather than be
asked to choose among predetermined responses, leaders respond to questions however they
deem appropriate in a face-to-face, open-ended interview setting. A question designed to infer
how leaders conceptualize organizational effectiveness, for instance, asks: ―Let me ask you about
the concept of effectiveness, which is something we all have trouble defining. How does your
organization define effectiveness?‖ Leaders respond by, in effect, revealing their salient
associations. Leaders‘ responses are observed but the underlying explanatory principles or
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‗conceptualizations‘ that explain their conceptual associations are unobserved. Analysis thus
requires abductively inferring the underlying conceptualizations that explain their observed
response patterns. Figure 3.1 illustrates the theorized process.
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Figure 3.1: Theorized process

Interview
question

Socially
Distributed
Conceptualization

Explanatory
principle

Response Pattern

Salient
association
Salient
association

Prompt

Explanatory
principle

Salient
association
Salient
association
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A tenet of compositional aggregation allows that different groups of individuals may hold
different conceptualizations. The variety of latent conceptualizations can be inferred from the
manifest heterogeneity observed among individuals‘ response patterns. An illustration is
provided below.

Figure 3.2 displays parameters that have been estimated with a technique called latent class
analysis (LCA). The results, which are only partially reported for convenience of display,
indicate that TNGO leaders tend to define organizational effectiveness in one of two ways (see
chapter seven). The principle explaining the first response pattern has been labeled ‗outcome
accountability‘ following a thorough in-context review of leaders‘ underlying statements. The
other conceptualization has been labeled ‗overhead minimization‘ following the same procedure.
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Figure 3.2: Illustrative example of the theorized process

Interview
question

Socially
Distributed
Conceptualization

Response Pattern

Goal achievement
(0.67)
Outcome accountability
(0.82)
Evaluation
(0.55)

How does your
organization define
effectiveness?
(n = 150)

Resources
(0.97)
Overhead minimization
(0.15)
Evaluation
(0.67)
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The parameter estimates for ‗outcome accountability‘ and ‗overhead minimization‘ are latent
class probabilities, which may be interpreted as the proportions of leaders subscribing to each
conceptualization (a small group of outliers is excluded from the figure). The parameter
estimates for the salient associations (in this illustration, only goal achievement, evaluation and
resources) are conditional probabilities, which may be interpreted as the salience of particular
associations given the latent conceptualization. Hence, roughly speaking, most leaders
understand organizational effectiveness as outcome accountability, which involves goal
achievement and evaluation, but not resources, while a much smaller number of leaders define
effectiveness as overhead minimization, which involves resources and evaluation, but not goal
achievement. Consistent with the theory-based approach to concepts, the salient associations (or
alternatively, attributes) do not—strictly speaking—define the conceptualizations; rather the two
different latent conceptualizations make the two corresponding observed response patterns more
likely. The meanings of the underlying conceptualizations are inferred from both the statistical
results and the underlying qualitative evidence.

This empirical approach implements the theory-based approach to concepts to study socially
distributed conceptualizations. A key contribution of the method developed in this study is the
ability to interpret underlying principles based on observed response patterns. Each leader‘s
response pattern is linked to his or her underlying in-context qualitative statements and the use of
finite mixture modeling (discussed below) provides certain parameters that help focus
interpretation on exemplary qualitative evidence. Moreover, the statistical results are replicable
and since qualitative interpretation is grounded in specific qualitative evidence through a
structured procedure, qualitative interpretation is also replicable. Throughout the substantive
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chapters that follow, wherever possible I present the quantitative and qualitative evidence from
which I have derived my interpretations.

Finite mixture modeling

Finite mixture modeling is a category of statistical techniques developed to model latent
heterogeneity in populations. To discover conceptual heterogeneity among TNGO leaders, I
employ two finite mixture modeling techniques: latent class analysis and discrete factor analysis.

Latent class analysis (LCA) was first formalized by American sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld in a
study of soldiers‘ attitudes toward the US Army that was published in 1950, but as a concept is
traceable as far back as 1884 to an article written by American pragmatist philosopher Charles
Sanders Peirce concerning the measurement of predictive success (Goodman, n.d.; Lazarsfeld,
1950; Lazarsfeld & Henry, 1968; Peirce, 1884). Although the technique enjoys a long and
impressive lineage, it was not until more recent developments in computer hardware and
software that LCA became practicable for mainstream social science research.

In common social science parlance, traditional LCA can be understood as discovering an
unobserved or latent categorical variable that accounts for spurious association among observed
or manifest response variables (Goodman, n.d.). A key assumption of LCA is that the manifest
variables are statistically independent within the categories of the latent variable, a condition
called local independence (Lazarsfeld & Henry, 1968; Magidson & Vermunt, 2003;
McCutcheon, 1987).
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Discrete factor analysis (DFA) is another type of finite mixture modeling that evolved as an
offshoot of latent class analysis. Magidson and Vermunt (2003; n.d.) have shown that a latent
class model consisting of four clusters is analogous to a discrete factor model consisting of two
dichotomous latent factors, with the added benefit that the discrete factor model requires fewer
parameters and is therefore more parsimonious. Both LCA and DFA share the same basic
procedures, statistics and interpretations.

A model that provides adequate fit to the data can be said to explain the association among a set
of response variables. Model fit is quantified by the L2 statistic, which follows a chi-squared
distribution when multi-way tables are well populated. However, when tables are sparse the L2
statistic p-value is unreliable. Since there are typically many more possible response patterns
than respondents, tables are sparse and I use a parametric bootstrap procedure to obtain more
reliable p-values (Magidson & Vermunt, 2003). The bootstrap procedure uses the probability
distribution given by the maximum likelihood estimates for a model to generate replication
bootstrap samples. The bootstrap p-value is the proportion of bootstrap samples with an L2
greater than the original (Vermunt & Magidson, 2005). A well-fitting model will predict cell
frequencies statistically similar to the observed cell frequencies; thus a larger p-value indicates
better model fit.

Unlike distance-based clustering techniques such as hierarchical cluster analysis and k-means
cluster analysis, latent class analysis begins with a formal hypothesis test by assessing the fit of a
null 1-class model. If the null model provides adequate fit then its log-likelihood ratio chi-
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squared statistic will be close to the degrees of freedom and the associated bootstrap p-value will
exceed a conventional threshold such as 0.05. Under this condition it could be said that TNGO
leaders‘ responses are homogenous or random. However, it is also useful to inspect the model‘s
bivariate residuals (BVRs), which quantify the level of statistical association between each pair
of response variables. Large BVRs (greater than 3.84 at the 95 percent confidence level) indicate
significant unexplained association in the data. Since the L2 statistic quantifies overall model fit,
the inclusion of response variables with insignificant effects alongside response variables with
significant effects dilutes the L2 statistic.11 Thus a model‘s BVRs provide a more robust
indication of model fit than the overall L2 statistic.

When comparing models, it is helpful to test whether increasing the number of latent classes
significantly improves (reduces) the L2 statistic. This is performed with a -2 log-likelihood
difference test between the unrestricted model and a model in which one class is restricted to
zero. If the difference is not significant, then the more parsimonious model may be retained. If
the difference is significant, the unrestricted model is preferred. Again, p-values are estimated
using a parametric bootstrap procedure (Vermunt & Magidson, 2005). This procedure uses the
probability distribution given by the maximum likelihood estimates for the restricted model to
generate replication bootstrap samples and log-likelihood values. The log-likelihood value of the
unrestricted model is subtracted from those of the bootstrap samples and multiplied by -2 to
obtain -2LL differences. The bootstrap p-value is the proportion of bootstrap samples with a -2
log-likelihood difference higher than the that of the unrestricted model (Vermunt & Magidson,
2005). At the 95 percent confidence level, a bootstrap p-value less than 0.05 indicates that the
unrestricted model is preferred. The same procedure is used to test for other restrictions, notably
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the contributions of individual response variables to overall model fit (by setting response
variable effects individually to zero).

One important assumption of LCA and DFA is that the response variables are locally
independent or statistically independent within each category of the latent variable. The validity
of this assumption can be evaluated by reviewing the BVRs for an estimated model. The nature
of this assumption is illustrated in figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Local independence
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In the diagram on the left, the response variables are locally independent. The latent variable
explains the association among the response variables within the latent class. In the diagram on
the right, the response variables are locally dependent. The latent variable leaves significant
association between the response variables unexplained. Since the goal of exploratory LCA is
explanation, acceptable models must explain all the associations among the response variables
(BVRs < 3.84). This can be accomplished by increasing the number of latent classes, adding
parameters for direct effects between response variables or deleting redundant variables
(Magidson & Vermunt, 2003).

To identify the best model, I increase the number of latent classes until (1) local independence is
attained and (2) increasing the number of classes further does not result in statistically significant
improvement in model fit. The change in L2 associated with an increase in the number of latent
classes is denoted ∆L2. The ∆L2 p-value indicates whether increasing the number of latent
classes by one significantly improves model fit. The total L2 reduction indicates the overall
amount of association explained by each model.

After a suitable model is chosen, each respondent is assigned to the latent class to which he or
she most likely belongs based on his or her posterior membership probabilities (PMPs). This
procedure is called modal assignment (Magidson & Vermunt, 2003; McCutcheon, 1987). Each
leader‘s PMPs are determined by his or her response pattern and the model‘s parameter
estimates. The classification errors introduced by modal assignment are displayed for models
along with various model fit statistics.
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Qualitative analysis

To discipline qualitative inquiry and facilitate interpretation of statistical results, qualitative
quotations illustrating particular conceptualizations are selected from leaders with high PMPs for
their modal assignments. This selection procedure, which I call structured information retrieval,
helps ensure that in-context qualitative analysis focuses on exemplary textual evidence. Mean
PMPs are also reported for each latent class. A mean PMP close to one indicates low
classification error within the latent class, while a mean PMP close to zero indicates high
classification error within the latent class.

Interview excerpts are selected for their exemplarity and clarity, and to illustrate specific
conceptual distinctions and nuances. Out of consideration for the reader, they have been edited
for punctuation, grammar, continuity and appropriate delimitation. In all cases alterations have
been securely inferred in-context to preserve the obvious intents of the speakers. Brackets
indicate where words or phrases have been added or omitted, usually to protect respondent
confidentiality, but occasionally to spell out esoteric acronyms or general reasons of clarity.
Ellipses indicate where stuttering or interruption occurred or where speakers trailed off, although
in some circumstances ellipses have been introduced during transcription and left intact.

Discussion

The substantive analyses presented throughout the chapters that follow demonstrate that latent
class analysis (LCA) and discrete factor analysis (DFA) can be used effectively to identify
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socially distributed conceptualizations within a large corpus of coded interview data. To assess
technical validity, all finite mixture model results have been cross-validated with results derived
from traditional hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA). Independence tests in confusion matrices
between assignment solutions from finite mixture modeling and HCA consistently show high
concordance, suggesting both that assignment is consistent across the different techniques and
that substantive discovery and abduction are robust to technique choice.12

Model-based clustering has distinct advantages over traditional HCA. These advantages include
greater stability and the ability to formally test for specific model restrictions. Also model-based
clustering provides more helpful information to guide model choice, particularly regarding the
number of latent classes. Model-based clustering also allows for the measurement of
classification error and perhaps most importantly, the calculation of PMPs, which provide
invaluable guidance for focusing qualitative analysis on exemplary evidence.

Possibly the most difficult and likely the most contentious aspect of exploratory cluster analysis,
regardless of the technique employed, concerns the ascription of labels to the latent segments. To
explicitly ground analysis in underlying evidence and facilitate replication, profiles identified
through finite mixture modeling are presented in tables and corresponding exemplary qualitative
evidence is discussed throughout the text. This structured disclosure offers a level of interpretive
transparency rare in exploratory qualitative research and often absent in quantitative studies
employing analogous techniques such as confirmatory factor analysis.
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A common critique of classificatory analysis of any kind involves the dependence of the results
on the chosen input variables. As in any analysis, quantitative and qualitative conclusions
derived through finite mixture modeling depend on the response variables included in the model.
The larger point here, however, is whether different sets of response variables would generate
substantively different results, which would suggest that conclusions are unduly sensitive to
arbitrary variations in coding schemes. Analyses presented in chapters six and seven strongly
suggest that, under specific conditions, this is not a problem.

Chapter six identifies three types of TNGO on the empirical basis of six input variables. Fearing
this result may have been induced by the inclusion of the categorical variable sector, I reestimated analogous models with sector included as an inactive covariate. The analogous 3-class
model is nevertheless preferred and all parameter estimates are identical in relative direction,
although of course not in exact magnitude. Both sets of results generate a nearly identical
assignment solution and lead to the same substantive interpretation, strongly suggesting that
substantive conclusions are insensitive to input variable choice.13

Chapter seven examines how TNGO leaders understand the construct of organizational
effectiveness. Here the coding scheme included a general code for evaluation, but failed to
differentiate between financial evaluation and program evaluation, which proves to be a highly
salient distinction. However, the generality of the code does not impose an interpretive problem.
Due to the inclusion of an adequate number of relevant input variables, a meaningful latent
structure nevertheless emerges. The variable evaluation simply fails to significantly discriminate
among the latent segments. Quantitative analysts often eliminate variables with insignificant
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effects, but in this case a detailed in-context qualitative analysis disciplined by PMPs easily
recovers the underlying qualitative nuance obscured by the simplistic coding scheme. Although
leaders from both of the main latent segments mentioned evaluation during their interviews, it
nevertheless becomes clear that they were referring to different types of evaluation. The
interpretive conclusion proves robust to deficiencies in the coding scheme.

These analyses imply four conditions that contribute to robustness, by which I mean the
insensitivity of substantive conclusions to arbitrary variations in coding schemes. First, the
identification of input variables must be grounded in the evidence and therefore be relevant.
Qualitative codes were extracted from the evidence being coded and not exclusively deduced
from prior speculation. Second, a suitable range of input variables or codes must be chosen to
capture the underlying heterogeneity of responses. To continue with the organizational
effectiveness example, a set of codes all pertaining to ‗overhead minimization‘ would be unlikely
to uncover the existence of the ‗outcome accountability‘ conceptualization. Codes were
deliberately added to the Transnational NGO Interview Project codebook to ensure such
heterogeneity would be captured. Here it is not necessary to already know the latent
conceptualizations, only to observe and acknowledge common responses for which no codes yet
exist. Third, an adequate number of variables must be employed to mitigate the effects of
omitted variable bias. There is no rule of thumb to follow, but more may be better, provided of
course that the variables are relevant and reflect concepts respondents actually mention in the
interviews. Committed variable bias, as it might be termed, is not particularly problematic.
Redundant codes within the Transnational NGO Interview Project codebook were condensed or
eliminated prior to in-sample coding, but even if such codes remained they could be easily
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handled by combining them ex post or adding direct effect parameters to relax the local
independence condition for finite mixture modeling. Naturally, an entirely irrelevant code or
input variable would have never been applied and thus have no impact on analysis. Finally,
interpretations of latent variables must be grounded in the underlying qualitative evidence. As in
the organizational effectiveness example, this was necessary to recover nuance obscured by the
coding scheme. In sum, a coding scheme and concomitant analytical process that is adequate in
relevance, range, number and evidence contributes to high interpretive robustness.

It is important to consider that analytical results are driven not only by variable choice but more
importantly by respondents‘ patterns of conceptual associations. Even results driven by poorly
labeled or delimited codes can still recover meaningful latent structure on the basis of the
associative patterns identified through finite mixture modeling and interpreted through structured
qualitative inquiry.

The ultimate value of finite mixture modeling may be judged according to whether the latent
structures identified in the data are meaningful. On this score, the techniques applied prove
highly successful. Only in the context of organizational obstacles, discussed in chapter eight, are
leaders‘ response patterns statistically homogenous. The results presented in chapters four, five,
six and seven all identify intuitive latent structures with high face validity.

Conclusion
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The theory-based approach to concepts is a useful framework for studying socially distributed
conceptualizations empirically. Finite mixture modeling, including latent class analysis and
discrete factor analysis, aids in the discovery of latent conceptualizations that explain observed
associations among response variables. This type of modeling also generates statistics that can be
used to focus qualitative analysis on exemplary qualitative evidence. The combination of finite
mixture modeling with structured information retrieval disciplines and facilitates qualitative
inquiry to generate robust and empirically grounded interpretations.

In the next chapter, I employ finite mixture modeling and structured information retrieval to
explore how TNGO leaders conceptualize their organizations‘ missions and activities. I call their
conceptualizations ‗ideologies of activism.‘
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CHAPTER FOUR: IDEOLOGIES OF ACTIVISM

How do professional transnational activists conceptualize transnational activism? Do activists
believe in empowering communities to demand sociopolitical transformation or do they prefer
less contentious strategies focused on mitigating the detrimental effects of structural poverty and
humanitarian disaster? How exactly do transnational activists pursue their goals? Do they
leverage rules and norms derived from universal principles, deliver physical goods and services
or both? In short, do distinct ideologies of activism exist that describe how professional
transnational activists prefer to approach global challenges?

To address these questions, I analyze TNGO leaders‘ perspectives on their organizational
missions. This reveals four ideological orientations toward transnational activism. The highly
uneven distribution of these ideologies suggests that scholars in international relations
disproportionately focus on the most visible but least common modes of transnational activism.

Background

Scholars of transnational activism generally agree that to the extent transnational NGOs
(TNGOs) influence political and social outcomes they do so primarily with ideational tactics,
since they lack the material powers of states (Florini, 2004; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Richard
Price, 1998; Risse, 2006; Risse et al., 1999; True & Mintrom, 2001). The ―ability to convert
moral authority and excellent knowledge of the issue-area into ideational power explains to a
large degree why transnational advocacy networks sometimes win against materially more
powerful actors such as MNCs and national governments,‖ writes Risse (2006, p. 268), adding
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that international NGOs ―rely on social mobilization, protest and pressure‖ using tactics like
reframing and shaming to mobilize the public and influence targets. Similarly, Florini (2004, p.
76) affirms that ―NGOs are powerful to the degree they can persuade others (government
officials, corporate leaders, voters, consumers) to act. They are primarily conveyers of
information and opinions.‖ Many scholars incorporating this view accord organizations like
Amnesty International and Greenpeace exemplary status, since these organizations are wellknown to employ such strategies (DeMars, 2005; Halliday, 2001; Wapner, 1995; Warkentin,
2001). Ron, Ramos and Rodgers, for example, in a study of Amnesty International assert that
both proponents and critics of transnational activism ―agree on the central role of information
politics‖ (2007, p. 558), while others, like Hafner-Burton (2008), examine how NGOs like
Amnesty International employ such tactics to influence state policies.

Transnational NGOs are frequently discussed within different research traditions employing
different assumptions and terminology (Vakil, 1997). Within the context of a Global Civil
Society, for instance, NGOs are often central players, although scholars disagree over a precise
understanding of the concept and its implications (Anheier, 2007; Boli & Thomas, 1999a;
Glasius, 2002; Kaldor, 2003; Lipschutz, 2005). Transnational NGOs may also emerge as
transnational social movement organizations grounded in grassroots social movements and
constituting a New Transnational Activism (Tarrow, 2005). Other scholars identify a New Rights
Advocacy embodied in the activities of human rights and development NGOs (P. Nelson &
Dorsey, 2007). Within these perspectives TNGOs are generally regarded as agents of a
grassroots civil society seeking broader sociopolitical transformation.
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However, scholars also distinguish between ‗bottom-up‘ and top-down‘ perspectives of global
civil society and the role of TNGOs in world politics (Cox, 1999). Josselin and Wallace, for
instance, differentiate between idealists, who view TNGOs as the ―vanguard of an emerging
global civil society‖ and realists, who see TNGOs as ―front-organizations thinly disguising the
interests of particular states‖ (2001a, pp. 1, 14). Similarly, DeMars (2005) divides NGO
scholarship into three camps. Pluralists view NGOs as emancipatory agents of a grassroots
global civil society; globalists view them as vehicles for global norms; and realists dismiss the
significance of NGOs. These various dimensions imply several combinatory models of TNGO
influence in world affairs. A structuralist view, for instance, might characterize TNGOs as part
of the US-dominated post-WWII system of global governance in which power emanates from
Northern institutions and TNGOs (Josselin & Wallace, 2001a).

Most scholars acknowledge a structural or ideological divide between Northern and Southern
NGOs (Demirovic, 2003; Kaldor, 2003; McCormick, 1999; Rohrschneider & Dalton, 2002).
Rohrschneider and Dalton (2002), for example, argue that a North-South power asymmetry
enables Northern NGOs to influence their Southern counterparts.

Competing perspectives on the role of TNGOs in world affairs can thus be loosely categorized
into two main categories, as discussed in the introduction. Proponents maintain that TNGOs are
components of grassroots social movements that help constitute an emergent global civil society
(Warkentin, 2001). Transnational NGOs seek to change the status quo using ideational strategies
such as research and advocacy and specific tactics such as framing and naming and shaming.
Whether TNGOs are themselves norm entrepreneurs or simply vehicles for the transmission of
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global norms to local contexts, TNGOs represent a bottom-up force challenging the conventional
state system with principled ideas. Under this view, the constructivist research program figures
prominently as agents and structures contest discursive frames and role identities to transform
world politics.

Detractors, on the other hand, often assume a top-down perspective. This approach takes many
forms. Edwards and Hulme speculate about the New Policy Agenda and its emphasis on
increasing official aid to NGOs. They worry that NGOs could transmogrify into state
contractors, leading to ―cooptation: the abandonment of a mission for social transformation to
become the implementer of the policy agendas of northern governments― (Edwards & Hulme,
1996, p. 970). Similarly, Feldman (1997, p. 63) noted that once:

NGOs looked skeptically upon donor assistance that would employ them as vehicles for
development projects. But, by the early 1980s, donor assistance had turned private
voluntary organizations into development agencies, recasting their challenge and raising
anew the question of the meaning of civil society.

In light of the New Policy Agenda, Cooley and Ron (2002) portray TNGOs as subcontractors
responding to requests for proposals, not as authentic agents of social change. Others simply
admit that ―Many NGOs are in effect, contractors for states‖ (Halliday, 2001, p. 26).

Another version of this argument is that TNGOs are embedded in a Western neoliberal order that
guarantees their subservience. ―Most non-state actors,‖ argue Josselin and Wallace (2001b, p.
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258), ―even among the most subversive, work within the framework provided by Western
international institutions and regimes, criticizing government policies but not challenging the
state system or its component states…‖

Those assuming critical orientations, often citing Foucaultian and neo-Gramscian influences,
implicate global civil society in a transnational neoliberal project of governmentality and
hegemony (Gill, 1995; Jaeger, 2007). Some criticize TNGOs‘ representations of the poor and
question their authenticity as agents of the world‘s marginalized (Bebbington, 2005; Billon,
2006; Rothmyer, 2011). According to Feldman (1997, p. 46), instead of grassroots empowerment
NGOs merely ―provide a venue for privatization and…liberalization‖ largely controlled by
donors. NGOs are either unduly influenced by, or otherwise functionally interdependent with,
traditionally powerful commercial and governmental institutions. Berkovitch and Gordon (2008)
describe such an interdependence in which states condition donor preferences, which in turn
impact the programs and strategies of NGOs, which potentially compromises the constructively
critical position NGOs are supposed occupy in the world system.

Jaeger (2007) provides one of the most sophisticated theoretical critiques along these lines,
concluding that during the 1990s NGOs depoliticized issues and became functionally
interdependent with states (2007, p. 272):

Instead of genuinely political challenges or solutions [global civil society] offered
humanitarian intervention and relief; and instead of tackling the political questions of the
effects of markets or of redistribution, it offered a neo-liberal governmentality of human
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resource development and individual self-realization …[T]he emerging international
public sphere operated as a subsystem of world politics rather than opposing the system
from outside. NGOs, as the presumed chief embodiment of global civil society, operated
within a ―trifurcated‖ political system of states, international institutions, and a public
sphere. Putting both movements together means that depoliticization itself is part of a
political logic of international governance, whereby global civil society relieves the states
system and international institutions from making fundamental political decisions by
offering ―world opinion‖ as well as ambulance and police services in their stead.

Similarly, DeMars (2005, p. 53) describes scenarios in which ―the ‗apolitical‘ NGO—claiming
to do development anywhere regardless of politics—inadvertently made itself available to absorb
and reinforce the existing political context, whatever it was.‖ NGOs were used ―first, to assist in
the government‘s assumption of responsibility for general welfare; second, to legitimize the
government‘s relinquishing of welfare responsibility; and third, to support and legitimize…antidevelopment, predatory political economy‖ (DeMars, 2005, p. 53). In short, ―the net effect of
NGO networks may be to protect the status quo by neutralizing both the idealists and the
manipulators‖ (DeMars, 2005, p. 58).

From this perspective, TNGOs convert political contention into technical ‗managerialism,‘
substituting humanitarian aid and relief for meaningful policy reform (Roberts et al., 2005). Thus
TNGOs further support and legitimize states by ameliorating their failures without resolving
underlying problems. Advocacy takes the form of public education, a supplementary activity
with the effect of instilling the neoliberal ideas that sustain governmentality. NGOs are
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participants in the circulation or diffusion of expert managerial knowledge, within which
neoliberal values and practices are disseminated globally (Ebrahim, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005).
While TNGO leaders themselves may view their organizations‘ work in managerial and
technical terms—‗delivering services‘ to ‗beneficiaries‘ as opposed to ‗mobilizing‘ and
‗empowering constituents‘—they are nonetheless participants in a neoliberal project that sustains
and replicates problematic power structures.

This scholarly dissensus provides a challenging puzzle for international relations scholars. What
role do TNGOs play in world affairs? Are TNGOs vehicles for ideational and discursive power
that amplify the demands of grassroots activists to influence states (Keck & Sikkink, 1998;
Struett, 2008) or agents of neoliberal governmentality legitimizing the status quo and extending
states‘ traditional prerogatives of power (DeMars, 2005; Feldman, 1997; Jaeger, 2007)? Or do
TNGOs simultaneously play both roles in the world system (H. Katz, 2006)?

Underlying this debate is a deeper question largely unaddressed within the international relations
literature. How do TNGO leaders approach transnational activism? To answer this question, I
identify ‗ideologies of activism‘ based on data from the Transnational NGO Interview Project.
By identifying the ideological orientations of TNGO leaders it is possible to gain deeper
understanding of the roles their organizations play in world affairs.

There are many definitions of ideology. Erikson and Tedin (2003, p. 64) define an ideology as a
―set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved,‖ while Denzau and
North (1994, p. 24) define ideology as ―the shared framework of mental models that groups of
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individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to
how that environment should be structured.‖ Moreover, Jost et al (2009, p. 309) note that
―specific ideologies crystallize and communicate…widely shared beliefs, opinions, and
values…endeavor to describe or interpret the world as it is…to envision the world as it should
be…[and] represent socially shared but competing philosophies of life and how it should be
lived.‖ When TNGO leaders discuss their organizational missions, they reveal their beliefs about
appropriate strategies for addressing social and political challenges. It is in this latter sense that
leaders evince ideologies of activism that condition how they perceive their sociopolitical
environment and choose to act within it.

Data

To understand how leaders conceptualize transnational activism, leaders were asked about their
organizational missions and activities. Interviewers asked TNGO leaders across the United States
the following question: ―In general, what would you say your organization is trying to
accomplish?‖ After a thorough review of initial interview transcripts for emergent themes, eight
substantive codes were developed to capture leaders‘ open-ended responses. These include
capacity building (for example, improvement of nonprofits, institutions, sectors, targets, media
sector, civil society), service delivery (for example, direct implementation), education (for
example, public awareness education), advocacy (for example, advocating policy change,
lobbying institutional targets), fundraising or grant management, grassroots mobilization (for
example, working in communities, organizing protests, getting people to act), research and

57
compliance monitoring (for example, enforcing compliance primarily through monitoring).
Leaders‘ responses are distributed across 151 valid cases.

The eight codes may be alternatively regarded as eight binary response variables. Because these
variables are not mutually exclusive, mathematically there are 2 8 possible response patterns
corresponding to 256 different ways in which leaders could have described their organizations‘
missions. Since a typical human analyst can only consider about seven of these patterns
simultaneously, quantification and automated classification analysis must be employed to
facilitate exploratory analysis (Grimmer & King, 2009). In the following section, I use discrete
factor analysis (DFA) to search for underlying structure in leaders‘ response patterns.

Respondents were also asked how much their organizations were engaged in specific activities.
Leaders were asked the following question:

We‘re interested in how your organization pursues its mission and on which activities it
focuses. I‘m going to mention several different kinds of activities and I would like you to
rank them from 1 to 5 (with 1 being low and 5 being high) according to how much time
your organization is engaged in each. In addition, we would like to know what kinds of
things you do within these domains. Here is a sheet that lists the categories.

Leaders may also have been prompted with the following probe. ―So would you say this is a
primary activity, a secondary activity, something you do on an as needed or in an ad hoc fashion,
or that you rarely, if at all, engage in?‖ Regardless of how leaders chose to respond to the
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question—some rated each activity, some ranked the activities, others discussed them more
qualitatively—each activity was coded as either ‗primary,‘ ‗secondary‘ or respondent‘s
organization ‗does not do.‘ As the question implies, the five categories of activities were
predetermined by the interviewer, who handed respondents a sheet of paper listing the activities.
The activities are direct aid and services, research and public education, mobilization of the
public (for example, grassroots political campaigns, organizing public protests), advocacy and
monitoring (for example, monitoring compliance with policies, international agreements and
commitments). Leaders‘ responses to this complete series of questions are distributed across 116
valid cases.

The five categories of organizational activities may be alternatively regarded as five
trichotomous response variables. Because these variables are not mutually exclusive,
mathematically there are 35 possible response patterns corresponding to 243 different ways in
which leaders could have described their organizations‘ activities. Again, discrete factor analysis
will be used to identify latent structure in the data.

I assume that leaders‘ understandings of their organizational missions and activities are derived
from their ideologies of activism. These ideologies describe how leaders choose to approach the
global challenges their organizations confront. In the next section, I use DFA to identify
underlying ideological dimensions that explain leaders‘ response patterns. These dimensions
yield a typology, which is introduced and discussed in the sections that follow.

Analysis
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Magidson and Vermunt (2003; n.d.) have shown that a latent class model consisting of four
clusters is analogous to a discrete factor model consisting of two dichotomous latent factors, with
the added benefit that the discrete factor model requires fewer parameters and is therefore more
parsimonious. Since a discrete factor model offers greater explanatory power than a latent class
model with the same number of parameters, I estimate discrete factor models to understand
leaders‘ ideologies toward transnational activism. The models estimated to explain how leaders
understand their organizational missions are summarized in table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Models for organizational mission
Model
name

Model type

LL

L²

pvalue

ΔL²

%
ΔL²

pvalue

Class.
Error

BVRs

Model_M0
Model_M1

1-Cluster
1-DFactor(2)

-657.24
-634.05

175.95
129.59

0.01
0.33

.
46.36

.
26

.
.

0.00
0.08

Fail
Fail

Model_M2

2-DFactor(2,2)

-627.00

115.47

0.47

14.12

34

0.40

0.09

Pass

61
Model_M0 tests the hypotheses that there is no statistical association among the eight response
variables for organizational mission. This model may also be regarded as the model of
homogeneous or random response patterns. This hypothesis is rejected since the L2 p-value for
Model_M0 is well below the conventional threshold.14 Model_M1 tests for the presence of a
single discrete factor and provides adequate model fit according to the L2 p-value. However, this
model contains an unacceptable local dependency and therefore fails to explain the association in
the data. Model_M2 tests for the presence of two discrete factors. This is the most parsimonious
model that successfully explains the association among the response variables and is therefore
the preferred model.

The results for Model_M2 are displayed in table 4.2. Level1 of DFactor1 describes about 66
percent of respondents. Based on (nominal) average expenditure data for sampled organizations
over the period 2001 to 2006, these leaders direct about 71 percent of US TNGO resources.
These leaders were more likely to have discussed service delivery than leaders at Level2.

Level2 of Dfactor1 describes about 34 percent of respondents directing about 29 percent of the
resources. Leaders at Level2 were more likely to have mentioned capacity building, education,
advocacy, fundraising or grant management, grassroots mobilization, research and compliance
monitoring.

DFactor1 appears to measure a service delivery-advocacy or operational-campaigning
dimension (Kaldor, 2003; Willetts, 2002). DFactor1 will be tentatively labeled ‗strategy.‘ Level1
will be labeled ‗amelioration‘ to indicate the nearly exclusive emphasis on service delivery and
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Level2 will be labeled ‗empowerment‘ to indicate the greater propensities toward more
empowering strategies such as advocacy, education, capacity building and grassroots
mobilization.
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Table 4.2: Results for Model_M2 (independent probabilities)
DFactor1
Level1 Level2
0.66
0.34

Prob.(Level)

Capacity building
Service delivery
Education
Advocacy
Fundraising or grant management
Grassroots mobilization
Research
Compliance

pvalue
0.05
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.14
0.00
0.04
0.01

0.48
0.65
0.44
0.07
0.20
0.07
0.11
0.02

DFactor2
Level1 Level2
0.77
0.23

0.69
0.27
0.61
0.78
0.43
0.44
0.17
0.10
n = 151

0.56
0.55
0.46
0.26
0.32
0.19
0.02
0.00

0.53
0.43
0.60
0.49
0.12
0.21
0.50
0.21
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Level1 of Dfactor2 describes about 77 percent of respondents directing about 84 percent of the
sample‘s resources. These leaders were more likely than those at Level2 to have discussed
capacity building, service delivery and fundraising or grant management.

Level2 of DFactor2 describes about 23 percent of respondents directing about 16 percent of the
resources. These leaders were more likely to have talked about education, advocacy, grassroots
mobilization, research and compliance monitoring.

DFactor2 is more difficult to interpret. To facilitate interpretation, I have retrieved leaders‘
actual statements about their organizational missions from the interview transcripts for those
assigned to Level2 of DFactor2 (mean PMP = 0.89). To discipline analysis and mitigate the risk
of misinterpreting atypical evidence as typical, I focus analysis on exemplary qualitative
evidence. The exemplarity of a leader‘s qualitative evidence for Level2 of DFactor2 is defined
as the probability that the he or she belongs at Level2 of DFactor2. This probability is the
leader‘s PMP for the modal assignment. A PMP close to zero indicates that a leader‘s statements
are not likely to provide good qualitative evidence to facilitation interpretation, while PMP close
to one indicates that a leader‘s statements are very likely to provide good qualitative evidence to
aid interpretation. Leader‘s statements have been interpreted within the contexts of the complete
interview transcripts, which are organized in the CAQDAS for efficient querying. Interview
dates for quotations are provided in the appendix.

One typical leader (ID = 7, PMP = 1.00) at Level2 of DFactor2 emphasized awareness-raising.
The respondent said that ―the main thing that we're trying to do is to promote environmental
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protection by [increasing] attention to—and promoting—environmental law, better
environmental policies and… environmental management.‖ Another respondent (ID = 17, PMP
= 1.00), whose organization focuses on environmental issues such as overfishing, said his or her
organization uses a scorecard system to name and shame transgressors—a classic example of the
use of information politics to enforce compliance with international norms (Keck & Sikkink,
1998). ―Overfishing has been an issue that has existed for decades at this point,‖ the respondent
said.

We focused on one, a score card to show who is doing the best on what practices we have
in hand. And that actually takes the data provided by the government, sorts it out
according to which [entities] are actually implementing practices that are better than
others. It applies a grade based on publicly available data and says one is better or worse
than another.

―Name and shame technique?‖ the interviewer asked. ―That's right,‖ the respondent confirmed,
―and then to monitor over-fishing.‖ Level2 of DFactor2 appears to account for whether leaders
are amenable to information politics, especially involving research, advocacy and compliance
monitoring, as commonly cited in the international relations literature on transnational activism
(Hafner-Burton, 2008; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). However, it may seem surprising that less than a
quarter of leaders seem to favor this approach. The strategic use of ideas, considered a major tool
in the repertoire of TNGOs, appears surprisingly rare given the emphasis it often receives in
scholarly work (Hafner-Burton, 2008; Ron et al., 2007; Sell & Prakash, 2004).
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DFactor2 will be labeled ‗mode‘ to indicate leaders‘ preferred mode of influence. Since leaders
at Level2 of DFactor2 are more likely to employ ideational tactics involving education,
advocacy, research and compliance monitoring, Level2 will be labeled ‗ideational,‘ and by
contrast, Level1 will be labeled ‗material.‘

This discrete factor model with two dichotomous factors may also be interpreted as a 4-cluster
latent class model. Table 4.3 summarizes the results of Model_M2 by displaying the joint
probabilities for the two factors. This table implies that there are four ideologies of activism held
by TNGO leaders. Each of these ideologies is discussed in turn using the PMPs for leaders‘
modal assignments to retrieve exemplary qualitative evidence to discipline interpretation.
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Table 4.3: Results for Model_M2 (joint probabilities)

DFactor1
DFactor2
Prob.(Cluster)

Capacity building
Service delivery
Education
Advocacy
Fundraising or grant management
Grassroots mobilization
Research
Compliance

pvalue
0.05
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.14
0.00
0.04
0.01

Cluster1
Level1
Level1
0.51

Cluster2
Level1
Level2
0.15

Cluster3
Level2
Level1
0.26

Cluster4
Level2
Level2
0.08

0.49
0.68
0.40
0.02
0.23
0.06
0.02
0.00

0.46
0.55
0.55
0.23
0.08
0.07
0.43
0.09

0.69
0.29
0.58
0.72
0.50
0.43
0.04
0.00

0.67
0.19
0.71
0.98
0.22
0.46
0.62
0.43

n = 151

68
Cluster1: Material amelioration

Overall, about half of TNGO leaders are oriented toward material amelioration (mean PMP =
0.81). This ideology is most prevalent among leaders from relief and development TNGOs.
These leaders characterize their missions primarily in terms of service delivery, representing a
relatively traditional, charitable role conceptualization for transnational NGO leaders.

An example of the material amelioration ideology is provided by a leader (ID = 60, PMP = 0.94)
who said ―Our role, our real expertise or core capability is processing medical analysis supplies.
We can take large, bulk, mixed truckloads of medical supplies, process them, refine them to
usable products, and that's what we try to do.‖ Further emphasizing the charitable, service
delivery aspect of his or her organization‘s mission, the respondent added that ―we're trying to
improve the delivery of healthcare, and we do that by gathering, processing and distributing
medical and other health supplies to other charities.‖ Clearly, this leader is interested in the
charitable distribution of material, not organizing public protests or engaging in contentious
information politics.

Another leader (ID = 97, PMP = 0.94) emphasized the ameliorative aspect of the orientation.
―The bottom line is the alleviation of poverty,‖ he or she said. ―That is really through supporting
microfinance organizations around the world that are really trying to do what [DELETED] did,
in terms of creating a large, self-sufficient organization that is able to reach massive numbers of
poor people.‖ Here the product, credit, is more abstract but similarly conceptualized as a means
for ameliorating social problems with resources such as money rather than contentious advocacy.
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Cluster2: Ideational amelioration

The mission orientation of ideational amelioration tends to involve service delivery and
education, followed by capacity building and research (mean PMP = 0.79) This role
conceptualization appears to place about equal emphasis on service delivery and education,
suggesting that neither strategy is substantially privileged. Interestingly, Jaeger (2007, pp. 266,
272) suggests that TNGOs specifically utilize ―public awareness, information and education
campaigns‖ to promote ―neo-liberal governmentality,‖ although leaders tend to regard public
education as means of augmenting service delivery.

Ideational amelioration is most prevalent among environmental TNGOs. A leader (ID = 9, PMP
= 0.95) from an environmental TNGO said that his or her organization is ―…trying to protect the
great ecological systems of the planet that enable us to live.‖ Moreover, ―we are wrestling, we
want to run global campaigns on these global ecological threats, global warming, protection of
the oceans, stuff that spreads, genetically modified organisms, nuclear proliferation, toxic
chemicals, and ancient forests.‖ He or she also thought that ―…if we get that stuff right, then the
planet, and the humanity lives to fight all these good fights, a woman's right to choose, gays to
marry, whatever it may be, right?‖ Such a mission orientation is difficult to categorize, but it
appears that the crux of the approach involves leveraging ideology and information to achieve
material change.
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Another leader, also from the environmental sector (ID = 21, PMP = 0.94), appeared to favor a
demand-driven approach. The respondent saw his or her organization as providing direct services
in the water sector, coupled with hygiene education and local capacity building, all as mutually
reinforcing components of a broader strategy. The leader also stressed that they ―work with
people in, in local environments who are likewise ready, willing and able to take the initiative on
their own behalf.‖ The respondent elaborated on a specific project as a ―demand-driven
enterprise:‖

…the community‘s investment was not just a psychic one, it was the people in
communities [who] demonstrated that they had the demand for this, it was a demand
driven enterprise because they came forward with labor and materials and actual cash
contributions to make this thing work. And um, we had assumed I think early on we were
very good about finding the right kind of local partners.

In its fuller context, it is clear that the leader prefers a participatory approach to development in
which service delivery, education and capacity building concatenate to generate sustainable
outcomes. This contrasts with the more common approach of material amelioration, which
chiefly involves service delivery.

A leader (ID = 23, PMP = 0.90) from a struggling human rights organization brings another
perspective to ideational amelioration. The respondent candidly admitted that his or her
organization‘s mission was:
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well until recently I think it was to, to sort of keep the lights, on, get us paid our salaries
and, and just you know, keep the shell in place. And ah, be available to receive funding
and to answer inquiries at a very sort of modest level. And we thought that was preferable
than nothing at all because um, where would people go…

Substantively, his or her organization generates and disseminates information to achieve arms
reductions. Given their difficult financial position, the respondent clarified that ―mainly the
objective then right now is to disseminate information… but in a, in a passive [manner] and I
mean that in a neutral sense.‖ The term ideational amelioration should not be taken to mean
‗making people feel better,‘ but rather indicates that some leaders view information
dissemination as a form of service delivery. The four most prevalent indicators for this view,
service delivery, education, capacity building and research, when contrasted with the profiles for
the other ideologies, collectively emphasize the ideational aspects of delivering services. Again
this also contrasts with the most prominent role conceptualization of material amelioration,
which focuses primarily on service delivery.

Cluster3: Material empowerment

About a quarter of TNGO leaders subscribe to an ideology of material empowerment (mean
PMP = 0.82). Material empowerment is most likely to involve advocacy, capacity building and
education. This orientation aims at providing beneficiaries with the resources they need to live
more engaged and empowered lives. It is most common among conflict resolution and human
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rights organizations. A leader (ID = 118, PMP = 0.97) holding this view described the evolution
of his or her organization‘s goals and strategies as follows.

…in the very beginning we started out being in an organization working for peace that
um, was doing political work. And…this is all political what we do, but somewhere after
the first year or two um, people over there started asking, they need help. And um, we
continued some of the…political work but we changed our focus to doing projects over
there to help children, and that‘s the main focus of this organization is to you know, give
hope and…make the lives of children a little bit easier and to work for justice.

More concretely, the leader offered that, ―we built playgrounds, parks and playgrounds. And we
support women‘s projects and embroidery projects and we also um, support, we set up a
computer lab at the [DELETED] refugee camp…‖ The respondent seems to believe that
providing the right materials and infrastructure can help instill an empowering sense of hope
among beneficiaries. Although his or her organization initially focused on political engagement,
it eventually adopted more materialistic programming.

Scholars have observed trends among NGOs that have been interpreted as a convergence
between development and human rights programming and a shift toward increased politicization
in the humanitarian sector (Barnett, 2009; P. J. Nelson & Dorsey, 2003). As a possible
illustration of this trend, another leader (ID = 139, PMP = 0.96) described how his or her
organization had ―been growing into advocacy.‖ He or she identified fundraising, awarenessraising and public education as core organizational foci.
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Well, I think that the primary function of the US office is to generate funding for projects
all over the world, raising money from various sources—corporations, governments,
private individuals, foundations. We also do advocacy in the United States and public
awareness…we want poverty and justice issues to become more important to American
citizens so that they put pressure on their elected officials for just and effective policies
that are friendly to the poor.

This respondent also emphasized that his or her organization strove to have a ―transforming
impact‖ not only on beneficiaries, but also on donors. The leader‘s organization uses fundraising
as an opportunity to influence donors. ―We are trying to deepen the relationships that donors
have—not to just send us a check every month, but to become a volunteer, to become engaged in
advocacy, to email a congressman,‖ the leader said. The conceptualization of material
empowerment involves leveraging physical and financial resources to promote social or political
empowerment.

Cluster4: Ideational empowerment

The orientation of ideational empowerment is potentially the most transformative ideology and is
most common among human rights organizations (mean PMP = 0.88). It is dominated by
advocacy, as well as education, capacity building and research, and it is the least likely to
involve service delivery. The conjunction of research and compliance monitoring implies an
affinity for information or accountability politics (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). One of these
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uncommon leaders (ID = 29, PMP = 0.98) described his or her organization as ―an incubator for
activists.‖ His or her organization seeks ―peace‖ by holding states accountable to international
human rights norms.

…our kind of founding principles are the UN declaration of human rights. We would like
to have that adopted internationally. We would like our government to respect the UN
declaration of human rights, which includes both political rights and economic rights.
And so we have concentrated a lot on the economic rights because we think they, they are
ignored or have been ignored in the past by a lot of the larger [NGOs], human rights
organizations.

Another leader (ID = 11, PMP = 1.00) said that his or her organization is trying to achieve:

a world where the rights of people [who] live along rivers are respected and where the,
those people have a say in decision making…and where ecological values of rivers are
respected. And beyond that, that's the sort of narrower range, beyond that, a world where
in general development decision making is much more participative and democratic and
environmentally conscious and there's more say for communities and civil society in
decision-making to try and to counteract the power of the state and corporations.

Notably, this leader also acknowledged that his or her organization frequently produced reports
and organized events as tactics for achieving sociopolitical change. From the leader‘s discussion
it is clear that he or she believes that environmental issues persist in the context of broader social
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and political power structures. For leaders holding such views transnational engagement may
involve overt political contention.

This ideology of ideational empowerment is most starkly contrasted with the much more
common and traditional ideology of material amelioration. Whereas material amelioration
mainly involves traditional service delivery, ideational empowerment involves strategies that are
likely to be more contentious and sociopolitically transformative.

Discussion

Overall, most leaders (about 51 percent) believe that the best way to approach global challenges
is with traditional, charitable strategies consistent with material amelioration. Based on
(nominal) average expenditure data for the period 2001-2006, leaders holding this ideology
direct about 56 percent of the sample‘s resources. Slightly more than a quarter of leaders (about
26 percent) believe in material empowerment or the leveraging of physical and financial
resources to achieve sociopolitical empowerment. These leaders direct about 15 percent of the
resources. About 15 percent of leaders directing about 28 percent of the resources favor
ideational amelioration. They employ ideational strategies to achieve material results.
Comparatively few (about 8 percent) leaders directing only about one percent of the resources
appear to subscribe to a transformative ideology of ideational empowerment.

As described above, leaders‘ ideologies are unevenly distributed within different sectors. Their
organizations were classified into five sectors (human rights, conflict resolution, sustainable
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development, environment and humanitarian relief) by Charity Navigator, the nonprofit ratings
agency in the United States from which the sample was drawn. Table 4.4 summarizes the
relationship between ideology and sector.
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Table 4.4: Ideological orientation by sector

Material
amelioration

Ideological
orientation

Ideational
amelioration
Material
empowerment
Ideational
empowerment

Percentage total
Count total
Chi2 contribution
total

Environment
41%

Human
Rights
14%

Sector
Humanitarian
Relief
81%

9

3

26

49

3

1.3
36%

7.2
5%

2.5
3%

3.1
5%

2.4
8%

8
17.4
9%

1
0.5
62%

1
1.3
16%

3
1.5
17%

1
0
67%

2
2.4
14%

13
10.6
19%

5
1.3
0%

11
1.8
2%

8
7.7
0%

3
2.9

4
7.5

0
1.7

1
1.7

0
0.6

100%
22

100%
21

100%
32

100%
64

100%
12

24

25.8

6.8

8.1

10.8

n = 151, Chi2(12) = 75.44, p = 0.00

Sustainable
Development
77%

Conflict
Resolution
25%
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According to the chi-squared decomposition, ideational amelioration is unexpectedly common in
the environmental sector, while material empowerment is unexpectedly common in the human
rights sector. Material amelioration is unexpectedly predominant in the sustainable development
and humanitarian relief sectors, while material empowerment is unexpectedly predominant in the
conflict resolution sector. Confrontational ideational tactics like naming and shaming may be
seen as too contentious or counterproductive for leaders in the conflict resolution sector.

The distributions of ideologies within the humanitarian relief and sustainable development
sectors are strikingly similar. This indicates that leaders of these two types of organizations
appear to think similarly about the appropriate way to approach global challenges. This may be
unsurprising given that some scholars have argued that the distinction between humanitarianism
and development is increasingly a false dichotomy (Slim, 2000).

Leaders‘ ideologies are intuitively distributed across the service delivery-advocacy divide. Using
secondary data from organizations‘ websites and annual reports, an independent coder classified
each TNGO as ‗service-oriented,‘ ‗advocacy-oriented‘ or ‗both.‘ Table 4.5 summarizes the
relationship between ideology and function.
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Table 4.5: Ideological orientation by function

Function
Advocacy Service
15%
84%
Material
amelioration

Ideational
amelioration
Ideological
orientation
Material
empowerment
Ideational
empowerment

Percentage
total
Count total
Chi2
contribution
total

Both
54%

5

59

26

10.9
15%
5

7.2
4%
3

0.2
13%
6

1.2
55%
18

1.9
10%
7

0.5
29%
14

10.5
15%
5

6.8
1%
1

0.2
4%
2

6

2

0.1

100%

100%

100%

33

70

48

28.8

17.8

1.1

n = 151, Chi2(6) = 47.66, p =
0.00
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Organizations coded as service-oriented tend to be headed by leaders holding ideologies of
material amelioration, while those regarded as advocacy-oriented are most likely to be headed by
leaders adhering to strategies of material empowerment. The chi-squared decomposition shows
that material amelioration is unexpectedly common among service organizations and
unexpectedly uncommon among advocacy organizations. Additionally, empowering orientations
are unexpectedly predominant among advocacy organizations and unexpectedly uncommon
among service organizations.

Independently, DFactor1 (strategy) is strongly associated with function (n = 151, chi2(1) =
35.68, p = 0.00). About 70 percent of leaders from advocacy organizations favor empowerment
while about 89 percent of leaders from service organizations favor amelioration. This suggests
that in the context of TNGOs‘ missions, ‗service‘ is bound up with ‗amelioration‘ and
‗advocacy‘ with ‗empowerment,‘ independently of whether leaders‘ organizations employ
ideational tactics (as this has been ‗factored out‘). Given the similarities in the coding schemes
for mission and function, this result may also be interpreted as a form of cross-validation.

The relationship between DFactor2 (mode) and function is also significant (n = 151, chi2(1) =
11.14, p = 0.00). Respondents from all types of organizations prefer material over ideational
modes of engagement, even though leaders from advocacy TNGOs are about five times more
likely to employ ideational tactics.

Cross-validation
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As discussed above, leaders were also handed a sheet of paper listing five activities and asked to
rate how much time their organizations spent engaged with each category of activity. The
existence if these data as well as the data from the interview question about organizational
mission introduces the possibility of cross-validation between the two areas of the interview
protocol. We expect a similar factor or factors to emerge within the context of organizational
activities as in the context of organizational mission.
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Table 4.6: Models for organizational activities
Model
name
Model_A0
Model_A1
Model_A2

Model type
1-Cluster
1-DFactor(2)
2-DFactor(2,2)

LL
-561.73
-515.48
-500.78

L²
234.77
142.28
112.88

pvalue
0.00
0.07
0.20

ΔL²
.
92.49
29.40

%ΔL²
.
39
52

pvalue
.
.
0.03

Class.
Error
0.00
0.06
0.05

BVRs
Fail
Pass
Pass
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Table 4.6 summarizes the models for organizational activities. The first model, Model_A0, is the
null model. The low L2 p-value indicates that unexplained association exists among the five
trichotomous response variables. Model_A1 provides adequate fit according to the L2 p-value
and successfully explains the bivariate associations among the response variables. However,
Model_A2 provides a statistically significant improvement in model fit over Model_A1 as
measured by the ΔL2 p-value. Since Model_A2 provides significantly better fit than Model_A1,
Model_A2 is the preferred model. The results of Model_A2 are presented in table 4.7.
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Table 4.7: Results for Model_A2 (independent probabilities)
DFactor1
Level1 Level2
0.68
0.32

Prob.(Level)

Direct aid and service

pvalue
0.00

Research and public
education

0.00

Mobilization

0.00

Advocacy

0.00

Monitoring

0.00

Primary
Secondary
Does not do
Primary
Secondary
Does not do
Primary
Secondary
Does not do
Primary
Secondary
Does not do
Primary
Secondary
Does not do

0.81
0.08
0.11
0.24
0.59
0.17
0.05
0.32
0.62
0.08
0.53
0.39
0.00
0.31
0.69

DFactor2
Level1 Level2
0.65
0.35

0.49
0.11
0.41
0.72
0.28
0.00
0.53
0.34
0.14
0.71
0.29
0.01
0.39
0.52
0.09
n = 116

0.72
0.05
0.23
0.43
0.42
0.15
0.31
0.06
0.63
0.32
0.30
0.39
0.07
0.37
0.56

0.69
0.16
0.15
0.33
0.63
0.04
0.01
0.83
0.16
0.22
0.74
0.05
0.24
0.39
0.37
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Level1 of DFactor1 appears to capture the ameliorative orientation centered on direct aid and
services and supplemented by research and public education. Level2 of this factor seems to
reflect a multidimensional approach to empowerment in which leaders believe that their
organizations are primarily engaged in research and public education, advocacy and
mobilization, and secondarily involved in monitoring. This factor will be labeled ‗strategy,‘ as
before, Level1 labeled ‗amelioration‘ and Level2 labeled ‗empowerment.‘

Whereas the first factor discriminates between an ameliorative conception of organizational
activities based on direct aid and services and an empowering conception based on research and
public education, advocacy and mobilization, the second factor appears to distinguish between
strategies of focus versus supplementation.

The profile for Level1 of DFactor2 appears to describe leaders who would rather do something
wholeheartedly or not at all. The activities have relatively low probabilities of being secondary.
Leaders holding this view report that their organizations are engaged in direct aid and services as
well as research and public education. However, they tend to avoid mobilization and monitoring
altogether and seem ambivalent on the appropriate role of advocacy. Overall, these leaders
appear more willing to avoid activities toward which they are not prepared to commit significant
time and resources. Leaders at Level2 of DFactor2, by contrast, believe that their organizations
are engaged in many activities secondarily. Thus, DFactor2 will be labeled ‗scope,‘ Level1
‗focus‘ and Level2 ‗supplementation.‘
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The discrete factor models estimated for organizational mission and organizational activities may
be assessed for concordant validity. In both contexts factors emerged appearing to measure an
amelioration-empowerment dimension. Table 4.8 displays a confusion matrix showing the
concordance between the assignment solutions for mission DFactor1 (strategy) and activities
DFactor1 (strategy).
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Table 4.8: Confusion matrix

Mission Strategy (DFactor1)
Amelioration
Empowerment
(Level1)
(Level2)
Activities
Strategy
(DFactor1)

Amelioration
(Level1)
Empowerment
(Level2)

64

17

13

21

n = 115, chi2(1) = 18.00, p = 0.00
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As shown in table 4.8, there are 85 concordant pairs relative to 30 discordant pairs, yielding
concurrence of about 74 percent. Additionally, a chi-squared test for independence reveals that
these two factors are statistically associated. Transnational NGO leaders appear to be about twice
as likely to hold an ameliorative orientation toward transnational activism as an empowering
orientation. This result is consistent within the contexts of both organizational mission and
activities.

Analysis of coder and interviewer biases

With data of this nature it is important to determine whether the results described above are truly
reflective of leaders‘ ideologies toward transnational activism and not mere artifacts of
interviewer baiting or coder bias. The results of tests for these influences are provided in table
4.9.
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Table 4.9: Tests for bias

Test
Coder ID
Mission
Interviewer
ID
Coder ID
Activities
Interviewer
ID

Variable
Strategy
(DF1)
Mode (DF2)
Strategy
(DF1)
Mode (DF2)
Strategy
(DF1)
Scope (DF2)
Strategy
(DF1)
Scope (DF2)

n

Chi2

d.f.

pvalue

151
151

6.90
2.38

4
4

0.14
0.67

151
151

16.41
4.48

6
6

0.01
0.61

116
116

4.90
12.26

4
4

0.30
0.02

116
116

8.22
2.46

6
6

0.22
0.87
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There is no evidence that coder bias is driving the result for organizational mission, as indicated
by the high p-value for the respective independence test. However, the variable for interviewer
identification (ID) is statistically related to the first discrete factor describing mission strategy.
The explanation is twofold. First, this evidence is not unexpected since interviewers were
nonrandomly assigned to respondents to facilitate rapport and maximize respondent candor. The
effect then may not be bias in the undesirable sense, but simply an effect of the assignment
procedure. To further assess the nature and extent of interviewer bias, the two primary
interviewers were contacted and asked to discuss their recollections about the interview
processes. Both interviewers effectively indicated that the association is spurious. Interviewers
were assigned to undertake multiple interviews in particular geographic areas where various
functional or sectoral foci tended to predominate among organizations. For example, both
interviewers commented that Washington, DC tended to host more sustainable development,
humanitarian relief and service delivery TNGOs, while New York, NY tended to host more
human rights, conflict resolution and advocacy TNGOs. One interviewer conducted a cluster of
interviews in Washington, DC, while the other conducted a cluster of interviews in New York,
NY.

As a result of their recollections, I performed additional tests between interviewer ID and
mission DFactor1 (strategy), controlling for the geographic location of the interview. The results
indicate that there are no independent interviewer bias effects (all p-values > 0.05). Caution is
still warranted, however, due to poorly populated tables, but within the best populated cells the
observed counts are very close to the expected counts, mitigating this concern.
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Although there is no evidence of interviewer bias regarding the types of activities respondents
believe their organizations are engaged in, there does appear to be some coder bias with respect
to the scope of such activities. This is most likely due to individual differences in how coders
interpreted whether specific activities were primary, secondary or not engaged in at all. Figure 1
shows that coders are spread vertically along the factor for activities DFactor2 (scope). The two
lines inside the graph intersect with the graph‘s axes to indicate the probabilities of being at
Level2 of each discrete factor.

92
Figure 4.1: Coder bias

DFactor2
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Coder 3
Coder 5
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0.0
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0.6

0.8

1.0
DFactor1
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Coder 3 is the furthest vertically from the intersection, revealing a propensity toward
supplementation (Level2 of DFactor2), while coder 4 has a propensity toward focus (Level1 of
DFactor2). An independence test and chi-squared decomposition confirms that coder 3‘s
propensity toward supplementation alone accounts for more than half of the chi-squared
statistic‘s magnitude.15 These tests suggest that activities DFactor2 (scope) may be a trivial
factor generated by coder bias. This factor should be interpreted cautiously.

Overall, tests for interviewer and coder biases do not reveal significant threats to the validity of
the main results presented in table 3.1.

Conclusion

It is often taken for granted that TNGO leaders are contentious activists who employ information
politics to influence targets and mobilize support to achieve sociopolitical transformation. But
proponents expounding the potential of professionalized transnational activism to transform
world politics typically focus on the least common types of TNGOs. According to data gathered
in the United States, most professional transnational activists directing most of the resources
appear to subscribe to an ideology of material amelioration, not ideational empowerment, as
summarized in table 4.10.
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Table 4.10: Ideological efficacy

Material
Mode
Ideational

Strategy
Amelioration Empowerment
51% of
26% of
leaders
leaders
56% of
15% of
expenditures expenditures
15% of
8% of leaders
leaders
28% of
1% of
expenditures expenditures
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Of course more research is needed to understand the perspectives of TNGO leaders outside of
the United States. Future research might also attempt to identify differences between
professional and amateur transnational activists.
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CHAPTER FIVE: AUTOMOMY AND COLLABORATION

Do TNGOs contest states from the outside or are they part and parcel of the international
system? Scholars question whether transnational NGOs are authentic norm entrepreneurs,
vehicles for global norms and ideas or merely state subcontractors (Berkovitch & Gordon, 2008;
Cooley & Ron, 2002; DeMars, 2005; Martha Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Halliday, 2001;
Josselin & Wallace, 2001c). In the first instance, TNGOs originate norms which they propagate
within global civil society and among powerful actors like corporations and governments.
However, TNGOs may also be viewed as vehicles for global norms. In this view, norms emerge
organically within civil society and eventually become institutionalized in the mandates of
TNGOs. Transnational NGOs represent the values of grassroots civil society and leverage
information politics to hold actors accountable to universal principles. Finally, in a critical view
TNGOs are simply subcontractors paid to enact the foreign policies of states and promote the
public relations interests of corporations.

Many variations exist on these perspectives. For instance, Josselin and Wallace (2001b, p. 252)
maintain that ―…the arrival of think-tanks and NGOs on the international stage as vehicles for
expertise and agenda-setters can hardly be overstated,‖ while later they cautiously note that
―Many non-state actors further remain dependent (at least in part) on the state for funding their
activities, and are willing to serve as conduits for the foreign policy of their government.‖
(2001b, p. 258) Others question (Halliday, 2001) or simply assume (Cooley & Ron, 2002) that
TNGOs are basically subcontractors rather than autonomous actors in their own rights. Still other
scholars, such as Berkovitch and Gordon (2008), argue that the situation is more complex: states
influence donors who influence TNGO programming. But in most cases TNGO subordination is
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understood as undesirable on the presumption that the proper role of TNGOs in world affairs is
to challenge states and corporations rather than collaborate with them.

Normative implications are often premised upon unstated assumptions about what TNGOs are
supposed to be doing. If TNGOs are independent watchdogs keeping states and corporations in
check, then TNGO subservience to donors and powerful institutions is undesirable. If however
TNGOs are supposed to be well-behaved fiduciary agents duly executing their contracts with
donors, then TNGO subservience is a desirable condition.

Scholars disagree over the implications of TNGO subservience. Sanyal (1997, p. 31) decries the
―autonomy fetish‖ and argues that decoupling TNGOs from state and market institutions is selfdefeating, whilc Cooley and Ron (2002) argue that TNGOs need to diversify funding sources to
preserve autonomy since the fiercely competitive marketplace for contracts undermines TNGOs‘
missions. Such arguments for and against TNGO autonomy vis-à-vis states and corporations are
premised upon different assumptions about the appropriate role of TNGOs in world affairs.

Regardless of the desirability of organizational autonomy, scholars seem to underestimate the
nature and degree of autonomy-preserving strategic behavior among TNGOs. Further
complicating matters, TNGO leaders exhibit qualitatively different collaborative styles. Some
TNGOs refuse to accept corporate or government support, while others routinely receive
corporate donations and coordinate with government ministries. Leaders also report various
benefits and obstacles to collaborations that are not well known. Each of these topics is discussed
in the sections that follow.
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Financial autonomy

When interviewers with the Transnational NGO Interview Project asked leaders if there were
any additional topics they would like to discuss that were not covered by the protocol,
respondents reported that more attention could have been paid to discussing the impact of
funding. Acknowledging this insight, two related questions were added to the interview protocol.
The first question asked: ―Can you describe how you secure funders and resources for your
organization?‖ Responses were captured with a general qualitative code, description of how
funders and resources are secured, to facilitate information retrieval for qualitative analysis. The
follow-up question asked ―How does the need to secure funding affect your goals, strategies and
the organization internally?‖ Again, responses were captured with a general qualitative code,
effect of the need to secure funding, to assist with information retrieval for qualitative analysis.
Because these codes have no meaningful quantitative interpretations, they are not included in the
quantitative dataset as variables. Additionally, from a statistical standpoint there is no possibility
for structured, facilitated inquiry using finite mixture modeling since leaders‘ response vectors
contain a maximum of one response variable.

However, the qualitative data are quite rich. To proceed with analysis, all quotations coded with
effect of the need to secure funding were extracted and reviewed. These quotations contain about
29,000 words. Particularly insightful quotations have been selected discretionarily.

A large part of the debate over TNGO autonomy turns upon a chicken-or-the-egg problem: does
funding drive programming or does programming drive funding? ―There‘s always that tension...‖

99
one leader said, ―do you pursue your own vision and mission or do you get driven by the agendas
of your donors‖ (ID = 4)? If money principally determines where organizations work, what they
do and how they do it, then transnational NGOs are essentially subcontractors; if they are
mission-driven organizations that rely upon the trust and generosity of altruistic donors, then
they exercise considerable discretion and autonomy to influence world politics in ways that may
run counter to the interests of states and corporations.

Many organizations appear to zealously guard their missions even at the expense of losing
donors or turning down potentially lucrative contracts. However, these same organizations also
express a broad willingness to adapt their strategies and programs to accommodate the demands
of funders, as long as donor requirements fall within the general contours of their supervening
goals and principles.

At least two alternative characterizations of TNGOs are possible. A naïve view implies that
TNGOs are authentic representatives of global civil society that raise resources on the basis of
their programs (e.g. Boli & Thomas, 1999a; Warkentin, 2001), while a cynical view suspects that
TNGOs are merely subcontractors competing for contracts issued by states and other resourseful
institutions (e.g. Cooley & Ron, 2002).

These two perspectives should be understood within the context of a conceptual distinction that
many TNGO leaders articulated. Respondents consistently distinguished between their
organizations‘ general missions and their specific programs, tending to be fiercely protective of
the former and strategically accommodating with respect to the latter. The mission-program
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distinction is subtle but important. For example, one respondent (ID = 144) said that ―by in large,
foundations are determining—much like big money determining candidates and…politics in the
United States—foundations determine quite often the direction of programs,‖ whereas another
(ID = 32) flatly stated, ―We never have created a goal to match a foundation‘s requirement.‖ The
naïve-cynical distinction can be reformulated in part as a question of how deeply donor demands
influence TNGO behavior.

Transnational NGOs may not necessarily reformulate their missions in response to donor
pressure, but they do seem to be highly opportunistic at a programmatic level when lucrative
funding opportunities materialize. ―There's been a couple of programs that we've taken on,‖ one
respondent said, ―that with hindsight, I think we were too influenced by the fact that the money
was available, and it really wasn't a big priority for us, but because the money was there, we did
it.‖ He or she continued that ―usually those don't turn out very well because we don‘t have the
capacity or skills or interest to really do them well. But those were specific programs rather than
broad policy or goals‖ (ID = 11). Another respondent explained how a malaria education
program began ―because [a corporation]…put out a call for proposals…dealing with malaria
in…Africa and we responded to that…There was a funding opportunity to do something that we
probably wouldn‘t have done otherwise.‖ Continuing, ―Similarly, [another corporation] has
um…pushed us into an area that we probably wouldn‘t have gone into otherwise‖ (ID = 59).

Organizations face strong incentives to adopt a subcontracting model that can bring in large
amounts of funds more efficiently than soliciting thousands of small individual contributors. One
small service delivery TNGO encountered such persistent fundraising difficulties with its ―tin
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cup approach‖ that it eventually merged with a much larger organization to better secure its
financial future (ID = 128). ―We‘ve gone from being a mission-driven organization to a contractdriven organization or a client-driven organization, which means the client is the person who
issues a contract, so a client-driven organization,‖ the respondent said. The strategy enabled his
or her organization to take part in a multiyear, multimillion dollar project funded by USAID.

A respondent from a faith-based service delivery TNGO described a similarly contract-driven
strategy (ID = 101).

And so what we try to do is we try to match what we're doing with what foundations are
interested in. And we often frequently end up writing unsolicited proposals and some of
those get funded. Same thing is true of government sources. I mentioned USAID. You
just have to keep your ear the ground to find out what, what it is that they're interested in
funding…you basically have to figure out, okay, what is it that the donor is interested in
and then you try to tailor your requests around that, but always keeping in mind what
you're trying to accomplish with the poor.

Funding can be an important driver of programs and subcontracting can be an effective
fundraising strategy. However, the subcontracting model may undermine organizational
autonomy.

Powerful benefactors capable of influencing TNGO behavior include governments, activist
donors, corporations and foundations. Of these four, governments are generally the most
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controversial and draw the greatest interest from international relations scholars. If TNGOs are
subcontractors to states then their role in world politics is effectively determined by national
interests. Indeed, in one respondent‘s words, ―sometimes you gotta do the bidding of the United
States government and you don‘t have the freedom to do what you want to do. You know they
basically look upon the use of government money as an extension of US government policy.‖
When governments are major funders and TNGOs act as subcontractors, the ―tendency is always
to follow the money and to be dominated by accountability to the US government‖ (ID = 77).

Reflecting strongly upon the political character of what TNGOs do, many leaders implicated
government money as a singularly compromising force to transnational activism. A respondent
from an animal rights TNGO noted that minimizing government funding was organizational
policy ―because we‘re an advocate organization. We [want] to stay away from, from large
government grants because it…inhibits our ability to speak out‖ (ID = 10). The primary concern,
presumably, is that government agencies will strategically withhold or fail to renew funding on
key contracts if a TNGO refuses to cooperate.

A respondent (ID = 28) from a human rights TNGO offered his or her assessment of the risk
involved when challenging government policy on the one hand while receiving government
funding on the other.

We‘ve considered having [to finesse relationships with government funders] and decided
not to. I mean, that‘s kind of the way…what it came down to was we do get money from
the State Department, from USAID, Office of Refugees…but it‘s very straightforward
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contract work, and we made the decision early on that we weren‘t going to change any of
our principles or the way that we do our work, or not speak out on those things and that
we would, you know, ‗God help us,‘ you know, try to deal with, you know any potential
repercussions later. And we haven‘t had those. It was the same piece when we decided,
again I keep coming back to [DELETED], testifying ‗cause that was a very public thing
to do. Very you know, kind of an edgy time, and the decision was made that we would do
it, and we you know, we certainly heard back from that in support and others who
thought maybe we shouldn‘t have, but we did not see any negative impact for
development work or from our contract work.

However, most leaders did not describe government funding as a strategic lever of state control.
Instead, government contracts are often seen as providing bridge money that can be useful for
covering expenses while organizations search for less restrictive contributions. ―We try not to be
donor driven,‖ a typical respondent said. ―In fact, that is a dirty word in [DELETED]. We'll
even, I mean, a lot of NGOs will seek government grants that they don't really want or need but
they feel like they have to have them because they need cash‖ (ID = 139). Overall, large grants
from powerful institutions like states, corporations and foundations can be pursued very
selectively. Leaders accept disproportionately large contracts on the precondition that donor
priorities already cohere with their missions.

We only um, pursue those projects and that funding if it is very, very closely aligned to
what our priorities and what our strategies already are. And I think…it can be very
tempting, right to…to sort of be staring at this five million dollar potential grant—‗Oh
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but that's going to require us to, to do this and that; well we really weren't thinking about
that, but hey it's five million dollars‘—you know? I think that we've been very good so
far, in not going there (ID = 14).

The threat of eroding organizational autonomy with big contracts and large individual
contributions is salient among respondents, and most leaders implement strategies to mitigate
this vulnerability. These strategies include raising unrestricted funds, diversifying funding
sources, educating donors and strategically structuring their organizations transnationally.
Theoretical perspectives that view TNGOs as subcontractors probably apply much more
narrowly to organizations that receive at least a majority of their funding in restricted form and
predominantly from a single source. ―We‘ve really striven to, to try to maintain a very high
percentage of unrestricted money, and non-governmental [money] so we‘re not encumbered by
government regulations, government procurement policy, all the USAID you know, architecture
that comes with that,‖ a respondent from a large TNGO said, ―so we‘re not chasing that money
and…we don‘t chase major donors who want to be highly engaged in restricting and directing
their funding…we‘ll walk away‖ (ID = 69).

Another respondent said that his or her organization targeted unrestricting funding specifically to
avoid the ―whole mission creep thing‖ that often occurs ―when you‘re running around chasing
USAID dollars.‖ The leader continued, ―that was the whole reason behind having a grassroots
independent funding base—to give us that freedom, that flexibility, those unrestricted
resources…‖ (ID = 136). This was echoed by several other respondents, one of whom declared
that moving to a ninety percent unrestricted funding base had ―been extremely effective‖ and had
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―allowed [their] programs to grow tremendously, and it allowed [them] to get away from
government funding…‖ This despite acknowledging that the pursuit of ―unrestricted multiyear
commitments…goes a little bit against the grain of fundraising strategies‖ (ID = 56).

In addition to promoting organizational autonomy, unrestricted funding is valuable to TNGOs
because it can be used to fund administrative and fundraising expenses—essential for
organizational growth and survival—widely disparaged by donors and nonprofit ratings
agencies.

Leaders unable to secure such large proportions of unrestricted funding necessarily adopt mixed
strategies, pursuing unrestricted funds when they can and accepting restricted contributions when
they must. One such respondent said the following (ID = 97):

Several years ago we found that we were a bit too donor driven...we're less that way, but
it still affects us…we are still confined by the interest of our donors, being able to support
certain areas. We can use unrestricted funds for certain things and, of course, we typically
try to raise money as unrestricted, but often the donor will say, ‗Well, it's four packets to
X‘ or ‗It's for the Philippines.‘

It is natural to assume that donors influence TNGOs with restricted money, but less common to
acknowledge that TNGOs influence donors about what they should be funding. Concerted efforts
at donor education constitute another key strategy for supporting TNGO autonomy. Many
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TNGO leaders discover this strategy through experience, such as the following respondent (ID =
17):

RESPONDENT: When we got to [a large number of] projects a handful of years ago,
before the strategic plan, it was because we chased the money. That's the phrase that's
often used. Chasing the money. It's very hard and often very tempting to do it, especially
when resources are scarce, like all the time. But we really try to stick to our knitting, be
extremely rigorous. Funders approaching us, more often a foundation—because the
individuals, more often than not, trust in us to make the decision as to how the program
should lay out—foundations come at us with a specific thing. We try to educate them
around what our programs are and why we're pursuing them compared to anything
else…For our priorities that we're focusing on, we just have to tell people [that] out of all
the things, out of all the recommendations, we feel that these are the
top…recommendations…the most urgent, and we either convince them or we don't.

INTERVIEWER: And if you don't then you…you let that funder go?

RESPONDENT: We let the funder go.

Transnational NGOs and donors actively influence one another and the transnational activism
‗market‘ evinces a similar symmetry. Much is made of the theory that TNGOs are like for-profit
subcontractors that fiercely compete for large contracts in a market for donor resources (e. g.
Cooley & Ron, 2002), but the reverse tends to be underemphasized, that donors compete against
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one another to fund and influence certain TNGOs.

Donors, like TNGOs, have limited resources. Donors presumably attempt to allocate their
contributions among organizations so as to maximize the expected benefits. The numbers of
competent TNGOs that work in specific areas are limited and in many instances TNGOs do
enjoy the luxury of choosing their funders. Transnational NGOs have the most leverage when
they are reputable, offer highly differentiated services and are already funded to scale. One
respondent enjoying this position said the following (ID = 5):

If a donor wants to give us money for something that is not part of what [DELTED] does,
we attempt to educate them as to what [DELETED] is really doing and how it‘s effective
in helping, and how unique [DELETED] is, in the sense that…there isn‘t another
organization [that] does what [DELETED] does…and if there still is not consensus on
that then we do not accept their funds. But we‘re very good at the…it is a very, it is a
very marketable thing…

Funding is a prevalent challenge for TNGOs and identifying worthy organizations to support is a
challenge for donors. Scarcity influences both parties to the transactions, not just TNGOs
searching for contributions but also donors looking for efficacious organizations that match their
values. Both the naïve and cynical views of TNGOs fail to fully appreciate this reciprocity.

Transnational NGOs raise unrestricted funds from diverse sources and attempt to carve niches
and educate donors as strategies for maintaining organizational autonomy. Some also have found
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ways of capitalizing on their transnational organizational structures to the same effect. In the
contemporary funding environment, donors place increasing value on supporting TNGOs based
in the developing ‗South‘ instead of the developed ‗North.‘ Some leaders of US-based
transnational NGOs explained how they were adapting their organizations to meet this new
reality.

Legally speaking we are a [nonprofit corporation], not a partnership, not an individual, so
as an American based organization well we are not eligible for ECHO [European
Commission Humanitarian Aid] money or EU money of any sort and probably even less
from others, maybe Canada, maybe Australia, but not really. So we are going to, we are
creating a sister agency in India that will be…an Indian Society, a nonprofit, that we will
work very closely with, to be able to receive funds from…[non-] US sources (ID = 8).

Another respondent (ID = 132) inasmuch as confirmed this strategy, declaring: ―that‘s one of the
objectives of setting up these [kinds] of [independent] affiliates is that they can tap into funding
as Central American organizations that we cannot tap into [as a] US-based organization.‖ This
particular strategy risks undermining the intent of donors since some US-based TNGOs seem to
be effectively exploiting technical loopholes to access funding intended for Southern NGOs.

Additionally, some TNGOs join formal confederations that allow them to exploit the financial
benefits of transnationalism. This structural strategy enables TNGOs to fundraise globally
through other member organizations, transforming the restrictions that governmental donors
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often place on funds from obstacles into assets. One respondent explained the strategy as follows
(ID = 48):

Different nations have different geographic areas of interest and so one of the strengths of
being in a confederation is that, as a country director, if, for example, the US government
isn't particularly interested in your country—but the Dutch could be interested or the
Danes could be interested or the Brits could be interested—you can work with those
particular national members to get some of the funding that's coming from those
governments.

Transnational NGOs act strategically to mitigate and circumvent donor requirements and
safeguard organizational autonomy. Donors also act strategically by imposing conditionalities on
their contributions. These contrary propensities collide in negotiations between donors and
TNGOs. Government agencies, activist donors and large foundations demand specific
commitments from TNGOs as conditions for disbursement. Transnational NGO leaders admit
that they occasionally adjust their programs to meet donor requirements, but assert that such
accommodations occur squarely within the contexts of their missions. Transnational NGO
leaders also persuade donors to adopt their own priorities and appear to be adept at leveraging
large contracts to fund ongoing expenses while pursuing more desirable funding sources.
Leaders can structure their organizations transnationally to exploit national preferences and
technical loopholes and ultimately many can exercise their prerogative to walk away if they feel
their missions are being threatened.
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Neither the naïve nor cynical view of transnational activism appears to hold up very well
empirically. Rather than favoring one over the other, data suggest that donors and TNGOs
strategically influence one another in a reciprocal, ongoing process of negotiation that primarily
influences the direction of projects, not missions. Overall, organizational autonomy does not
appear to be an all or nothing proposition and evidence suggests that independence is a function
of reputation, specialization, funding diversification and the proportion of unrestricted funds.

Transnational activism achieves a balance between the desire of TNGOs to raise money for
programs and the occasional need to modify programs to conform to donor expectations.
Whether the proverbial funding ‗cart‘ drives the programming ‗horse‘ seems less important than
whether they are both headed in the same direction. As one leader said (ID = 138):

The interesting thing is—this is the chicken and the egg—you have to have the vision and
the program to get the funding. Money follows vision. It isn't, ‗I want to raise all of this
money and then we'll go do this‘ There's that fine line that you have to almost promise,
‗Yes, we will do this, and I'll go find the money.‘ But you have to be very careful or
you're going to get yourself out there on thin ice and then you don't find the money. I
wish that I could say that there's a wonderful formula. I'm sure somebody has a
wonderful formula. But it just sort of works out of my gut in this way.

And another leader said the following (ID = 30):

It‘s a combination of you trying to influence the funders to be interested in the things

111
you‘re interested [in], but in the end, you also get interested in the things that the funders
will fund. And it‘s…I think for every organization, there‘s a fine line of trying to hone to
your values. I think there are plenty of things [DELETED] will not do even if given
money to do…I could even give you examples of that but within your set of values and
the general areas that you‘re interested in, do you skew a little one way or the other
because that‘s where the funding is? Sure.

TNGO leaders constantly negotiate the operational priorities their own organizations identify
with those their donors are willing to fund. Organizations face different types of funding
challenges and tend to adapt pragmatically to their circumstances. For most TNGOs this means
developing a funded activism model with the flexibility to accommodate a certain level of
conflict between donor demands and organizational priorities. This involves a certain level of
―compromise,‖ as one leader termed it, with the commonplace caveat that the outcome be
consistent with the organization‘s overarching mission (ID = 137):

You often have to compromise because funding agencies—be they governments or
individuals or foundations—have a particular point of view. The trick is to obviously
never take money when you don‘t believe in their point of view, but…sometimes their
point of view and yours overlap but not 100 percent. So how you balance what the donor
wants to get out of it with what you want to get out of it takes a lot of time and effort and
skill.

Collaborative style
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The notion of TNGO autonomy can also be understood in relation to collaborative behavior,
namely the extent to which TNGOs collaborate with powerful entities like states and
corporations. Truly independent and autonomous TNGO challenge the status quo by confronting
states and corporations, not partnering with them. If TNGOs restrict their collaborative behavior
only to other NGOs, then TNGOs might be more accurately regarded as agents of an authentic
grassroots global civil society than subservient state subcontractors. To discover how TNGO
leaders understand organizational collaborations, I again analyze data from the Transnational
NGO Interview Project.

Data

Transnational NGO leaders were asked a series of questions about their organizations‘
collaborative relationships. They were first asked about their collaborations with other NGOs
and were then asked ―Do you collaborate with other types of organizations or institutions? Why
or why not?‖ Leaders may also have been prompted as to whether they collaborate with ―NGOs,
international organizations, governments or corporations.‖ Accordingly, four substantive codes
were developed to capture their open-ended responses: NGOs, states, corporations and
intergovernmental organizations. Leaders responses are distributed across 141 valid cases.

Several latent class cluster models were estimated to explore leaders‘ collaborative styles. The
results are presented in table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Models for collaborative style

Model1
Model2
Model3

Model
type
1-Cluster
2-Cluster
3-Cluster

LL
-345.51
-335.68
-335.27

L²
24.15
4.49
3.68

L² pvalue
0.03
0.77
0.97

ΔL²
.
0.81
0.18

ΔL² pvalue
.
0.00
0.97

%ΔL²
.
81
85

Class.
Error
.
0.14
0.34

BVRs
Fail
Pass
Pass
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The null of homogenous or random response patterns is rejected since the L2 p-value for Model1
is within the conventional limit. Model2 contains no local dependencies, provides adequate
model fit, represents a statistically significant improvement over the null model and explains
most of the association among the indicator variables. Model3 offers virtually no improvement
over Model2, so Model2 is the preferred model. The latent class and conditional probabilities are
presented in table 5.2.
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Table 5.2: Results for Model2 (collaborative style)

Prob.(Cluster)

Cluster1
0.63

Cluster2
0.37

0.23
0.38
0.29
0.81

0.60
0.76
0.92
0.95

pvalue
Intergovernmental
organizations
Corporations
States
NGOs

0.01
0.00
0.00
0.11

n = 141
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About 63 percent of leaders vastly prefer to partner with other NGOs than with corporations,
states or intergovernmental organizations. This collaborative style is labeled ‗protective‘ because
favoring partnerships with other NGOs likely serves to protect organizational autonomy.

The remaining 37 percent of leaders describe collaborative relationships not only with other
NGOs, but also with states in almost equal likelihood, followed by corporations and
intergovernmental organizations. This collaborative style is labeled ‗interdependent‘ because
leaders are more likely to partner with a wider range of actors, potentially engendering
relationships of dependence that could threaten organizational autonomy.

Crosstabs between collaborative style, coder ID and interviewer ID did not present strong
evidence of coder bias (n = 141, chi2(4) = 8.18, p = 0.09) or interviewer bias (n = 141, chi2(6) =
5.65, p = 0.46).

Cluster1: The protective collaborative style

This collaborative style (mean PMP = 0.90) describes TNGOs that actively refuse to partner with
states and corporations as a matter of principle as well as organizations that are more passively
selective. In one discussion typical of the protective collaborative style (ID = 9, PMP = 0.98), the
respondent said that his or her organization would only partner with other NGOs:

in a extremely minimal way. Never with governments. And corporations, again,
extremely limited. Always stuff that can be really isolated…if you know, if 3M or GE or
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whomever said, ―We‘ve got a plan,‖ we would not touch it; we just would not touch it.
We could be in an economic crisis and we would not touch it, just would not touch it.

However, most leaders do not harbor this strong distaste, but are nevertheless disinclined to
partner with governments and corporations. One such leader (ID = 24, PMP = 0.98) said that
―there are times when we have friendly conversations with, or conversations that are at least not
unfriendly, or at least they're interested in listening to us with the, you know, government offices.
It's not too often…‖ His or her organization is ―not so much in partnership‖ with governments as
merely in acquaintance with them. ―And with corporations,‖ the respondent continued, ―no. In
fact at the [DELETED] we are not supposed to take money from any corporation or
government…‖

Other leaders are simply highly selective about the types of organizations with which they
collaborate. For example, one leader (ID = 95, PMP = 0.93) admitted that ―we work with a lot of
corporations but we don't work with the U.N., don't work with the World Bank, don't work with
USAID.‖ The respondent added that he or she does not have much faith in the ability of
governments to address social problems, saying that ―we have some very interesting thoughts
about the role of government in, I mean, I do personally, on social services for the poor…I tend
to be, I'm not sure governments are very effective.‖

Still for other leaders other types of organizations are simply not as relevant to them as other
NGOs. One such respondent‘s organization (ID = 31, PMP = 0.99) collaborates with ―labor
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groups‖ and ―HIV groups‖ but the respondent seems to be more focused on his or her
interpersonal relationships with activists in other NGOs:

we clearly collaborate a lot with feminist and women‘s rights organizations. Because the
issues of sexuality have such crossover, and frankly there are a lot of lesbians in each
community doing work, and so there is just this crossover in terms of just our colleagues,
and our long-term colleagues, and some of us have been around if not doing work
internationally, have been around and known people, known each other for a very long
time.

The protective collaborative style favors partnerships with other NGOs, often to the deliberate
exclusion of states, corporations and intergovernmental organizations. Respondents vary in the
intensity of their convictions that organizations other than NGOs should be avoided, but
otherwise the style is straightforward.

Cluster2: The interdependent collaborative style

This collaborative style (mean PMP = 0.79) includes TNGOs that partner with both corporations
and governments, as well as those that partner with corporations but not governments. Many
organizations exhibiting this collaborative style work within the environmental, humanitarian
relief and sustainable development sectors.

One environmental TNGO, for example, regularly collaborates with governments and partners
with major corporations to certify their products (ID = 14, PMP = 0.92):
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We have substantial relationships with companies like [DELETED], and [DELETED],
and [DELETED], and some of the larger [DELETED] companies, beyond just being
certification clients, or whatever, we have our, at our gala every year, we recognize our
corporate partners, they're part of the whole thing, the recognition thing. We call attention
to some of those companies each year, so corporate, and then governments, I mean we
have, you know, formal, like MOU's [memorandums of understanding] with, you know,
ministries, government ministries in various countries, just as sort of, to work toward
similar purposes in the environmental sector, or the tourism sector for example

A leader from another environmental TNGO (ID = 20, PMP = 0.69) candidly explained that his
or her organization works ―with governments, not for governments:‖

since it's anonymous, I will say this…my strategy is that we work with governments, not
for governments. Working for governments is suicide in terms of your money, in terms of
your project, in terms of them stealing everything from you…but that doesn't mean that
we don't work with them. Purposely, we create a program where we don't have to ask for
permission. We don't go and say, "Oh, we're going to be working in this country,"
because then they want to get more involved and get more of a little bita—that's a
Spanish word for "little bite"—they want their part. We try to avoid that.
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A leader from a humanitarian relief organization (ID = 45, PMP = 0.69) explained how his or her
organization collaborates intimately with corporations, governments and NGOs. Adopting a
corporate idiom, the respondent said:

In the global humanitarian assistance program, we basically operate as an intermediary
between the wealth and the capacity of pharmaceutical and medical equipment
companies and resource starved communities. And we systematically cover those
companies. We seek to establish a strategic connection to their corporate philanthropy
and their corporate sustainability and responsibility programs to service their
intermediaries for product donations…

We work with local healthcare providers and intermediaries like the ministries of health
and clinic operators to be our in-country partners and so our objective is to supply them
and strengthen them…

We have some places in which the government is an in-country partner, the Minister of
Health…and to the extent that you‘re working in any of these countries, you at least have
to have a relationship with the Ministry of Health. But, it would be relatively unusual for
us to have a program partnership with the Ministry of Health…

The respondent also mentioned several ―great partnerships‖ with prominent TNGOs. A leader
from another humanitarian relief organization (ID = 60, PMP = 0.69) said that in addition to their
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corporate partners, ―we have partners that are governments,‖ but they are chosen very
selectively:

You either have to be a nonprofit NGO group to be a partner with us or a government.
Now, it's not every government. Domestically we work with a lot of different
governments, like an aging services department of a county or something like that. We do
a lot of that kind of stuff to help them get product and supplies to help their groups,
because they have very limited budgets, so we feel like that fits. Some governments and
some countries we would never work with, because of the worry about it getting resold or
used for something else is too great. So, we would rather find and NGO to work with, but
we will work with governments.

A leader from a sustainable development TNGO (ID = 133, PMP = 0.92) described partnerships
with NGOs, corporations and governments. For instance, their relationship with:

―[CORPORATION 1] goes back to about 1990. And actually goes back to when it was
[DELETED]. It's had several mergers. So we now have a very close relationship with
them. And we have two [CORPORATION 1] executives on our board. We just got a fifty
thousand dollar grant for our work in India from them. [CORPORATION 2] became a
donor several years ago. There is a [CORPORATION 2] executive who is on our board
as well. There are others, but those would be the two biggest.
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They also ―get funding from the…bilaterals and multilaterals‖ and ―have a small grant from the
World Band through [DELETED] to do a test pilot program in India.‖ Interestingly, the
respondent claimed that ―we don't work with governments,‖ but added ―with one exception:
[COUNTRY]. One of our local partners is the ministry of health. It just happened that way.
They're able to deliver service at a high level.‖

Overall, the interdependent collaborative style is more likely than the protective style to involve
loose collaborations or formal partnerships with governments, corporations and
intergovernmental organizations. Relationships with governments can take many forms, as one
respondent remarked that his or her organization works with, but not for governments. Corporate
partnerships are also varied, as some TNGOs receive donated goods from corporations while
others certify corporate products. Collaborations with intergovernmental organizations typically
place TNGOs in the role of funding recipient, although some leaders mentioned that they
benefited from the research and other work of intergovernmental organizations including UN
agencies.

Discussion

Theorization about the role of TNGOs in world affairs is often driven by purposive case studies
of single sectors or individual organizations, and inconsistent generalizations are difficult to
reconcile and contextualize. This is also true in debates over TNGO autonomy and independence
from states. Compare, for instance, McCormick‘s (1999, pp. 56, 53) favorable view of
environmental TNGOs on the grounds that these organizations ―function outside the rule-making
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process‖ of governments and ―contribute to the development of a global civil society‖ with
Cooley and Ron‘s (2002, pp. 5, 36) disapproving assessment of humanitarian aid TNGOs in
which they find widespread evidence of ―subverted nominal agendas,‖ ―inhibit[ed] cooperation‖
and ―dysfunctional results.‖

The TNGO data reveal a more nuanced picture. The interdependent collaborative style is most
common among sustainable development, environmental and humanitarian relief organizations,
based on classifications provided by Charity Navigator. The protective style is most common
among conflict resolution and human rights organizations, as shown in table 5.3.
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Table 5.3: Collaborative style by sector
Sector

Protective
Collaborative
style

Interdependent

Percentage
total
Count total

Environment
52%
11

Human
Rights
81%
17

Humanitarian
Relief
64%
18

Sustainable
Development
51%
30

Conflict
Resolution
83%
10

48%
10

19%
4

36%
10

49%
29

17%
2

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

21

21

28

59

12

N = 141, chi2(4) = 9.37, p = 0.05
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Benefits and obstacles to collaborations

Transnational NGO leaders were also asked about the benefits and obstacles to collaborations.
Regarding the benefits, leaders were asked: ―What kinds of benefits, if any, do you see resulting
from networks and the formation of partnerships?‖ Ten substantive codes were developed to
capture their open-ended responses: better results (for example, increased effectiveness,
increased efficiency), broader programs (for example, can help more people, make a larger
impact), increased funding, better understanding, (for example, better understanding of
substantive issues), local capabilities, learning, enhanced visibility, better access (for example,
registration, government requirements, accreditation, invitations to delegations, etc.), legitimacy
or credibility (for example, with donors, policy makers and peers), and legal. The results are
presented in figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: Benefits of collaborations
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Overall, better results was the most frequently mentioned benefit of partnerships or
collaborations, while about 40 percent of leaders mentioned increased funding. Leaders from
TNGOs with an interdependent collaborative style were more likely to have mentioned increased
funding as a benefit of collaboration (54 percent versus 34 percent, n = 126, chi2(1) = 5.04, p =
0.03).

Regarding obstacles to partnerships and collaborations, leaders were asked: ―Are there obstacles
or challenges that arise in the formation of partnerships and networks?‖ Seven substantive codes
were developed to capture their open-ended responses: incompatibility of missions (for example,
concerns about compatibility of missions or agendas), muddled management (for example, roles
and responsibility, accountability, uncertainty about leadership, no partnership experience, ‗too
many cooks in the kitchen,‘ etc.), reduction of resources (for example, loss of resources to
partners, less funding individually or for the field, etc.), time (for example, too time consuming
in comparison to going at it alone), organizational cultures (for example, conflicts about how to
manage the collaboration), loss of control (for example, too many concessions, concerns over
intellectual capital/ownership of ideas, etc.), and lack of confidence (for example, concerns about
reliability and trustworthiness). The results are shown in figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Obstacles to Collaborations
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Incompatibility of missions was the most commonly mentioned obstacle, which suggests that
TNGO leaders are relatively concerned about safeguarding their missions and prefer to partner
with likeminded organizations.

Conclusion

In sum, transnational NGOs are strategic in their own rights and appear to be highly protective of
their overarching missions even though they may strategically adjust their programs in response
to donor preferences. On balance, neither TNGOs nor donors appear to be clearly dominant and
both parties seem to be engaged in a reciprocal relationship of mutual negotiation. Transnational
NGOs with strong brand recognition, diversified funding sources and a high proportion of
unrestricted funds can walk away from pushy donors rather than compromise their missions.
When financial pressures become more intense, TNGOs can secure government or other large
grants to serve as bridge funding. Finally, transnational organization gives TNGOs additional
autonomy-preserving efficiencies since organizations can acquire funds internationally that may
be unavailable domestically and can use Southern partners to secure resources ostensibly
unavailable to Northern organizations.

The debate over the desirability and implications of TNGO autonomy is confounded by
heterogeneity in TNGOs‘ organizational types and collaborative styles. Protective TNGOs are
most likely to work in the conflict resolution and human rights sectors, where neutrality and
distance from government, corporate and intergovernmental interests is presumably an asset. For
these organizations, autonomy enhances organizational effectiveness by maintaining
independence and neutrality. Interdependent TNGOs are most likely to work in the sustainable
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development, environment and humanitarian relief sectors, where corporations, governments and
intergovernmental organizations are major players whose complicity and support may be
necessary for organizational effectiveness. These TNGOs may receive donated medical supplies
from corporations to distribute to beneficiaries, while collaborating with ministries of health to
streamline service delivery, for example. For such organizations, maintaining independence from
important institutions may significantly hinder service delivery and ultimately prove
counterproductive. The normative desirability of TNGO autonomy, in short, is contingent upon
organizational type.

131
CHAPTER SIX: TAXONOMY

The possibility that different types of TNGOs serve different roles in the international system
may be regarded by now as self-evident. Unfortunately, agreement is lacking as to the
specification of any one taxonomy of TNGOs specifically relevant for international relations
theorists. This chapter presents a taxonomical meta-analysis of criteria commonly used to
differentiate among different types of TNGO. The result is a synthetic taxonomy of TNGOs.

Transnational NGOs are difficult to define and distinguish from other types of organizations
using formal criteria. Many established taxonomies include TNGOs as a type of
nongovernmental organization, international organization or nonprofit organization. Within these
taxonomies, TNGOs are rarely a clearly distinguished subset. More commonly, TNGOs are
placed into broad categories or are distributed across multiple subcategories. Moreover, the most
established classificatory systems generally do not correspond with the classification criteria
implicitly used by academics in international relations, which generally exclude lobbying
organizations and interest groups, for example (Willetts, 2002).

Salamon and Anheier (1992) reviewed several taxonomies that have been adopted at the
international level. The United Nations offers an International Standard Industrial Classification
System (ISIC) that contains three categories that could be used to identify NGOs: organizations
that are engaged in education, health and social work or other community, social and personal
activities. The Eurostat General Industrial Classification of Economic Activities (NACE) system
goes further by distinguishing between research and development and recreation and cultural
organizations within the ISIC‘s latter residual category.
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The Union of International Associations (UIA) provides a comprehensive inventory of
international organizations. The UIA‘s taxonomy includes 15 categories of organizations further
classified into five main clusters, each of which is divided into intergovernmental and
nongovernmental organizations. They counted 10,399 international nongovernmental
organizations in 2002, although this category includes trade unions and trade associations, which
might be considered lobbying groups, not TNGOs. Caution is warranted since UIA numbers can
vary widely depending upon whether one refers to international organizations, intergovernmental
organizations, nongovernmental organizations or various combinations or subsets ("Yearbook of
International Associations: Statistics, visualizations and patterns," 2003/2004, p. 3).

Within the United States, the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) produces the
National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE), which offers several hundred detailed
categories organized into 26 major groups (Lampkin, Romeo, & Finnin, 2001; Salamon &
Anheier, 1992). The closest NTEE category to TNGOs is labeled ―international, foreign affairs,
and national security.‖ The 2007 NCCS dataset contains 6,500 such entities filing IRS Forms
990, which are required for 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations with revenues greater than
$25,000. Figure 6.1 shows that nearly half of all these international organizations were classified
as either international development or international relief agencies. Note that some categories are
missing labels in the NCCS codebook.
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Figure 6.1: NTEE classification (international, foreign affairs and national security)
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Filers are asked to apply up to three IRS activity codes to their organizations. However, almost
half of organizations have nothing coded as their first activity, and still less data are available for
secondary and tertiary activities. Among those reporting primary activities, the most common is
qualified state-sponsored tuition (9 percent), followed by other related school activities (4
percent), gifts, grants or loans to other organizations (3 percent), discussion groups, forums,
panels, lectures, etc. (3 percent), supplying money, goods or services to the poor (2 percent),
501(k) childcare (2 percent), cultural exchanges with foreign countries (2 percent), boy scouts,
girl scouts, etc. (2 percent) and missionary activities (2 percent). Clearly, the NTEE system is
designed for legal and tax purposes, not international relations theorization.

Researchers working with the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, after having
intensively reviewed the most prominent classification systems, created the International
Classification of Nonprofit Organizations (ICNPO) containing 12 major categories each with
several detailed subcategories tailored to the nonprofit sector. This was propounded around 1992
and by 2006 had reportedly attracted some interest (Tice & Salamon, 2006). Other classificatory
schemes include the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) and AIRS/INFO
LINE Taxonomy of Human Services, but neither of these is well suited for researching
nonprofits (Lampkin et al., 2001). For these reasons, yet another system was created, the
Nonprofit Program Classification system (NPC), to augment the NTEE system with a menu of
26 major categories and about 1,000 subcategories.

Current taxonomies generally do not contain categories that correspond well with what scholars
commonly consider to be transnational NGOs. Instead, most established classification systems
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have been created for arcane legal and tax purposes, such as for facilitating taxation, regulation
or representation to international bodies. None of the current systems is capable of intuitively
differentiating TNGOs by their goals, strategies and activities, which would be much more
useful to scholars of international relations who often subdivide organizations by function or
sector to promote theoretical clarity.

A few international relations scholars have attacked the classificatory problem directly. After an
extensive review of attempts by numerous scholars and experts to produce general and specific
taxonomies of NGOs, Vakil (1997) recommended that a general framework be adopted for
developing a taxonomy in the future. The recommended framework involves identifying
―essential‖ and ―specific‖ criteria for sorting NGOs. Essential criteria could include orientation
and level of operation, while specific descriptors could include sectoral foci and evaluative
attributes. Orientation here refers to organizations‘ main area of activity, potentially ―welfare,
development, advocacy, development education networking and research‖ (Vakil, 1997, p.
2063). Sectoral foci might include the environment, healthcare or other substantive fields.

Vakil‘s distinction between activity and sector is more permeable for other taxonomists,
however. For example, Spar and Dail (2002) identify ten types of NGOs: health services,
infrastructural services, development assistance, education, commercial services, refugee
assistance, basic needs, social development, environmental concerns and human rights. Spar and
Dail‘s scheme apparently collapses Vakil‘s multiple criteria into a single categorical variable.
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Naturally additional taxonomies are possible and can be created to suit specific purposes.
Scholars differentiate organizations according to systemic location (Northern or Southern), scope
(global or local), function (service or advocacy), sector or issue-area (environment, human rights,
etc.), social purpose (solidarity or mutual benefit), form (formal or informal, network or
federation, etc.) and so forth (DeMars, 2005; Kaldor, 2003). Many of these distinctions imply or
operationalize particular theoretical perspectives. For instance, the North-South distinction is
often employed in discussions of systemic power asymmetries between Northern and Southern
organizations, while others use the service-advocacy distinction as proxy indication of whether
NGOs partner with or challenge governments (e.g. DeMars, 2005).

Taxonomies of TNGOs are often created for tax and legal purposes, but they are also applied
within particular research programs to explore certain theoretical relationships. The categories
and distinctions employed by researchers determine what questions can be asked and what
answers are possible. As heuristic devices, they structure empirical and theoretical inquiry and
sustain distinct research programs emphasizing particular units of analysis and theoretical
approaches.

Common taxonomic criteria

Scholars commonly recognize distinctions by sector, function, degree of autonomy, mode of
influence and strategic repertoire (DeMars, 2005; Kaldor, 2003; Vakil, 1997). Organizational
sector or issue-areas often include categories such as environment, human rights, humanitarian
relief, sustainable development and conflict resolution. The functional classification generally
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includes service delivery-advocacy or equivalently, operational-campaigning organizations
(Willetts, 2002). This functional distinction can have important theoretical implications for
theories of NGOs and world politics. For example, Lecy et al. (2010) caution that service and
advocacy organizations exhibit different characteristics which impose scope conditions for
grafting theories of the firm or collective action onto NGOs. Moreover, DeMars (2005) asserts
that service NGOs tend to cooperate with states whereas advocacy NGOs are more
confrontational. Incidentally, an independence test between collaborative style and function
reveals that although there is a small effect along these lines it is not statistically significant (n =
141, chi2(2) = 0.72, p = 0.70).

Scholars discuss the primary mode of TNGO influence in world affairs, with most affirming that
TNGOs wield some form of ideational, cultural, normative or discursive power, as distinctly
opposed to material or coercive influence (Boli & Thomas, 1999a; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse,
2006; Struett, 2008). Many analyze the strategic repertories of TNGOs, generally focusing on
ideational rather than material tactics (Hafner-Burton, 2008; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Ron et al.,
2007; Sell & Prakash, 2004). Finally, at the broadest level scholars study the overall significance
of TNGOs to world affairs, debating the extent to which they empower grassroots civil society to
challenge the status quo or simply alleviate failures of the international system (DeMars, 2005;
Jaeger, 2007; Josselin & Wallace, 2001a; Warkentin, 2001).

As such, classifications of TNGOs according to sector, function, autonomy, mode of influence
and strategy appear to be among the most useful and relevant to international relations theorists
seeking to understand the role of TNGOs in world affairs. These classificatory criteria speak to
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the principal theoretical differences between TNGOs that appear to have the most significant
implications for many research programs pertaining to transnational activism across various
subfields.

The following section addresses the problem of TNGO taxonomy empirically by analyzing
information about leaders‘ organizations derived from both primary interview data and
secondary sources. While any empirical inquiry necessarily rests upon prior theory and
categorization, great pains have been taken to substitute inductive learning for deductive
categorization. This is reflected in the largely inductive development of the protocol questions
and codebook categories of the Transnational NGO Interview Project. Additionally, I favor
exploratory over confirmatory statistical analysis. Finally, by incorporating a large number of
classificatory criteria into a meta-analysis, coverage of the conceptual space is relatively
thorough and the effect of any one factor is unlikely to dominate the results.

Taxonomy

Taxonomical analysis is based on variables representing the five key criteria mentioned above:
sector, function, autonomy, mode of influence and strategy. The variable sector was obtained
from Charity Navigator while the variable function was obtained from information found on
organizations‘ websites and annual reports. Variables derived from the interviews include
mission DFactor1 (strategy), mission DFactor2 (mode), activities DFactor1 (strategy) and
collaborative style. Activities DFactor2 (scope) is excluded because it likely reflects coder bias.
Incidentally, the biased factor does not contribute significantly to model fit. 16
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Two variables are included to describe the missions and activities of TNGOs. Mission DFactor1
(strategy) indicates whether TNGO leaders direct their organizations according to an ideology of
amelioration or empowerment. Activities DFactor1 (strategy) indicates whether leaders believe
their organizations are actually engaged in ameliorative or empowering activities.

Much is written about the ideational nature of transnational activism and the central role of
information politics. Mission DFactor2 (mode) indicates whether leaders‘ organizations employ
more materialistic or ideational modes of influence.

Finally, collaborative style indicates whether leaders‘ organizations are protective or
interdependent in terms of their propensities to collaborate with entities other than NGOs, such
as governments and corporations. The latent variable collaborative style may be roughly
interpreted as a proxy for organizational autonomy.

Several latent class models have been estimated, as indicated in table 6.1. The null of
homogenous or randomly distributed attribute profiles is rejected since the L2 p-value for the
Model1 is well within the conventional limit. Model2 is similarly rejected since it also fails to
account for the observed association in the data and contains local dependencies. Model3
provides adequate model fit. Increasing the number of latent classes from three to four provides
an ambiguous improvement in model fit since the associated ΔL2 p-value only barely
transgresses the traditional threshold (p = 0.054). In the interest of parsimony, Model3 is
preferred.
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Table 6.1: Models for TNGO taxonomy
Model
type

LL

L²

L² pvalue

ΔL²

ΔL² pvalue

%ΔL²

Class.
error

Model1
Model2

1-Cluster
2-Cluster

-527.94
-474.80

262.01
155.73

0.00
0.03

.
0.41

.
0.00

.
41

.
0.03

Model3
Model4

3-Cluster
4-Cluster

-458.69
-448.14

123.51
102.42

0.16
0.29

0.21
0.17

0.00
0.05

53
61

0.03
0.02

BVRs
Fail
Fail
Pass
Pass
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To ensure the solution represented by Model3 is robust and does not simply reproduce the
sectoral classification, another model was estimated with sector specified as an inactive
covariate, as discussed in chapter three. This analysis yielded an interpretively identical solution,
strongly indicating that the results are robust to indicator choice.17 The latent class and
conditional probabilities for Model3 are presented in table 6.2.
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Table 6.2: Results for Model3 (TNGO Taxonomy)
Cluster1
0.67

Cluster2
0.26

Cluster3
0.08

Environment
Human Rights
Humanitarian
Relief
Sustainable
Development
Conflict Resolution
Advocacy
Service
Both

0.17
0.03

0.00
0.58

0.72
0.13

0.26

0.03

0.01

0.54
0.00
0.05
0.60
0.36

0.06
0.33
0.61
0.03
0.35

0.02
0.12
0.86
0.13
0.02

Amelioration
Empowerment
Material
Ideational
Amelioration
Empowerment
Protective
Interdependent

0.85
0.15
0.90
0.10
0.87
0.13
0.53
0.47

0.16
0.84
0.89
0.11
0.45
0.55
0.84
0.16

0.51
0.49
0.04
0.96
0.04
0.96
0.17
0.83

Prob.(Cluster)
pvalue

Sector

0.00

Function

0.00

Mission: Strategy
(DFactor1)

0.00

Mission: Mode
(DFactor2)
Activities: Strategy
(DFactor1)
Collaborative Style

0.00
0.00
0.00

n = 106

143
Cluster1: Charitable relief and development TNGOs

The emergent taxonomy reveals that there are three types of TNGO. About two-thirds of TNGOs
are charitable development and relief organizations. This type of TNGO is most likely to be
classified as sustainable development and to be regarded as a service organization. Its strategies
and activities are overwhelmingly ameliorative (rather than empowering) and its mode of
influence is unequivocally materialistic (rather than ideational). Finally, charitable development
and relief organizations are more likely than not to partner with powerful actors like
governments and corporations. Based on average expenditure data for sampled organizations
over the period 2001 to 2006, this type of TNGO controls about 85 percent of US TNGO
resources.

Cluster2: Human rights activism TNGOs

About a quarter of organizations are human rights activism TNGOs. They are most likely to be
classified as human rights organizations and are more likely than not to be regarded as advocacy
TNGOs. Leaders from this type of TNGO describe missions emphasizing empowerment, but
when it comes to their organizations‘ actual activities this emphasis is much less pronounced.
Interestingly, human rights activists appear to eschew ideational tactics like information politics.
However, they are the most fiercely protective type of TNGO, avoiding partnerships with
powerful entities that could compromise autonomy. Based on average expenditure data for the
period 2001 to 2006, this type of TNGO controls about 14 percent of US TNGO resources.
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Cluster3: Environmental advocacy organizations

Finally, only about eight percent of TNGOs are environmental advocacy organizations. This type
of TNGO is most likely to be classified as environmental and engaged in advocacy. Leaders of
these organizations describe their missions in terms of amelioration and empowerment almost
evenly, but their organizations‘ actual activities are summarily empowering. This is the only type
of organization that is overwhelming likely to employ ideational tactics like information politics.
However, environmental advocacy TNGOs are also the most interdependent organizations as
they are very likely to collaborate with partners like states and corporations in ways that could
erode autonomy. Based on average expenditure data for the period 2001 to 2006, this type of
TNGO controls about one percent of US TNGO resources.

Discussion

Scholars of transnational activism often identify Amnesty International and Greenpeace as
quintessential or exemplary TNGOs (DeMars, 2005; Halliday, 2001; Wapner, 1995; Warkentin,
2001). As human rights and environmental advocates, respectively, these organizations are
regarded as exemplifying the research-oriented information politics and occasionally contentious
activism thought typical of TNGOs generally. But these so-called exemplary or quintessential
TNGOs are neither representative of US TNGOs nor even of their own categories. As a human
rights activism organization, Amnesty International is renowned for its research and
documentation (Hopgood, 2006). But such tactics are empirically uncharacteristic of human
rights activism organizations, which are unlikely to employ ideational tactics. Greenpeace, as an
environmental advocacy organization, is also highly atypical. Greenpeace is most famous for its
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contentious politics that publicly challenge states and corporations, not its collaborations with
them, as is typical among environmental advocacy TNGOs. Even as a composite category,
human rights and environmental organizations together only account for about one-third of US
TNGOs, which together control only about 15 percent of total US TNGO resources. These types
of organizations are unrepresentative of their categories and far less common and less
resourceful than charitable development and relief organizations. So-called exemplary
transnational actors like Amnesty International and Greenpeace are outliers.

This taxonomical result largely comports with that derived by Boli and Thomas (1999a), who
organized 5,983 TNGOs into 13 sectors using comprehensive UIA data. They concluded that
about 60 percent of organizations (a percentage they estimated was increasing) ―concentrate on
economic or technical rationalization,‖ not contentious human rights activism or environmental
advocacy. Only about 14 percent were ―individual rights/welfare‖ or ―world-polity oriented,‖ by
contrast, categories which include ―many of the most prominent [T]NGOs, especially
environment and human rights organizations‖ specifically including Amnesty International and
Greenpeace (Boli & Thomas, 1999a, pp. 41-45).

Comprehensive 2007 NCCS data for 6,500 international nonprofits filing Forms 990 in the
United States show 1,642 ―international relief‖ organizations and 1,590 ―international
development‖ organizations relative to only 57 ―alliances and advocacy‖ organizations (see
figure 6.1). Relief and development TNGOs dominate the US TNGO sector, while advocacy
organizations, though commonly the focus of TNGO scholarship, are rare.
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This implies that international relations scholarship focuses disproportionately on the least
common and least resourceful types of TNGO: human rights activism (e.g. Berkovitch &
Gordon, 2008; Hafner-Burton, 2008; Hagel & Peretz, 2005; P. Nelson & Dorsey, 2007; Richard
Price, 1998; Ron et al., 2007; True & Mintrom, 2001) and environmental advocacy (e.g.
McCormick, 1999; Raustiala, 1997; Rohrschneider & Dalton, 2002; Wapner, 1995, 1996).
Accounting for this phenomenon (although employing a slightly different taxonomy), Boli and
Thomas (1999a, p. 46) noted:

oppositional or emergency-catalyzed activity of human rights, environmental, and relief
organizations makes them especially prominent in the world polity, while the more
central rationalizing sectors are much less well known…[the latter‘s] highly rationalized
universalism (especially in scientific and technical areas) is considered ―neutral‖ and
therefore unremarkable, despite the enormous effects they have on definitions of reality,
infrastructure, household products, school texts, and much more.

In other words, even though charitable development and relief organizations are the most
numerous and resourceful TNGOs in world affairs, they are the least visible and presumably the
least studied because their work is perceived as less interesting. However, their relative
invisibility does not imply their relative unimportance. To the contrary, sociological
institutionalists such as Boli (1999) assert that the rational-voluntaristic form of authority
common to relief and development TNGOs is manifestly powerful. Similarly, critical scholars
such as Jaeger (2007) consider their managerialism a key vehicle of neoliberal power in world
politics.
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Conclusion

Since TNGOs are a heterogeneous class, scholars often employ taxonomies of TNGOs and focus
on specific subsets of organizations. While this is useful for promoting theoretical clarity,
differences in classificatory criteria combined with an abundance of intra-category studies that
lack an explicit treatment of context and proportion hinder theorization about the roles of
TNGOs in world affairs. Moreover, a disproportionate emphasis on highly visible and
uncommonly interesting organizations (for example, organizations purposively selected for their
role in successful campaigns) apparently leads scholars to incorrectly identify organizations like
Amnesty International and Greenpeace as exemplary or quintessential TNGOs. However,
taxonomical analysis suggests that these organizations are highly uncharacteristic of both
TNGOs generally and of the subcategories they are commonly thought to typify.

Broadly, international relations research seems to focus disproportionately on human rights
activism and environmental advocacy TNGOs. While few scholars of transnational activism
would deny the significance of these organizations, combined they probably compose less than a
third of all US TNGOs and control as little as 14 percent of all US TNGO resources. These
findings are consistent with data on global TNGOs as well (Boli & Thomas, 1999b).

Much more significant are the charitable development and relief organizations that dominate the
US TNGO sector in both numbers and resources. However, their ameliorative orientation and
material mode of influence are not as well understood by international relations theorists in
comparison to the voluminous studies examining TNGOs involved in contentious advocacy.
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Theories of transnational politics based on extrapolations from the experiences of highly
unrepresentative and uncommon organizations are likely to mischaracterize the true significance
of TNGOs to world politics. More research is needed to better understand the role of charitable
development and relief TNGOs.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

How to define a TNGO‘s organizational effectiveness is among the most important but also most
difficult challenges of the nonprofit sector. Transnational NGO leaders struggle to demonstrate
their effectiveness in order to obtain resources and maintain accountability.

Over the last half century, scholars have proposed various definitions or ‗models‘ of
organizational effectiveness. Much of this research is based on conceptual analyses and
stakeholder surveys. Largely absent from this rich academic literature, however, are systematic
efforts to directly understand how TNGOs define effectiveness empirically. Thus, this chapter
addresses a simple research question: how do leaders of TNGOs in the United States—as an
important subset of US nonprofits—define organizational effectiveness?

Background

Within the academic literature on nonprofit management, scholars have proposed various models
of organizational effectiveness. One model, generally known as the goal attainment model of
effectiveness, has served as a conceptual anchor in organizational effectiveness scholarship
(Campbell, 1977; Etzioni, 1964; J. L. Price, 1972; Sheehan Jr, 1996; Spar & Dail, 2002).
Herman and Renz (1997, 1998, 2004, 2008) have consistently characterized the research
program as mostly working out alternatives to, or modifications of, the goal attainment model.
But many scholars argue that this model, which simply posits that organizations are effective to
the extent to which they achieve their goals, is untenable. For example, goals necessarily reflect
values and priorities and are therefore not objective (Mohr, 1982). Goals are identified through
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processes of negotiation within organizations and are therefore political (Murray & Tassie,
1994). Goals are too difficult to concretely specify, precluding measurement (Fowler, 1996;
Herman & Renz, 1999; Mohr, 1982; Murray & Tassie, 1994; Stone & Cutcher-Gershenfeld,
2001; Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967). Even if meaningful measurement was possible within an
organization, differences in goal specification would invalidate comparisons between
organizations (Mohr, 1982). Finally, even if all these difficulties could be surmounted, it is often
too difficult, if not impossible, to satisfactorily address the fundamental problem of causal
attribution (Herman & Renz, 1999; Mohr, 1982; Stone & Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 2001).

In light of the many difficulties with the goal attainment model of effectiveness, scholars have
proposed a variety of alternatives. Etzioni (1960) proposed effectiveness be defined in terms of
well-functioning bureaucratic systems; Katz and Kahn (1966) proposed it be a ratio of an
organization‘s inputs to its outputs; Yuchtman and Seashore (1967), borrowing from ecological
theory, proposed it be a nonprofit‘s ability to exploit its environment through fundraising; Price
(1986) equated organizational effectiveness with a nonprofit‘s financial viability; and more
recently, Herman and Renz (1997, p. 188) have proposed effectiveness be understood as ―a set of
judgments by various stakeholders‖ rather than ―a real property‖ of organizations. Scholarship in
this most recent vein has generally sought to identify the implicit criteria stakeholders employ
when judging the effectiveness of specific organizations, as distinct from identifying how
nonprofits define effectiveness per se (Herman & Renz, 1997; Packard, 2010; Shilbury & Moore,
2006; Tassie, Murray, & Cutt, 1998).
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Forbes (1998) reviewed the literature on nonprofit effectiveness from 1977 to 1997 and
concluded that treatments of the topic initially attempted to evaluate organizational effectiveness,
then to identify correlates of effectiveness and finally to focus on processes. However, this
impressive body of academic research has generally not focused on how nonprofits define
organizational effectiveness.

More recently, Herman and Renz (2008) aptly summarized the state of the art of organizational
effectiveness research in ―nine theses.‖ Among their theses, they conclude that organizational
effectiveness is always comparative, multidimensional and socially constructed, and offer
―stakeholder responsiveness‖ as ―a useful organizational-level effectiveness measure‖ (Herman
& Renz, 2008, p. 399). They note that a ―measure that leaves to the respondent just what criteria
are to be used might offer a way [of] recognizing the social construction of effectiveness but still
allow for aggregating stakeholders‘ judgments of effectiveness‖ (Herman & Renz, 2008, p. 405).

Such conclusions have encouraged scholars to consider increasingly complex perceptual,
multiple stakeholder and multidimensional models, often emphasizing stakeholder perceptions
and judgments (Herman & Renz, 1997; Lecy, Schmitz, & Swedlund, 2010; Packard, 2010;
Shilbury & Moore, 2006; Sowa, Selden, & Sandfort, 2004; Tassie et al., 1998). Meanwhile, the
practical challenge of measuring organizational effectiveness persists. Nonprofit rating and
designation agencies have emerged in the United States offering evaluations of nonprofit
effectiveness and efficiency based primarily or exclusively on financial data. Such assessments
take neither stakeholders‘ perceptions nor organizations‘ programmatic achievements into
account, and although these ratings are widely consulted, they are also considered to be deeply
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flawed (Hager, Pollak, Wing, & Rooney, 2004a, 2004b; Hager, Pollak, Wing, Rooney, & Flack,
2004; Lowell, Trelstad, & Meehan, 2005; Ogden et al., 2009). Although scholars have even
recommended the construct be dropped (Kahn, 1977), the quest for a workable definition of
organizational effectiveness is simply too important to abandon. Despite the ―conceptual disarray
and contradictions of organizational effectiveness…,‖ Murray and Tassie (1994, p. 322) remind
us, ―managers still must manage, and various stakeholders still make judgments…‖ Much hangs
in the balance, but without a workable definition of what it means for a nonprofit to be effective
the problem of appropriately evaluating organizational effectiveness must remain.

A good place to look for a workable definition of organizational effectiveness is within nonprofit
organizations themselves. The following sections describe how leaders of TNGOs in the United
States understand the construct of organizational effectiveness.

The following section describes the data from the Transnational NGO Interview Project. The
section after that introduces the results of an exploratory latent class analysis of leaders‘ openended responses to an interview question asking them to define organizational effectiveness.
This analysis discovers that leaders tended to define organizational effectiveness in one of two
distinct ways. The two sections after that correspondingly provide structured qualitative analyses
of these two definitions of effectiveness. In the final two sections I offer some further discussion
and concluding remarks.

Data
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Among several questions in the interview protocol related to organizational effectiveness,
interviewers asked leaders: ―Let me ask you about the concept of effectiveness, which is
something we all have trouble defining. How does your organization define effectiveness?‖ Nine
substantive codes were developed to capture leaders‘ open-ended responses to this question.
These codes were designed to conform to the interview data and were not created to test for the
presence of any preexisting theories or models of effectiveness. The nine codes, which were
organized into a single code family, are resources (for example, material resources such as
money), flexibility (for example, nimbleness and adaptability), innovation (for example,
innovative thinking), expertise (for example, expertise in an issue area or established credibility),
contacts (for example, making contacts for networking and collaboration), staff or associate
competencies (for example, a well-trained staff), stakeholder satisfaction (for example, donors,
members and other constituents), goal achievement (for example, achievement of own goals,
loyalty to own mission and meeting of own standards) and evaluation (for example, project
evaluations, evaluations for donors, global assessments and certifications). Leaders‘ responses
are distributed across 150 valid cases.

The nine codes may be alternatively regarded as nine binary response variables. Because these
variables are not mutually exclusive, mathematically there are 2 9 possible response patterns
corresponding to 512 different ways in which leaders could have defined organizational
effectiveness. Since a typical human analyst can only consider about seven patterns
simultaneously, quantification and cluster analysis must be employed to facilitate exploratory
analysis (Grimmer & King, 2009). In the following section, I use latent class analysis to
determine the number of ways in which leaders understand organizational effectiveness

154
empirically. In the two sections after that, I use structured information retrieval to help interpret
leaders‘ response patterns.

Latent class analysis

Four exploratory latent class models have been estimated, each including all of the nine response
variables listed above. The models differ only according to the number of categories of the
posited latent variable. Model1, Model2, Model3 and Model4 test the hypotheses that there are
one, two, three, and four definitions of organizational effectiveness present in the data,
respectively. The models are summarized in table 7.1.
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Table 7.1: Models for organizational effectiveness

Model1
Model2
Model3
Model4

Model
type
1-Cluster
2-Cluster
3-Cluster
4-Cluster

LL
-596.63
-586.70
-575.53
-571.63

L²
153.62
133.75
111.41
103.62

L² pvalue
0.07
0.14
0.31
0.20

ΔL²
.
13%
17%
7%

ΔL² pvalue
.
0.12
0.02
0.90

%ΔL²
.
13
27
33

Class.
Error
.
0.12
0.09
0.14

BVRs
Fail
Fail
Pass
Pass

156
The retention of all nine response variables regardless of statistical significance complicates
formal hypothesis testing. The null hypothesis that all leaders think alike is initially accepted
according to the usual rule since the L2 bootstrap p-value for the baseline model, Model1, 0.07 >
0.05. However, significant unexplained association nevertheless exists among four pairs of
response variables (see appendix), suggesting that the L2 statistic is simply diluted by the
inclusion of many variables that fail to significantly discriminate between the clusters. 18

Model2 does not provide a significant improvement in model fit over Model1 according to the
ΔL2 bootstrap p-value and contains three local dependencies, again violating the local
independence assumption required of latent class analysis (see appendix). This means that
Model2 fails to explain significant association among the response variables and is therefore
unacceptable. Model3 provides a significant improvement in model fit over Model2 and contains
no local dependencies (see appendix), meaning that Model3 successfully explains the observed
association among the response variables. According to the ΔL2 bootstrap p-value Model4 does
not significantly improve upon Model3, indicating that Model3 is the preferred model.

Each leader is subsequently classified into the latent class to which he or she most likely belongs
based on his or her PMPs, a procedure known as modal assignment (Magidson & Vermunt,
2003; McCutcheon, 1987). Each leader‘s PMPs are determined by his or her response pattern
and Model3‘s parameter estimates. The classification errors introduced by modal assignment are
displayed for each model in table 7.1. Model3 has the lowest classification error.
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An important consideration when analyzing data of this nature is whether the three ways of
defining effectiveness are truly the result of respondents‘ conceptualizations or merely artifacts
of coder bias or interviewer baiting. A chi-squared test for independence performed between
Model3‘s assignment solution and the variable interviewer identification indicates no evidence
of interviewer bias (n = 150, chi2(12) = 13.63, p = 0.33), but a similar test with the variable
coder identification implies the presence of coder bias (n = 150, chi2(8) = 28.38, p = 0.00). This
coder bias is illustrated in figure 1, which indicates Coder 4‘s divergent propensities relative to
the other coders.19 Coder 4 is entirely responsible for the existence of the third latent class and a
chi-squared decomposition reveals that coder 4 accounts for an overwhelming 81 percent of the
statistic‘s magnitude.20
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Figure 7.1: Coder bias
Cluster3
1.0

0.8

0.0

0.2

0.6

0.4

0.4

0.2

0.6

0.8

4

Cluster2
0.0
1.0
Cluster1

13 52

1.0
0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0

159
Conveniently, the 3-class solution perfectly identifies the small outlier group generated by coder
4, isolating the bias. Removing the four outliers introduced by coder 4 has a negligible effect on
sample size and results in a statistically significant reduction in coder bias as measured by the
difference in chi-squared statistics [n = 150, (chi2(8) = 28.38) – (chi2(4) = 9.75) = (chi2(4) =
18.63, p = 0.00)].21 As an artifact of coder bias, the third latent class will be ignored.22 To test for
the robustness of this strategy, a 2-class model was estimated with the outliers deleted ex ante
and the assignment solution was compared against that of Model3 with the outliers deleted ex
post. The assignments are identical, indicating that outlier deletion has no effect on the
composition of the two main latent classes. For convenience of exposition, the original solution
from Model3 is preserved.

The key quantities of LCA are the latent class and conditional probabilities (Magidson &
Vermunt, 2003; McCutcheon, 1987). The latent class probabilities provide estimates of the size
of each class and the conditional probabilities describe the profiles of each class. These
quantities for Model3 are indicated in table 7.2.23 The profile for Cluster1 describes about 82
percent of respondents while the profile for Cluster2 describes about 15 percent of respondents.
The other values in the columns labeled Cluster1 and Cluster2 are the probabilities that
respondents in those clusters mentioned the corresponding items during the interviews, given
their latent class assignments.24 As can be seen in table 7.2, the definition of effectiveness
indicated by the profile for Cluster1 involves goal achievement and evaluation, while the
definition indicated by the profile for Cluster2 emphasizes resources, and to a lesser extent,
evaluation.
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Table 7.2: Results for Model3 (organizational effectiveness)
Cluster1
0.82

Cluster2
0.15

Cluster3
0.03

p-value
0.08
0.34
0.01

0.68
0.56
0.25

0.29
0.67
0.97

0.94
0.96
0.70

0.28
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.03
0.00

0.23
0.18
0.09
0.04
0.05
0.00

0.18
0.01
0.04
0.19
0.00
0.18

0.70
0.92
0.66
0.45
0.44
0.44

Prob.(Cluster)
Goal achievement
Evaluation
Resources
Stakeholder
satisfaction
Contacts
Staff or associates
Expertise
Flexibility
Innovation

n = 150
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While latent class analysis is very useful for discovering latent structure in data, quantitative
results alone are seldom adequate for interpretation. How do we interpret the definitions of
organizational effectiveness implied by the profiles for Cluster1 and Cluster2 in table 7.2?

In the next two sections, I have retrieved leaders‘ actual statements about organizational
effectiveness from the interview transcripts separately for those assigned to Cluster1 and to
Cluster2. To discipline analysis and mitigate the risk of misinterpreting atypical evidence as
typical, I interpret each definition of organizational effectiveness based on exemplary qualitative
evidence. The exemplarity of a leader‘s statements about organizational effectiveness is defined
as the probability that the leader belongs to the cluster to which he or she was assigned. This
probability is the leader‘s PMP for the modal assignment. A PMP close to zero indicates that a
leader‘s statements are not likely to provide good qualitative evidence to facilitation
interpretation, while PMP close to one indicates that a leader‘s statements are very likely to
provide good qualitative evidence to aid interpretation. Leader‘s statements about organizational
effectiveness have been interpreted within the contexts of their complete interview transcripts,
which are organized in the CAQDAS for efficient querying. Interview dates for quotations are
provided in the appendix.

Cluster1: Organizational effectiveness as outcome accountability

The most prevalent way leaders think about organizational effectiveness is indicated by the
profile for Cluster1 in table 7.2 and may be labeled outcome accountability (Kearns, 1996). The
strongest theme underlying this conceptualization (mean PMP = 0.94) is the notion that
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effectiveness involves achieving measurable progress toward specific outcomes. ―Well I mean
ah, for us to be effective,‖ one such leader noted (ID = 34, PMP = 1.00), ―is to achieve the
programmatic or strategic goals that we‘ve identified.‖ Another phrased it slightly differently (ID
= 7, PMP = 0.99). ―We define it as whether or not we are sort of getting the tasks achieved that
we set for ourselves.‖ And another put it even more simply (ID = 22, PMP = 0.94). ―We set
important goals and, and we achieve them.‖ Whatever phrasing they chose, most leaders seem to
agree that effectiveness involves goal attainment.

Another common theme is that of promise-keeping. Leaders routinely promise donors to use
their resources to achieve specific outcomes, such as is commonly exemplified in formal
contracts. One leader who conceptualized effectiveness in this way argued that ―if we‘ve done
the work that we‘ve said we would do, that‘s...that should be one level of effectiveness‖ (ID =
147, PMP = 0.73). Other respondents characterized effectiveness more mission-centrically. ―I
mean, to me,‖ the leader asserted (ID = 136, PMP = 1.00), ―it‘s when you are doing what you‘re
saying you‘re doing, that you‘re serving your mission...and that you‘re able to show that you‘re
serving your mission…‖ To be effective involves not only goal attainment, but demonstrable
goal attainment.

Another widespread theme involves the use of detailed frameworks and timelines for outcome
evaluation (Poole, Davis, Reisman, & Nelson, 2001). A typical leader responded to the question
about effectiveness by first emphasizing the goal attainment and promise-keeping aspects of
organizational effectiveness, then describing sometimes very elaborate evaluation frameworks
and providing examples of recent program evaluations. Leaders frequently discussed mixed-
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methods and multiple indicators and defined broad evaluative frameworks encompassing both
outputs and outcomes. One leader said as follows (ID = 115, PMP = 1.00):

Well, very simply we set out in the logical frameworks, where our goals and objectives
are, and then through our [monitoring and evaluation], in monitoring those goals that
we've set out, and objectives, we measure outputs and outcomes and we, I mean it's easy
to measure the outputs, and that's one measurement of effectiveness, but the outcome is
of course in the goals and objectives we've set out.

The precise delimitation of the output-outcome distinction is not always crystal clear, but
respondents are generally adept at distinguishing between notions like inputs and outputs on the
one hand, and outcomes and impacts on the other—consistent with the well-known logical
framework approach (Rosenberg & Posner, 1979). This despite inherent measurement
challenges. Another leader said as follows (ID = 112, PMP = 0.73).

On the education part, that‘s the part that‘s hard, that‘s the part I talked about just a little
while ago, and you can‘t just measure…you can just measure how many people show up
for a lecture, but that‘s not going to do it. That‘ll give you your output; it won‘t give you
your impact. And so we‘re struggling right now to make sure that all of our measuring
and evaluation instruments look at…what are the three? There‘s output, impact—I guess
result, output and impact.
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Generally, leaders at least implicitly acknowledge potential disconnections in the causal chain
between upstream output indicators and downstream outcome and impact indicators. They
distinguish between inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts. Inputs involve the resources
necessary for producing goods and services, such as money. Outputs generally refer to the goods
and services organizations provide, whereas outcomes are the presumed effects of these services
on beneficiaries. Finally, impacts are effects that are causally attributable to an organization‘s
activities (White, 2009). As might be expected, outputs are often associated with short-term
objectives, while outcomes are associated with longer-term goals, again consistent with a logical
framework approach (Thomas, 1994).

Although leaders affirm the primacy of achieving meaningful results, their organizations do not
necessarily take the additional steps to systematically evaluate outcomes and impacts (Berger,
2009; Poole et al., 2001; Sawhill & Williamson, 2001; Sheehan Jr, 1996). Many organizations
are held accountable for inputs, such as functional expenses, and outputs, such as quantities
delivered, but not necessarily outcomes or impacts. One leader remarked that (ID = 125, PMP =
1.00):

…there has been a tendency in the organization in the past and there‘s tendency for a lot
of organizations just to measure outputs. I am opposed, personally, to measuring output
because I think you have to measure outcomes, and so we don‘t count—I‘ve already told
you that we don‘t pay attention to the fact that we did 50 missions in a year or that we
saw 10,000 patients. What we‘re all about is changing behaviors, changing capabilities…
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Measuring goal attainment on an ongoing basis usually involves complex systems. Leaders
expound ―matrix‖ (ID = 17, PMP = 1.00) systems and assess progress quarterly, annually and
even according to ―five-year plans‖ (ID = 98, PMP = 0.98). ―Well we have a strategic plan,‖ a
respondent (ID = 98, PMP = 0.98) said, ―we have certain goals that evolve annually, and we, at
least quarterly, we measure what is happening against what our goals for the year are, our fiveyear plan.‖ Another leader‘s account illustrates a concern about the practical difficulty of
operationalizing abstract outcome variables with proxy measures (ID = 36, PMP = 0.81):

Yeah, so effectiveness for us is, is really seeing concrete positive change on the ground
for the displaced people that we‘re concerned about. So you know, that‘s really the only
measure. Ultimately, I mean, there are many; you try to make those changes through a
variety of means. So yeah for example getting, you know, an op-ed article in a newspaper
or getting an important meeting or you know, having someone publicly acknowledge the
importance of a report that we‘ve put out. But unless you see actual change, you know,
unless the recommendations are adopted and you see actual change for…among the
people that we‘re concerned about, you know, those other things don‘t really add up to
very much.

Moreover, just as leaders differentiate between outputs and outcomes, they also distinguish
between short-term, intermediate and long-term goals in a variety of ways. For example, one
leader said as follows (ID = 143, PMP = 0.99):
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The way we broke it down is that we have goals, and then we have objectives, and then
we have performance indicators. And my expectation of my staff is that they are
attempting to determine whether we are hitting our performance indicators, which are
leading to our objectives, which, long term, will lead to our goals. Or whether we need to
constantly reevaluate and determine whether or not we‘re aiming for the right things,
whether we have the right performance indicators, whether we have the right objectives,
and ultimately, whether we have the right goals.

Leaders also differentiate between long-term abstract missions and short-term programmatic
goals. When pressed, respondents often discussed effectiveness at the programmatic level rather
than the more abstract level of their organizational missions. Outcome accountability involves
the demonstrable achievement of measurable goals, not necessarily the complete fulfillment of
overarching missions. As Sawhill and Williamson (2001, p. 380) found, nonprofits need
―specific, actionable, and, most critical, measurable goals to bridge the gap between their lofty
missions and their near-term operating objectives.‖ While some scholars criticize the
conceptualization of organizational level effectiveness as a function of program effectiveness
(for example, Herman & Renz, 2008), many nonprofit leaders appear to make precisely this
connection.

In sum, outcome accountability involves goal attainment, promise-keeping, complex
intertemporal evaluation frameworks and multiple levels of analysis. Many leaders adhere to a
logical framework approach, whether explicitly or implicitly. Leaders subscribing to this general
view believe that effectiveness means being accountable for achieving their promised outcomes.
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Cluster2: Organizational effectiveness as overhead minimization

The second latent class is indicated by the profile for cluster2 in table 7.2 and may be labeled
overhead minimization (mean PMP = 0.72). This conceptualization involves themes that include
financial efficiency, cost minimization, functional expense ratios and accounting. One leader
described organizational effectiveness as whether programs achieve ―bang for the buck,‖
emphasizing financial efficiency (ID = 144, PMP = 1.00). Another respondent from a traditional
service delivery organization explained that his or her ―way of thinking about a nonprofit is that
you want to at least strive to do what you do for less until you can do it for free‖ (ID = 103, PMP
= 0.90). Organizational effectiveness, in other words, is cost minimization.

A particularly succinct definition of effectiveness as overhead minimization came from a
respondent who simply stated that ―to be effective in [DELETED] is to deliver services and
assistance to the people of [DELETED] at low cost‖ (ID = 78, PMP = 0.53). Other leaders
included both conceptualizations of effectiveness in their definitions, simply prioritizing
overhead minimization over outcome accountability. One defined effectiveness in ―two ways.
The amount of money that‘s actually getting to the field dedicated to the programs…and
secondarily the actual impact of projects that you can quantify‖ (ID = 44, PMP = 0.65). Another
respondent offered a slightly more detailed explanation (ID = 40, PMP = 0.89).

I think we define effectiveness in three ways. In terms of fundraising we consider
ourselves effective if we meet our fundraising goals and if we turn over a substantial
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amount, obviously an overwhelming amount of that to [DELETED]. And if we keep the
administrative costs on that low. So right now we say we have…about ninety-two cents
on the dollar are used for programs.

The leader continued to describe his or her organization‘s second and third ways of defining
effectiveness, one of which was also financial and the other of which was programmatic.
However, achieving fundraising goals and minimizing overhead were the respondent‘s most
immediate associations with effectiveness.

There are many possible explanations as to why some leaders would understand effectiveness
more as overhead minimization than outcome accountability. Leaders may be responding to
external pressures from donors and nonprofit ratings agencies in the United States evaluating and
comparing nonprofits based on publicly available financial information. Indeed, many leaders
touted their organizations‘ low overhead ratios during the interviews and some explicitly
commented that low overhead is an important selling point for fundraising. One such leader
volunteered that ―our best ace card is our efficiency in terms of how we have a low overhead,‖
and subsequently explained how he or she measured effectiveness in the context of disaster
relief, where the construct is possibly easier to define (ID = 63, PMP = 1.00). How to measure
effectiveness ―depends on what kind of program it is. In disaster relief…it‘s the number of
people you treat, the injuries you‘ve come in contact with, the number of patient contacts and the
amount of medicines you‘ve dispensed…‖ (ID = 63, PMP = 1.00).
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That low overhead is an ―ace card‖ and that effectiveness can be measured by counting outputs
are more typical of the overhead minimization perspective than the outcome accountability view.
Measuring effectiveness, another leader admitted (ID = 74, PMP = 0.65):

Well that‘s very difficult for the international programs…we can‘t determine the
outcomes, so we measure products. We, we measure outputs. What is sent over you
know, what its purpose is, where it goes. We don‘t necessarily know how many people it
will affect. If it‘s a missionary group that we‘re equipping, they can say well we treated
you know, two-thousand people within a two week time period. This is what you gave us,
this is what you know, we did with it, and these were the outcomes. I mean you can do
that. But when you‘re dealing with, let‘s say a clinic or a hospital…you can measure
success primarily by your outputs.

Financial and output reporting constitute two broad themes that contrast with those of goal
attainment, promise-keeping and program evaluation that characterize outcome accountability.
While evaluation is also a prevalent theme of overhead minimization, evaluation tends to focus
on financial reporting and outputs rather than promise-keeping and goal attainment.

Discussion

These two definitions of organizational effectiveness observed among TNGO leaders pose a
challenge to the academic literature summarized earlier. Most leaders define organizational
effectiveness as outcome accountability, which clearly subsumes the embattled goal attainment
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model. Given the strong emphasis on evaluation within the outcome accountability model,
contemporary practitioners clearly are wrestling with the well-known evaluation challenges
associated with goal attainment model (Fowler, 1996; Herman & Renz, 1999; Hoefer, 2000;
Mohr, 1982; Murray, 2005; Stone & Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 2001).

The overhead minimization model of effectiveness may have emerged among practitioners as an
expedient alternative to the outcome accountability model. Within the academic literature this is
analogous to the emergence of financial models of effectiveness in response to the measurement
difficulties associated with the goal attainment model. Consider Price, for example, who first
defined organizational effectiveness as ―the degree to which a social system achieves its goals‖
(1972, p. 101), but who in a later edition of the same work changed this definition to ―the
financial viability of an organization‖ (1986, p. 128). His reasons for this change are instructive.
Financial viability is easier to measure, is ―correlated with traditional views of effectiveness‖
(although he notes that ―systematic evidence for this view does not exist‖), is conducive to
identifying ―determinants of effectiveness‖ and has wide application (J. L. Price, 1986, pp. 129130, 135). Similarly, we might attribute the existence of the overhead minimization model
among practitioners to evaluative expediency, or perhaps to donor pressure, but more research is
needed to better understand how these views emerge.

It is worth reiterating that leaders interviewed for this study were based in the United States,
where we might suspect a cultural bias favoring financial accountability and the use of business
metrics. It is very possible that leaders of domestic nonprofits in the United States may be more
susceptible to the overhead minimization model, while leaders of international nonprofits located
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in other countries may be less so. Here again more research is needed.

Leaders‘ conceptualizations of organizational effectiveness do not vary based on sector,
function, Charity Navigator efficiency rating or capacity rating, headquarters location,
respondent‘s gender, tenure at organization or country of residence.25 They do however vary
based on organizational size. This association (n = 150, chi2(2) = 9.11, p = 0.01) is driven by the
larger than expected number of ‗overhead minimizers‘ within large organizations (annual budget
greater than $10 million), an effect that accounts for 67 percent of the chi-squared statistic‘s
magnitude.26 This may be the result of larger organizations being more likely to hire financial
professionals, but more research is needed to reach a firm conclusion.

Finally, there is reason to suspect that the proportion of leaders holding the overhead
minimization view may be overstated due to Charity Navigator‘s selection criteria, which
exclude nonprofits with revenues less than $500,000. The data suggest that leaders from smaller
organizations may be less likely to define effectiveness as overhead minimization.

Conclusion

Leaders of TNGOs in the United States tend to conceptualize the construct of organizational
effectiveness in one of two ways (see table 7.2). Most leaders (about 82 percent) conceptualize it
as outcome accountability. They focus on achieving substantive outcomes, not just maximizing
outputs, and believe that their organizations are effective when they keep their promises to
stakeholders, particularly donors (Raggo et al., 2010).27 Only a minority (about 15 percent)
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subscribe to an overhead minimization model of effectiveness that focuses on financial
evaluation and output reporting. A small group of outliers also emerged from the analysis. These
leaders appear to hold an extraordinarily complex conceptualization of organizational
effectiveness (see table 7.2), but subsequent analysis revealed this to be a result of coder bias.
Future scholarship may seek to test this finding more directly.

This research reveals that there are at least two major strategies with which organizational
effectiveness is measured within the TNGO sector in the United States. One strategy involves
evaluating the extent to which an organization achieves its goals; the other involves the
proportion of an organization‘s total expenses allocated to programs. It is not uncommon for
financial metrics of the latter type to be taken as proxies for the former. Future research may
wish to ascertain whether this substitution is empirically warranted.

Finally, leaders‘ sophisticated conceptualizations of organizational effectiveness involving
complex logical frameworks and financial accountability reveal a technocratic managerial
discourse presumably quite foreign to their beneficiaries. As Roberts et al. (2005, p. 1849) found:

Managerialism of a distinctly northern type—marked by concepts like accountability,
transparency, participation, and efficiency, as well as practices like double-entry
bookkeeping, strategic planning, Logical Framework Analysis, project evaluation, and
organizational self-assessment—has been shown to be pervasive in NGO‘s operations
(Edwards & Fowler, 2002; Lewis, 2001).
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This would be an unremarkable statement, except that they go on to note that ―research has also
shown how managerialism has transformed the form and day-to-day operations of even the
smallest NGOs in the global south (Crewe & Harrison, 1998; Mawdsley, Porter, & Townsend,
2000; Mawdsley, Townsend, Porter, & Oakley, 2002; Robinson, 1997)‖ (Roberts et al., 2005, p.
1849). Northern discourses of outcome accountability and overhead minimization may transmit
Western values and organizational forms in addition to pervasive managerial practices. More
research is needed to determine the nature and extent of these influences.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: OBSTACLES TO GOALS

Most TNGO leaders subscribe to a traditional ideology of material amelioration and believe their
organizations are effective when they demonstrate outcome accountability, particularly to
donors. To understand TNGO behavior, it is not enough to identify how organizational leaders
approach transnational activism and understand their effectiveness. Leaders are also constrained
by their environments and must attempt to be effective within the context of these constraints.
Chief among the challenges TNGO leaders perceive is the need to secure funding, and to a lesser
extent, political context. When asked to discuss the obstacles they believe their organizations
face, leaders reveal a highly pragmatic orientation toward the intricacies of funding and a
surprising distaste for political contention. The combination of these factors portrays TNGO
leaders more as technocratic managers than sociopolitical change agents, although as discussed
in the final chapter, these roles may not be mutually exclusive.

The challenges of transnational activism

The challenges that TNGO leaders experience appear to reflect the multidimensionality of
transnational NGOs as both charitable nonprofit organizations and sociopolitical actors in world
affairs. To better understand these challenges, the interview protocol for the Transnational NGO
Interview Project asked leaders about the obstacles they believed their organizations faced.
Leaders were asked the question: ―What are the major obstacles, if any, to reaching your
objectives?‖ After inductive readings of initial transcripts for emergent themes, eleven codes
were developed to capture their open-ended responses: funding, political context, staff or
associate competencies (for example, human capital issues, expertise), local resistance (home

175
country public awareness, target area public opinion, cultural issues), bureaucratic and legal,
lack of coordination (for example, organizations working at cross-purposes, inefficiencies, poor
communications, etc.), programs (for example, inadequate programs), time, founder (for
example, the founder of the organization poses challenges), access (for example, access to
officials, leaders, etc.) and technology. Figure 8.1 displays the overall results.
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Figure 8.1: Obstacles to goals (proportions)

Funding
Political context
Staff or associates

Local resistance
Bureaucratic and legal
Lack of coordination
Programs
Time
Founder
Access
Technology
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
n = 149, error bars represent the 95% confidence interval
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The most widely mentioned obstacle was funding, followed somewhat distantly by political
context. Figure 8.2 shows how often leaders mentioned each obstacle. The distribution of mean
counts suggests that funding issues are significantly more salient than political context. Leaders
mentioned funding as a challenge on average one and a half times per interview, while political
context was mentioned less than once per interview. Other obstacles were less salient.
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Figure 8.2: Obstacles to goals (mean counts)
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Latent class analysis did not identify significant association in the data, suggesting that leaders
tend to think similarly about their obstacles.28 As such, the discussions below focus on the two
most common challenges, funding and political context. In the absence of LCA, PMPs are
unavailable to structure inquiry. Instead, complete quotation reports for each of the two codes
were separately retrieved from ATLAS.ti and fully reviewed. Quotations coded for funding
contain about 13,000 words, while quotations coded for political context contain about 11,000
words. In the following sections quotations have been selected discretionarily.

The challenge of funding

When asked about obstacles facing their organizations, most respondents immediately replied
―money‖ or ―funding.‖ Often leaders repeated this several times, occasionally amidst
lighthearted laughter acknowledging the apparent ineluctability of their replies. Other
interviewees were more matter-of-fact. ―The major thing is funding,‖ said one respondent (ID =
146), ―the other major obstacle of course is simply funding,‖ said another (ID = 27). These
comments were often followed by more detailed explanations elaborating upon specific aspects
of their financial challenges.

Some leaders characterized the funding problem as an omnipresent component of transnational
activism. ―The problem of humanitarianism,‖ one such respondent quipped (ID = 129), ―is that
we're trying to solve a hundred billion dollar a year problem with twenty-five billion dollars a
year.‖ Many leaders acknowledged this fundamental asymmetry between the scope of global
problems and the comparatively modest capacity of TNGOs to achieve commensurate impact.
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This asymmetry underscores the imperative of organizational growth and implies a frustrating
limitation as to what TNGOs can realistically accomplish.

For many respondents financial problems were intimately bound up with growth issues. ―There
is never enough money,‖ lamented such a respondent (ID = 70), ―even though we've—in our
own small way—we've grown a lot. But there is never enough money and so fundraising is a
constant challenge.‖ It would be misleading to formulate resource inadequacy exclusively as a
fundraising problem, however. For most transnational NGOs funding shortfalls would likely
persist regardless of fundraising efficacy because of the immense scale of the challenges they
confront.

Not only does funding availability for transnational activism seem perpetually inadequate, but
the structure of funds is often incongruent with what TNGOs need. ―Our biggest obstacle is the
fact that it‘s so hard to get unrestricted funds,‖ a respondent remarked (ID = 22). ―I'll tell you our
real challenge is non-earmarked funds,‖ noted another (ID = 40). A general distaste pervades the
donor community for funding general operating expenses through unrestricted or non-earmarked
funds. This presents a particularly frustrating problem for transnational NGOs embarking on
growth strategies that require increased fundraising and administrative costs. Internal
investments to expand organizational capacity increase overhead and reduce the program
expense ratio closely monitored by donors and nonprofit ratings agencies. From the perspectives
of many stakeholders, higher overhead implies that an organization is wasting resources.
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Moreover, many leaders identify a myopic orientation within the donor community. For
example, one leader (ID = 48) commented that ―the biggest obstacle is the aid architecture, the
global aid architecture, the way aid is delivered by those who give aid and, in particular, people
tend to think about it in short-term time frames.‖

External pressures to keep overhead low explains another respondent‘s comment, which
illustrates how organizational growth was being retarded by structural forces (ID = 60).

We're trying to ramp up—how do you, with limited resources, how do you do that? How
do you—it's sort of like there are some individuals—like I would love to have a COO
right now. I would love that, so that I could deal with some other things and they could
focus more on the operations. But at what point can you afford to have a COO and at
what point can you afford not to have one? Those are some—those growth issues are
kind of hard, because you have to do everything incrementally and we don't have a big
investor that comes in and says, ‗Here's five million dollars. Go ahead and set the whole
thing up and we'll run with it.‘ We have to earn it little by little. You can't issue stock.

The term overhead has starkly negative connotations within the discourse of charitable giving,
which frustrates and annoys many professional transnational activists. One such leader described
the problem as follows (ID = 48):

RESPONDENT: So, hopefully we can take some of this data back out and share it with
donors and try to convince them that if you really want to do this—I'm going to sound
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like a broken record—but if you really want to do some of this long-term change, you
need more than a two or three year project. You can't ask country offices to write a new
proposal every six months, which is what happens in some countries. Donors only will
commit at six month periods. You know? That's not good enough if you really want to
take a long journey and really see change.

INTERVIEWER: You are echoing a lot of the things that people say also about the
foundation world where they fund a lot of project grants but not operating support and
very not often multi-year funding.

RESPONDENT: Not often multi-year funding, and, you know, people seem to be very
allergic to operating costs and yet, if you don't have people in an organization actually
attending to the details of making the operations happen, you cut yourself off at the knees
at the get-go. It's a real frustration that we have, too, in talking to donors. So, that's part of
what we need. Either we need to be better in explaining operational costs and what the
efficiency is in the overall equation and that overhead is not quote-unquote ‗bad‘—it
seems to be this, you know, it's a synonym: ‗overhead‘ equals ‗bad.‘ I agree everybody
can get too fat and you have to be very careful. One of the things that we have to
constantly do is step back and reassess. Have we allowed ourselves to get too off-kilter
and do we need to re-tinker and get ourselves focused? And I think that's true of any large
organization. It's important to do that from time to time without question. But that doesn't
mean that overhead is bad. It's how you use that money; everybody's being focused on
the same thing and pulling in the same direction.
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Donor aversion to long-term commitments and general antipathy toward funding overhead may
actually contribute to the very inefficiencies these norms are presumably intended to mitigate.
An important study from Indiana University and the Urban Institute, for example, found that ―to
deal with the inadequate funding for administration, organizations resort to the strategies of low
pay, make do, and do without that diminish organizational effectiveness‖ (Hager, Pollak et al.,
2004a, p. 3).

Since interviews took place in the United States many respondents offered comments specifically
pertaining to the US fundraising environment. These touched upon domestic legislation such as
the USA Patriot Act, cultural provinciality, public suspicion toward internationalism and a
general reluctance among Americans to spend money overseas when it could be spent at home.
For example, one interviewee (ID = 101) claimed that ―there is no question that the US has a US
bias. It's easier to raise money for work in the US. It's easier to raise money here for work in the
US than it is to raise money for work outside of the US.‖ Other obstacles discussed had more
palpable political overtones, and are discussed below.

The challenge of political context

Even a cursory examination of the obstacles mentioned relating to political context reveals how
politicized yet operationally pragmatic TNGO leaders seem to be. Leaders reported a broad
range of political obstacles, including general ignorance among the public and elites, various
foreign cultural and political obstacles, US militarism, the USA Patriot Act, the administration of
President George W. Bush and the general post-9/11 political climate.
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Some organizations exclusively pursue strategies of public education to achieve their objectives,
and many TNGOs employ these strategies secondarily. Some of this activity is focused on
influencing political elites beyond just the general public. In the context of transnational politics
this is an unremarkable statement, but in the US context it is somewhat controversial because of
domestic tax regulations that limit nonprofit lobbying behavior. Regardless, transnational NGO
leaders discussed at length their difficulties attempting to influence policymakers. Some leaders
expressed frustration trying to reorient the strategic thinking of key officials. ―Well there I think
it‘s um, again, resources,‖ one leader reiterated (ID = 124), referring again to funding as a chief
obstacle, ―but also a lack of awareness around, among a lot of policymakers about the
importance of behavior change as a critical element of programming.‖ Other leaders indicted
policymakers more harshly. A respondent from a human rights organization dealing with
immigration issues said the following (ID = 33):

I think one of the biggest obstacles is politicians, people who serve in the law making
bodies who do not understand the issues. That is an obligation for us to do teaching but
the job is so big. I think that the politicization of these issues is really very disturbing and
the idea that a group can decide by demonizing an entire group of people who I really
hesitate to use the term ‗vulnerable‘ but vulnerable in terms of not having access to all
parts of our society and who they view as not a threat to them, because so many
immigrants are not citizens yet and so they do not vote. And the fact that these are public
policymakers and they do not see the real impact on real human beings to what they did
and even the hateful discourse that is created. So it is a huge obstacle just having public
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policymakers who do not understand and who are so politicized that we have policies and
laws that make no sense.

Here the respondent explicitly criticizes the politicization of immigration issues, preferring
instead to view immigration as a managerial problem. Another leader (ID = 52) whose
organization works to promote religious freedom offered a more conciliatory characterization of
the problem. ―It is very difficult because there are, you know, major concerns that policymakers
have to deal with. And religious persecution is probably the last thing on the list. And so to get
the attention of policymakers and everything is very difficult.‖

Other political obstacles that leaders discussed were more concrete. In one extraordinary
interview the respondent recounted a number of rather spectacular, if not fantastic anecdotes that
included the following (ID = 12):

I was in the upper, working in the upper Amazon and there was a—a charity sent a group
of three people into a tribal village. And they didn‘t know anything about the customs or
culture, it was a real primitive tribe and ah, they heard that the tribe was hospitable,
which they were, very hospitable. And ah you know by custom, you know a stranger
comes to the village and you know you get a meal and a place to sleep. With that tribe
they also practice wife hospitality. And these three guys declined, not knowing that was a
declaration of war and they were decapitated within a few minutes.
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In addition to direct mortal challenges, longstanding domestic and international political disputes
often yield similarly hostile environments for transnational activism. Examples abound the world
over, but especially since 9/11 the Middle East has received increased attention. ―I hate to keep
coming back to the word Israel,‖ said one respondent apologetically (ID = 118), ―but the fact is
that we could probably do ten times the amount of aid work, not just the project stuff but the aid
work in Palestine, if it wasn‘t locked down the way it is.‖ In the wake of Israel‘s 2006 invasion
of southern Lebanon another leader mentioned the following (ID = 117):

At the implementation side there are the usual barriers of unforeseen conflicts arising or
the myriad of things that go on in the world. And we have been working in southern
Lebanon for five years and that work has just been not only interrupted but probably
eliminated. A lot of the things we have worked on have been bombed now, so that is a
barrier.

The respondent‘s understated manner seems to suggest such challenges are commonplace. In the
post-9/11 context during which the interviews took place, many respondents noted that US
foreign policy itself had rendered transnational humanitarianism considerably more difficult.
More specifically, some leaders observed increased foreign suspicion toward US TNGOs. One
such leader explained how he or she thought NGO neutrality had been brought into question (ID
=56):

…in the context of this…especially in the last five years of course, with post 9/11, there
is this, a new or stronger trend towards having Western military intervention alongside
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with aid and other activities accompanying that. That has polarized and made it more
difficult I think for independent aid, humanitarian aid organizations to work in certain
conflict settings. There‘s more rejection of that, more distrust of aid groups, question
whether they can be independent…

The leader quoted below would probably agree with this characterization. He or she explained
the complications posed when organizations are associated with the US government, correctly or
otherwise (ID = 23):

And so, you know for example, ah, something will happen in the world where you know
ah, a leader of a country will go on television and denounce our work and say this work is
CIA and this organization, this person is an agent of the US government…and then we
have to do sort of public relations for the next week. So in that way we are constantly sort
of reacting to events, and it‘s very disruptive.

That association with US foreign policy would be a detriment to transnational activism suggests
something unsettling about America‘s perceived role in the world community at that time. It is
unclear whether this is specific to particular US administrations or is a more general corollary of
perceived government aegis.

Many leaders found their organizations directly at odds specifically with the policies of the
Republican administration and congress and explained their political obstacles in no uncertain
terms. One such leader construed the challenges quite broadly (ID = 145):
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It certainly is a major obstacle to reaching our objectives, which would be to establish a
new global world order that‘s a civil world order and based on civil institutions whereas
right now, the direction of US policy appears to us to be one that relies very much on
military force and seeks to create a global network of military alliances to maintain order.
In that setting, the idea of creating peaceful security through rule of law is challenged a
lot.

Other leaders articulated their frustrations with recent US legislation. The USA Patriot Act was a
singular vehicle for the expression of these criticisms (ID = 28).

With the Patriot Act and other laws that make it frightening for us at some level even to
deliver services, you know the intelligence agencies have authority now to go through
files and to, you know investigate in ways that they haven‘t before, and the appeals
around that are becoming less and less.

A leader from a Christian organization explained how the USA Patriot Act introduced increased
political pressure and various practical obstacles (ID = 110).

Obviously that, as a faith-based entity we have to be careful, of course, who we partner
with. Obviously given all the Patriot Act and things that are going on, it adds a little bit
more pressure, paper-work, whatever you want to call it, to [INAUDIBLE] as far as your
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partners and potential partners, you have got all this vetting names, all this kind of stuff.
So yeah.

Some respondents expressed their concerns more flippantly, often not without humor.
Considering the obstacles facing his or her organization, one interviewee (ID = 27) responded
―oh there‘s lots of them. The current administration [LAUGHTER]. I don‘t know if I‘m allowed
to say that now [LAUGHTER].‖ Others articulated very specific criticisms. The following
conversation has been truncated to protect confidentiality, but it illustrates the attitude of a leader
who found his or her organization‘s work stymied by Bush-era policies (ID = 26).

INTERVIEWER: If you take a step back, what are the major obstacles to reaching those
objectives?
RESPONDENT: One objective, well the, um, well there‘s the Bush Administration for
one.
INTERVIEWER: Right.
RESPONDENT: Um, no, I, I and I‘m being facetious, but not really…
INTERVIEWER: Not entirely?
RESPONDENT: One of the major, one of the major obstacles in achieving the expansion
of [DELETED] rights has been um, the recent presidential administration.
INTERVIEWER: Yeah.
RESPONDENT: And the conservatism of the federal judiciary.
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The leader‘s organization saw many of its achievements reversed by domestic legislation and
court decisions. Another respondent flatly stated that the Bush administration was ―absolutely
closed‖ to civil society (ID = 150):

It depends, if you were to talk to me during the Clinton Administration it would have
been different. Because the Clinton Administration was very open to civil society, um, to
their analysis, to their um, policy recommendations, and this administration is absolutely
closed to that.

The Bush Administration vocally supported faith-based organizations within civil society, but
even religious organizations reported political difficulties with the administration. A leader from
the ―more progressive‖ side of the religious sector expressed some disappointment with the
relationship between religious organizations and the administration, choosing his words rather
carefully (ID = 88).

And that is just to say um, you know the politics of religion. And how that plays
out…over the course of the last eight years, for example with a more conservative
administration in the United States, the work of [DELTETED], which tend to be viewed
as the, as the main line of the more, more progressive churches in the United States, has
struggled to work as effectively with this administration as perhaps we would have liked.

The zeitgeist of the Bush presidency was the post-9/11 political context and subsequent US
behavior. This had some obvious consequences for transnational NGOs, such as increased
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scrutiny of financial transfers, especially those of faith-based organizations and NGOs working
in Arab countries. But the fallout of 9/11 had other unintended consequences. Another leader
explained how the terrorist attacks caused major donors and other stakeholders to orient attention
toward the Middle East, which diverted resources away from other needy regions and causes (ID
= 151).

Well I think…there are a lot. I‘d say the policy environment is probably one of the
biggest obstacles, especially in recent years where Latin America is not on the front page
of the news in a lot of cases. When we first started…doing work in [COUNTRY
DELTED] it was already a public issue…and so now going from something that is a
public issue and working to actually try and build up something to become a public issue
is challenging. And then…since September 11th and since the focus on the Middle East,
when we were working in [COUNTRY DELETED] in 2000, US, the [INITIATIVE
DELETED] and US military funding, [COUNTRY DELETED] was one of the largest
disbursements of money and military aid. Now it just seems like pocket change compared
to what‘s [being spent in] Iraq and Afghanistan. So I mean that‘s made it challenging…I
would say with good reason grassroots energy has been focused towards the Middle East
so that‘s made it, it has been a challenge for us…

But other themes persist far beyond transitory administrations and policies to reveal more
persevering relationships between transnational activism and politics. Effective service delivery,
as one respondent commented, requires concomitant outreach and political support. Donor
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education, fundraising, public education and service provision are all facets of a synthetic
strategy that is most effective within a facilitative ―political climate‖ (ID = 61).

So that that kind of political climate of course translates into what happens with funding
climates but also translates into how people on the ground are working and reacting. That
wholly affects what we do. When we‘re trying to achieve a positive agenda of health for
all many of us are having to dig into battles about let‘s get drugs to this one community,
this one population. So I‘d say this is very broad thing. The political climate is a real
challenge to our work. When there‘s healthy, vibrant health-promotion going on, more
work gets done, because the books and the materials that we give to people-they‘re really
of use. Those organizations are all under extreme pressure.

The political obstacles that leaders face reveal the multidimensional character of their
organizations as simultaneously technocratic and politicized. The post 9/11 context presented
particular challenges to TNGO leaders both domestically and internationally.

Conclusion

Leaders‘ preoccupation with financial obstacles and understanding of politics as an obstacle
rather than a strategy suggests important insights about how TNGO leaders view their work. In
the first instance, leaders exhibit a strong sense of pragmatism in overwhelmingly declaring
funding as their most salient obstacle. In the second instance, leaders discuss politics
disapprovingly, preferring instead to couch their activism in relatively apolitical, technocratic
and managerial terms. However, as Willetts (2002) has argued, a failure to fully appreciate the
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political significance of TNGO activity does not mean that its consequences—whether
intentional or unintentional—are politically neutral:

Legal systems may classify raising money for purposes such as poverty alleviation,
disaster relief or environmental conservation as non-political, but the legal distinction
between charitable and political activity is always based on an arbitrary, illogical and
controversial definition of politics. Many NGOs will not see themselves as engaging
directly in public policy, but their activities are always a social expression of values.
Hence, NGOs are very likely to be political in the broadest sense of affecting social
discourse and can often have an indirect effect on politics in the narrow sense of shaping
public policy.

Transnational NGO leaders in the United States walk a fine line. Domestically, their
organizations are classified as charities and rewarded with a tax exemption. Their legitimacy
hinges on a domestic cultural compact in which an implicit or explicit pledge to ‗do good‘
purchases valuable legal privileges and social respect. A TNGO that takes a political side puts its
legitimacy at risk and calls into question whether the organization is fighting for universalistic or
particularistic values. Leaders must respect this cultural compact at home while conducting
operations abroad with political consequences.

That many TNGO leaders would view political context as an obstacle second only to funding is
revealing. Leaders may have so thoroughly internalized their technocratic managerialism that
they fail to fully appreciate the political significance of their work both at home and abroad. The
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discourse of transnational activism, with all its elaborate jargon—logical frameworks, capacity
building, stakeholders, etc.—supplies a politically neutral language in which to conduct
transnational public policy. Transnational NGO leaders may not conceptualize their work in
overtly political terms, but an analysis of their perceived obstacles indicates that their work is no
less political.
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION

What is the role of TNGOs in world affairs? The heterogeneity discovered among organizations
implies that this is the wrong question. The right question is: ‗What are the roles of TNGOs in
world affairs?‘ Transnational NGO leaders think differently about how to approach transnational
activism and their organizations implement different types of strategies. Taking this
heterogeneity into account reveals three types of TNGO: charitable relief and development,
human rights activism and environmental advocacy. Each of these types of TNGO may be
understood as playing a different role in the world system. Before turning to this discussion, I
offer a brief summary of what has been discovered substantively so far.

Summary

Chapter four examined TNGO leaders‘ ideologies toward transnational activism. An exploratory
discrete factor analysis found that about 66 percent of leaders described missions of
amelioration, while about 34 percent described missions of empowerment. Additionally, only
about 23 percent of leaders described missions involving ideational strategies or tactics, such as
research and compliance monitoring, which is surprising considering that most scholars regard
ideational strategies a hallmark of transnational activism. Taking these two latent factors
together, about 51 percent of leaders adhere to an ideology of material amelioration, followed
distantly by material empowerment (26 percent), ideational amelioration (15 percent) and
ideational empowerment (8 percent). Leaders‘ most common attitude toward transnational
engagement is that of material amelioration, not ideational empowerment, broadly suggesting
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that most leaders take a materialistic, charitable approach to transnational activism rather than
the approach of ideational contention thought by many scholars to epitomize TNGO behavior.

Leaders‘ views differed only slightly when asked about the specific activities their organizations
undertake. After factoring out the influence of likely coder bias, the familiar distinction remerged
between amelioration (68 percent) and empowerment (32 percent) in strikingly similar
proportions. In the contexts of both mission and activities, TNGO leaders are roughly twice as
likely to favor strategies of amelioration over empowerment.

Based on the sample data, leaders with an ameliorative mission orientation direct about 71
percent of total TNGO expenditures while leaders with a material orientation control about 84
percent. Leaders who described their organizations as primarily engaged in ameliorative
activities direct about 93 percent of total TNGO resources. The majority of TNGO leaders in the
United States directing most of the sector‘s resources have an ameliorative, materialistic
approach to transnational activism.

Chapter five examined the questions of TNGO autonomy and collaborative style. Transnational
NGOs are strategic in their own rights and appear to be highly protective of their overarching
missions even though they occasionally strategically adjust their programs in response to donor
preferences. On balance, neither TNGOs nor donors clearly predominate. Leaders implement
specific strategies to maintain operational independence in the presence of financial dependency.
Transnational NGOs protect autonomy through brand recognition, funding diversification and by
maintaining high proportions of unrestricted funds. When financial pressures become more
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intense, some TNGOs secure government or other large grants to serve as bridge funding.
Transnational organization gives TNGOs additional autonomy-preserving efficiencies since
organizations can acquire funds internationally that may be unavailable domestically. Some use
Southern partners to secure resources ostensibly unavailable to Northern organizations.
Transnational NGOs thus appear capable of maintaining a degree of autonomy to influence
world politics despite their reliance on external financial support.

Chapter five also found that that about 63 percent of TNGOs exhibit a protective collaborative
style, vastly preferring to partner with other NGOs rather than states, corporations or
intergovernmental organizations. About 37 percent exhibit an interdependent collaborative style
and are more likely to collaborate with other types of organizations.

TNGOs vary within each collaborative type. Some protective TNGO leaders actively refuse
government and corporate funding, others simply disfavor it. Within the interdependent style,
many TNGOs collaborate with other types of organizations because they believe doing so
increases effectiveness. A few TNGO leaders explicitly adopt a subcontractor model, which
critics of the New Policy Agenda believe may pose a systemic risk to the authenticity and
autonomy of TNGOs (Edwards & Hulme, 1996).

Whether TNGO autonomy and independence from states and corporations is desirable depends
upon additional factors such as function and sector, despite strong normative undercurrents
pervading much scholarship. For instance, independence from government agencies may hinder
service delivery in the health sector but improve the effectiveness of human rights activism.
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Among the most difficult challenges to TNGO theorization is the problem of taxonomy. Scholars
widely recognize TNGO heterogeneity but implement different and overlapping criteria to
segment TNGOs for theoretical clarity. Chapter six developed a taxonomy of US-registered
TNGOs based on the most commonly adduced taxonomic criteria: sector, function,
autonomy/collaborative style, mode of influence and strategy. Consistent with the general
structure of scholarship on transnational activism, there are three types of TNGO, but they are
distributed in inverse proportion to the amount of scholarly attention they receive. About 67
percent of TNGOs are charitable development and relief organizations. This type of TNGO is
associated with sustainable development, service delivery, ameliorative strategies and
materialistic influence, and controls about 85 percent of the sample‘s total resources. About 26
percent of organizations are human rights activism TNGOs. They are associated with human
rights, advocacy, the protective collaborative style and missions of empowerment, although they
eschew ideational tactics. This type of TNGO controls about 14 percent of the sample‘s total
resources. Finally, about 8 percent of TNGOs are environmental advocacy organizations. This
type of TNGO is associated with the environment sector, advocacy, the interdependent
collaborative style and empowering activities. This is the only type of organization that is very
likely to employ ideational tactics such as information politics. This type of TNGO controls only
about one percent of the sample‘s total resources.

Transnational NGO research in international relations frequently identifies organizations such as
Amnesty International and Greenpeace as exemplary or quintessential TNGOs. However,
taxonomical analysis suggests that these organizations are highly uncharacteristic of both
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TNGOs generally and of the subcategories they are commonly thought to typify (human rights
activism and environmental advocacy, respectively). Scholars appear to focus disproportionally
on the least efficacious types of TNGO in terms of their numbers and resources.

Leaders‘ understandings of organizational effectiveness reveal additional insights about their
approaches to transnational activism. Whether they understand effectiveness as ‗outcome
accountability‘ or ‗overhead minimization,‘ their perspectives tend to be managerial and
technocratic and their accountability practices are largely oriented toward donors. The
widespread uses of complex logical frameworks and the high salience of specific financial ratios
are indicative of a transnational NGO culture that prizes technical evaluations and upward
accountability to boards and donors rather than beneficiaries. This donor-oriented managerialism
calls into question the presumption that TNGOs authentically embody the values and preferences
of their beneficiaries.

Leaders do not hold heterogeneous attitudes toward all issues. When asked to discuss the
obstacles their organizations face, leaders agreed on the centrality of funding, and to a lesser
extent, leaders expressed concerns over the challenges posed by political context. Their nearly
unanimous concern about funding reveals a pragmatic orientation that defies characterization as
either strictly ‗principled‘ or ‗self-interested,‘ while their general discomfort with politics and
use of technocratic jargon exposes a disconnection between the popular image of TNGOs as
overtly contentious political activists and the considerably more mundane reality of TNGOs as
professionalized managerial agencies.
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Synthesis

Based on preceding analyses, TNGOs registered in the United States appear to play three roles in
world affairs. These are outlined in table 9.1.
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Table 9.1: Roles of TNGOs in world affairs

TNGO type
Collaborative
style

Alleviation
Charitable development
and relief
About equally as likely to
collaborate within civil
society as with states and
corporations

Mission and
activity

Amelioration, avoids
ideational tactics

Function

Primarily regarded as
service delivery
Primarily regarded as
sustainable development,
and to a lesser extent,
humanitarian relief

Sectoral
typicality

Efficacy

67% of organizations,
85% of expenditures

Potential impact

Alleviation from poverty
and disaster; reproduction
of hierarchical power
relations between the
'developed' and
'developing' societies

Realization
Human rights
activism
The most
independent,
preferring to
collaborate within
civil society
Espouse missions
of empowerment,
but implement
ameliorative
activities; avoids
ideational tactics
Primarily regarded
as advocacy
Primarily regarded
as human rights,
and to a lesser
extent, conflict
resolution
26% of
organizations, 14%
of expenditures
Leveraging of
material resources
to promote the
realization of
human rights,
depoliticization
and
institutionalization
of conflict

Environmentalism
Environmental advocacy
The most interdependent,
collaborating with states
and corporations

Missions are about equally
likely to be couched in
terms of amelioration or
empowerment; activities
are the most empowering;
most likely to employ
ideational tactics
Regarded as advocacy
Primarily regarded as
environmental, and to
much lesser extents,
human rights and conflict
resolution
8% of organizations, 1%
of expenditures
Environmental protection,
whether through
conservation, public
mobilization or the
certification of
government and corporate
practices
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Roles of TNGOs in world affairs: Alleviation

The first and most important role TNGOs play is that of ‗alleviation,‘ the role I ascribe to
charitable development and relief organizations. Alleviation refers to more than simply lessening
the suffering of disadvantaged people; it also represents a form of political power that, as
DeMars (2005, p. 61) writes, ―goes far beyond success or failure in achieving…official goals.‖
Alleviation may create relationships of dependency that reproduce hierarchical power relations,
while the discourse with which alleviation takes place enables and promotes transnational
governmentality and rational managerialism (Jaeger, 2007; Roberts et al., 2005; Schuller, 2007).

Alleviation is by far the most common role, and this role is a frequent target of critical
scholarship questioning the consequences of the international relief and development community
(DeMars, 2005; Jaeger, 2007; Naylor, 2011; Schuller, 2007). Scholars show how the
international development discourse identifies ‗beneficiaries,‘ often represented in disturbing
imagery, who are ‗vulnerable‘ and require ‗capacity building‘ and ‗empowerment,‘ suggesting
that the ‗targets‘ of alleviation are incapacitated and weak and must submit to the ‗technical
assistance‘ offered by Northern TNGOs (Billon, 2006; Naylor, 2011). Naylor (2011, p. 193)
illustrates this powerfully in a detailed case study in which she characterizes the international
development discourse as sustaining this ‗Politics of Pity:‘

[B]ecause the current international development discourse operates through relations of
power according to a Politics of Pity, which necessarily (re)constitutes subjects in an
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unequal hierarchical relation to one another, it is unable to fully address the underlying
structural inequalities that are at the root of poverty.

If ideational power is indeed the primary source of TNGO influence in the world, the nature of
this power is disputable. Instead of using information politics to achieve sociopolitical
transformation, the most efficacious TNGOs may be sustaining a Politics of Pity articulated
through technocratic managerialism that maintains and perpetuates the status quo.

Scholars have argued that development TNGOs not only help sustain the contemporary
international system, but may be essential for its continued maintenance. According to Chabbott
(1999), most development TNGOs are located in the North. Figures compiled from multiple
sources put their numbers at more than 2,500 in North and under 300 in South (Chabbott, 1999,
p. 255). These TNGOs, argues Chabbot, maintain a discourse based on science and individual
welfare largely grounded in rational individualism and neoclassical economic theory. Many
official donors prefer to channel development and relief funding through these TNGOs instead of
giving directly to individual states as a means of preserving control and limiting corruption. To a
large extent these organization have carved out a role for themselves that extends far beyond
what states originally intended, and in many contexts states have come to rely upon development
and relief TNGOs for the provision of the basic services.
Kaldor (2003, p. 92) has described the ―NGOization of public space‖ in which this type of
organization plays a prominent role in the international system (also see: Schuller, 2007).
―Effectively, what this means,‖ she writes:
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is that those NGOs who are northern and therefore close to the centres of power and
funding, whose emphasis is service provision, who are solidaristic rather than mutual
benefit, and whose organization tends to be more formal and hierarchical, have come to
dominate the NGO scene. This is, in part, a consequence of the growing support of
northern governments towards NGOs: they tend to favour service provision and may be
nervous about advocacy; they are biased towards NGOs from their own countries and
also prefer to deal with formally organized professional NGOs.

Kaldor (2003, p. 92) also argues that ―growing dependence on particular donors may distort the
priorities or missions of NGOs. Dependence on government funding has, in some cases,
transformed NGOs into…government subcontractors‖ that ―have become substitutes for the
state.‖ She also warns of a ―damping down of the advocacy role of NGOs since,‖ particularly
American ―NGOs are fearful of losing their sources of income,‖ which ―in extreme cases…are
merely the ‗handmaidens of capitalist change‘ with little serious concern for effective poverty
alleviation strategies. They are seen as the ‗modernizers and destroyers of local economies,‘
introducing Western values and bringing about ‗economicide‘‖ (Kaldor, 2003, pp. 92-93). Future
scholarship would do well to examine these bold propositions empirically.

Roles of TNGOs in world affairs: Realization

The second aspect to understanding the role of TNGOs in world affairs is to understand the
nature of ‗realization.‘ Human rights activism TNGOs advance missions of empowerment by
providing material support to beneficiaries. These organizations are the most independent of
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states, corporations and intergovernmental organizations and therefore the best suited to
challenge the status quo from the outside.

Conventional wisdom suggests that human rights realization is typically promoted through
information politics, especially documentation and compliance monitoring (Hopgood, 2006;
Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Ron et al., 2007). However, data suggest that although these
organizations espouse missions of empowerment, they are largely not conducting ideational
activities such as research and compliance monitoring. Instead, these TNGOs tend to deliver
products and services for their beneficiaries to employ in the realization of their rights. An
example provided in chapter four illustrates this role. Supporting embroidery projects, setting up
computer labs and constructing playgrounds empowers beneficiaries with a sense of ―hope‖ (ID
= 118, PMP = 0.64).29

The role of realization performed by human rights activism TNGOs is perhaps the most common
subject of academic study for scholars of transnational activism. However, more recently
scholars have begun to question whether realization counterproductively serves to absorb and
institutionalize political dysfunction and conflict (DeMars, 2005). Future scholarship could
contribute to this already impressive research program by examining the materialistic
programming more common to the sector and as well as its unintended consequences.

Roles of TNGOs in world affairs: Environmentalism
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The third aspect to understanding the role of TNGOs in world affairs is to understand the nature
of environmentalism. Environmental advocacy organizations are the only type of TNGO to
heavily rely on ideational tactics such as information politics. However, they are also the most
likely to partner with states, corporations and intergovernmental organizations. These
partnerships may promote environmental sustainability through certification programs that
confer legitimacy and reward corporate social responsibility. Many TNGO leaders engaged with
environmentalism collaborate with governments to improve program effectiveness when
ministries exercise regulatory prerogatives over environmental resources. However, the
interdependence between environmental advocacy TNGOs and state and corporate interests may
call into question the autonomy of TNGOs to criticize transgressors from the outside.

Interestingly, this contradicts McCormick‘s (1999, p. 56) view that environmental NGOs
―function outside the [governmental] rule-making process, offering expert advice, undertaking
research, and monitoring the application of these rules,‖ while lending credence to Raustiala‘s
(1997) general conclusion that environmental NGOs tend to extend the regulatory power of
states.

Environmentalism is the most empowering TNGO role in the sense that it is highly likely to
involve activities such as research and public education, advocacy and grassroots mobilization.
These activities suggest that environmental advocacy TNGOs wield a unique combination of
both carrots (certification) and sticks (grassroots mobilization) in the pursuit of their goals.
Future scholarship could improve our understanding of environmental advocacy by examining
how these diverse tactics promote or impede environmentalism.
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Reflection

Proponents claim that TNGOs promote universal rights; detractors claim they propagate
neoliberal governmentality. A normative preference appears to imbue this literature, which
celebrates the empowering orientations of realization and environmentalism, while disparaging
the untended consequences of alleviation (compare, for example: Jaeger, 2007; Keck & Sikkink,
1998). Politicization and contention are preferred to managerialism and service delivery, and a
peculiar optimism—an emancipatory faith—about the potentiality of TNGOs to transform world
politics is easily detectable.

Perhaps this emancipatory aspiration has been projected onto TNGOs. Consider the idealized
TNGO—a nongovernmental, noncommercial organization, an organization immune to hubris
and greed, an agent of a global civil society yearning to improve its condition. It aspires for
sociopolitical transformation. Untainted by violence and self-interest and imbued with the
righteousness of universal principles, its potential to peaceably transform world politics seems
unbounded.

Alas, leaders of TNGOs in the United States paint a different portrait. Although their
organizations are noncommercial, they are preoccupied with funding. While they are relatively
independent of governments, they are more concerned about demonstrating accountability to
donors than to their beneficiaries (Raggo et al., 2010). Most leaders adopt a materialistic,
ameliorative approach to transnational activism. Grassroots mobilization and information politics
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are uncommon. This is not to assert that some TNGOs are not conducting emancipatory
campaigns; on the contrary, we know them all too well. But they are in the minority.

Transnational NGOs registered in the United States may not radically transform the world
system, but they do appear to offer alleviation from poverty and disaster, realization of basic
human rights and environmental stewardship. But these services may be delivered with
unintended consequences. Future scholarship would do well to focus greater attention on these
effects. Additionally, future scholarship would benefit from more explicit treatments of empirical
proportion so as to avoid theoretical mischaracterizations on the basis of irregular evidence.

Finally, as detailed in chapter two, these conclusions are based on interviews with TNGO leaders
in the United States and so pertain only to a national subset of organizations, albeit the largest
one. Leaders in other Northern countries may offer different perspectives, as may leaders of
Southern TNGOs. It is possible that TNGOs not registered in the United States are more
politically contentious and transformative. More research is needed to better understand the
perspectives of TNGO leaders based in other countries.
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APPENDIX: ACRONYMS
Acronym

Description

AIRS/INFO LINE

Alliance of Information and Referral Systems/Info Line

BVR

Bivariate residual

CAQDAS

Computer aided qualitative data analysis software

DFA

Discrete factor analysis

ECHO

European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department

ECOSOC

Economic and Social Council

HCA

Hierarchical cluster analysis

ICNPO

International Classification of Nonprofit Organizations

ID

Identification

IRS

Internal Revenue Service

ISIC

International Standard Industrial Classification System

L²

Log-likelihood ratio chi-squared statistic

LCA

Latent class analysis

LL

Log-likelihood

MOU

Memorandum of understanding

NACE

Eurostat General Industrial Classification of Economic Activities

NAICS

North American Industry Classification System

NCCS

National Center for Charitable Statistics

NGO

Nongovernmental organization

NPC

Nonprofit Program Classification

NTEE

National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities

PMP

Posterior membership probability

TNGO

Transnational nongovernmental NGO

UIA

Union of International Associations

UN

United Nations

USAID

United States Agency for International Development
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APPENDIX: FINITE MIXTURE MODELING

A latent class model with three response variables,

,

and

, taking on values

,

and

, respectively, models the probability of the ith leader‘s response pattern as follows:

where

is a nominal latent variable of

categories and

represents the unconditional latent class probabilities over the K latent classes, which sum to one,
and

represents the product of the conditional probabilities over the t indicator variables (Vermunt &
Magidson, 2005). The conditional probabilities for the values of each indicator within each latent
class sum to one and their product over the indicator variables is one.
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The latent class and conditional probabilities are the key quantities in LCA because they provide
estimates of class size and information for ascribing class profiles, respectively (McCutcheon,
1987). The conditional probabilities that define the profiles of the latent classes are
parameterized as

where

is a linear predictor obtained by

.

The intercept is

and the effect of the latent variable on the indicators is

. The software

automatically determines the correct logit model based on the specified scale types of the
indicator and latent variables. Maximum likelihood estimates are obtained by way of the
expectation maximization algorithm.30 The software, which is specifically designed for latent
class analysis, also provides the latent class and conditional probabilities. 31

The probability structure for a latent class factor model with two discrete latent variables,
and four indicators is as follows:

,

,
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which is similar to the traditional latent class model presented above except that the ith leader‘s
response pattern depends upon two discrete latent variables instead of one (Magidson &
Vermunt, 2003; Vermunt & Magidson, n.d.). The discrete factors are mutually independent and
as with traditional LCA the meaning of each latent factor is derived from the information
conveyed by the conditional probabilities.
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APPENDIX: DATES OF INTERVIEWS
ID
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Date
3/14/2007
12/10/2007
2/15/2008
1/2/2008
4/17/2008
4/2/2008
6/22/2006
3/19/2007
7/13/2006
3/10/2008
3/15/2007
3/12/2008
5/24/2007
5/17/2007
12/11/2006
6/12/2007
11/28/2006
3/16/2007
3/13/2007
3/14/2007
3/11/2008
1/9/2008
3/13/2008
6/20/2006
8/24/2006
2/5/2008
6/30/2006
11/17/2006
2/20/2008
12/5/2006
12/11/2006

ID
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Date
1/9/2008
11/15/2006
12/10/2007
3/5/2008
7/11/2006
7/10/2006
3/16/2007
3/12/2008
12/12/2006
12/12/2007
1/7/2008
12/12/2007
11/30/2007
3/27/2008
5/22/2007
11/15/2006
4/20/2007
3/13/2007
1/18/2007
3/15/2007
12/13/2006
3/13/2008
1/7/2008
7/17/2006
12/13/2006
11/5/2007
2/15/2008
5/25/2007
4/24/2007
3/15/2007
7/12/2006

ID
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

Date
1/16/2007
2/18/2008
11/7/2007
4/20/2007
6/13/2007
6/12/2007
3/11/2008
12/14/2006
3/15/2007
2/21/2008
12/29/2006
11/9/2007
12/13/2006
12/13/2006
7/20/2006
12/12/2007
8/14/2007
3/13/2007
12/12/2007
6/14/2007
7/13/2006
11/16/2006
3/12/2007
4/27/2007
3/11/2008
1/23/2008
12/11/2006
2/15/2008
5/18/2007
12/29/2006
11/9/2007

ID
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Date
3/13/2007
11/27/2006
11/16/2006
11/27/2006
3/7/2007
12/11/2007
6/23/2006
12/12/2006
1/10/2008
12/11/2006
6/12/2007
2/19/2008
2/22/2008
3/14/2007
12/11/2007
2/19/2008
7/14/2006
7/14/2006
2/20/2008
11/6/2007
11/5/2007
1/18/2007
3/5/2008
7/26/2006
2/21/2008
1/19/2007
4/15/2007
3/10/2008
4/1/2008
11/8/2007
6/8/2007

ID
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Date
7/19/2006
3/25/2008
3/12/2007
3/13/2008
6/26/2006
3/15/2007
12/21/2006
3/24/2008
12/12/2006
9/6/2006
3/13/2007
12/12/2007
3/11/2008
12/14/2006
6/14/2007
7/12/2006
5/3/2008
6/21/2006
7/18/2006
1/8/2008
8/2/2006
6/21/2006
1/8/2008
7/26/2006
12/19/2007
3/13/2007
11/28/2006
6/27/2006
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APPENDIX: BIVARIATE RESIDUALS FOR EFFECTIVENESS
Model1*
Code

Resours

Flexabil

Innovati

Expertis

Contacts

Staff or

Stakehol

Goal Ach

Evaluati

Resours

.

Flexabil

0.55

.

Innovati

10.42

1.58

.

Expertis

3.49

3.86

0.80

.

Contacts

0.00

2.16

0.99

2.69

.

Staff or

0.11

2.10

0.31

0.88

5.43

.

Stakehol

0.00

0.94

0.15

0.10

0.12

5.04

.

Goal Ach

3.14

0.00

0.43

0.33

0.22

0.11

0.14

.

Evaluati

0.15

0.26

1.56

0.08

0.13

1.47

0.33

0.54

.

Resours

Flexabil

Innovati

Expertis

Contacts

Staff or

Stakehol

Goal Ach

Evaluati

Model2*
Code
Resours

.

Flexabil

0.28

.

Innovati

0.27

2.55

.

Expertis

0.00

4.71

0.05

.

Contacts

0.05

2.20

0.72

2.39

.

Staff or

0.50

2.19

0.08

0.55

5.34

.

Stakehol

0.06

0.96

0.26

0.05

0.12

4.95

.

Goal Ach

0.00

0.01

0.20

0.02

0.29

0.23

0.09

.

Evaluati

0.12

0.22

0.68

0.36

0.15

1.33

0.29

0.22

.

Resours

Flexabil

Innovati

Expertis

Contacts

Staff or

Stakehol

Goal Ach

Evaluati

Model3*
Code
Resours

.

Flexabil

0.46

.

Innovati

0.82

0.04

.

Expertis

0.04

0.94

0.41

.

Contacts

0.28

0.01

0.03

0.85

.

Staff or

0.14

0.03

0.19

0.01

0.59

.

Stakehol

0.00

0.05

0.92

0.03

0.23

1.82

.

Goal Ach

0.01

0.57

0.00

0.05

0.31

0.13

0.63

.

Evaluati

0.11

0.88

0.18

0.88

0.54

0.63

0.10

0.39

*BVR = chi2/df. A value greater than 3.84 indicates a local dependence at the 95% confidence level.

.
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1

This research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant No. SES-0527679 (Agents of Change:
Transnational NGOs as Agents of Change: Toward Understanding Their Governance, Leadership, and
Effectiveness) and the Transnational NGO Initiative at the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs at Syracuse
University.
2
The dataset can be obtained by visiting http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/.
3
For more detailed information see: (Hermann et al., 2010)
4
The NCCS cautions their data be interpreted cautiously, however, due to reporting inaccuracies and other technical
issues.
5
The calculation is based on average expenditure data from sampled organizations‘ IRS Forms 990 for the period
2001-2006 and raw NCCS data for the year 2007.
6
The Gini coefficient for revenue inequality in the population of international nonprofits in the 2007 database of the
National Center for Charitable Statistics is 0.94, whereas that for the transnational NGO sample is 0.84.
7
However, it should be noted that the NCCS population contains many inactive organizations with zero or near-zero
revenues, so the distribution is zero-inflated.
8
The initial sampling n was determined to enable meaningful statistical comparisons among subgroups. The
ultimate sampling n reflects this and also budgetary considerations resulting from refusals and other factors.
9
The strata were defined by five sectoral, three size (budget) and four financial classifications derived from
information provided by Charity Navigator (www.charitynavigator.org). The five sectors were human rights,
sustainable development, conflict resolution, environment and humanitarian relief. The three categories of budget
size were small (less than $1 million), medium ($1 million to $10 million) and large (greater than $10 million). The
four financial classifications were based on Charity Navigator‘s organizational efficiency and capacity ratings,
derived from information from IRS Forms 990.
10
The response rate of 68 per cent is calculated as the number of successful interviews from the original sample
divided by the number of cases in the original sample or 123/182=0.68.
11
The author is grateful to Jay Magdison for confirming this interpretation.
12
These tests were exploratory and the results of are not reported owing to path dependencies in the clustering
routine that make replication difficult. I used the average linkage method and Jaccard similarity measure using
identical sets of response variables as with the corresponding finite mixture models. Concordance between HCA
assignment solutions and finite mixture model assignment solutions, as measured by the ratio of concordant
assignments to total assignments, was generally in the neighborhood of 70 to 90 percent, indicating strong technical
validity.
13
The solutions are statistically associated (n = 106, chi2(4) = 133.89, p = 0.00) and concordance is 93/106 or 88
percent.
14
L-squared p-values are obtained using a parametric bootstrap procedure. Delta L2 p-values and response variable
p-values are obtained from -2LL difference tests using a parametric bootstrap procedure.
15
Coder 3‘s chi-squared contribution is 6.6/12.26=54%, n = 116, chi2(4) = 12.26, p = 0.02.
16
The -2LL difference test p-value = 0.11.
17
Analogous models Model1 and Model2 both contain local dependencies. The analogous model Model3 (L 2 =
30.57, p = 0.37) provides adequate model fit and does not contain any local dependencies. Increasing the number of
latent classes to four does not significantly improve model fit (ΔL2 p-value = 0.46). Again, a 3-class model is
preferred. Profile parameter estimates are identical in direction, although not in magnitude, leading to the same
substantive interpretation of the results.
18
An examination of the p-values for Model3 reveals that evaluation least significantly contributes to model fit,
indicating that most respondents associate evaluation with effectiveness regardless of latent type. Indeed, the coding
did not distinguish between different types of evaluation, such as financial and programmatic, which appear to
define the clusters. Eliminating the effect of this single variable immediately lowers the L-squared bootstrap p-value
for the null model well below the conventional threshold (L-squared = 112.40, p = 0.01), confirming the dilution
interpretation noted above. Re-estimated latent class models with evaluation included as an inactive covariate
generate a virtually identical set of solutions, pointing to a virtually identical 3-class model as the preferred solution.
Thus, to simplify exposition Model3 may still be regarded as the preferred model.
19
The three lines inside the triangle intersect the three axes to indicate the latent class probabilities for outcome
accountability (Cluster1), overhead minimization (Cluster2) and outliers (Cluster3). These correspond to the
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estimated relative sizes of the three groups. The three lines converge at the point of zero coder bias, indicated by a
small triangle toward the bottom left corner of the diagram. Coders 1, 2, 3 and 5 are all very near to this point and do
not appear to be significantly biased. They are clustered along the horizontal axis with similar propensities toward
outcome accountability (greater than 0.8), overhead minimization (less than 0.2) and outliers (close to 0.0). Turning
to coder 4, we see the nature and direction of the bias. Coder 4 has the only significantly positive propensity toward
the outlier group (close to 0.2). Coder 4‘s lower propensity toward outcome accountability and higher propensity
toward overhead minimization can also be seen.
20
Coder 4 accounts for 23.00/28.38 = 81 percent.
21
Although even the reduced bias borders on significance (chi2(4) = 9.75, p = 0.045).
22
The residual significance is due almost entirely to coder 4‘s relative propensity toward overhead minimization and
aversion toward outcome accountability. Again, although the table is poorly populated, coder 4 appears to be
responsible for about 80 percent of the chi-squared statistic‘s magnitude. After modal classification and outlier
removal, about 85 percent of respondents are categorized as having defined effectiveness as outcome accountability
and about 15 percent as having defined it as overhead minimization. If coder 4 were eliminated altogether, the
proportions would adjust to about 89 percent and 11 percent respectively [146 – 22 = 124; (124 – 14)/124, (22 –
8)/124], indicating the maximum extent of coder 4‘s influence. Regardless of coder 4‘s residual bias, the substantive
interpretation remains the same.
23
Statistical significance is determined by -2LL difference tests using a parametric bootstrap procedure.
24
More accurately, the conditional probabilities are the probabilities that the transcripts contained qualitative
evidence justifying application of the corresponding codes.
25
All tests are performed at the conventional 0.05 level. The categories of sector are environment, human rights,
humanitarian relief, sustainable development and conflict resolution (chi2(4)=2.70, p=0.61). The categories Charity
Navigator‘s efficiency ratings are low (1 and 2 stars) and high (3 and 4 stars, chi2(1)=0.00, p=0.99). The categories
of Charity Navigator‘s capacity ratings are low (1 and 2 stars) and high (3 and 4 stars, chi2(1)=2.68, p=0.10). The
categories of function are advocacy, service and both (chi2(3)=2.85, p=0.42). The categories of headquarters
location are New York, NY, Washington, DC, Boston, MA, the West, the South and the Midwest (chi2(5)=5.16,
p=0.40). The categories of respondent‘s gender are male and female (chi2(1)=2.67, p=0.10). The categories of
tenure at current organization are measured in years: 0-1, 2-3, 4-5, 6-7, 8-9, and 10 or more (chi2(5)=8.80, p=0.12).
The categories of respondent‘s country of citizenship are US citizen and other citizenship (chi2(1)=1.68, p=0.20).
26
The chi-squared contribution of this cell is 6.1/9.11=0.67.
27
When asked about accountability, leaders were most likely to feel accountable to donors.
28
The L-squared p-value for the null model is 0.13, providing adequate model fit. Subsequent model specifications
failed to discover meaningful structure in the data, as model fit actually deteriorated with additional classes.
29
The leader‘s PMP is provided in chapter ten for his or her membership in the human rights activism cluster. This
may differ from the leader‘s PMP in the material amelioration cluster from chapter four.
30
EM switches to Newton-Raphson after a tolerance criterion is met.
31
For an evaluation of the software‘s performance (Latent GOLD), see: (Haughton, Legrand, & Woolford, 2009)

